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Abstract 
 
The role played by Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) in the global 
economy is becoming increasingly relevant as they shape sectorial, 
regional and national trajectories of economic development through their 
cross-border activities and behaviour. This thesis investigates how the 
characteristics of MNEs, their activities and location-specific attributes 
interact with each other and shape both behaviour and choices of MNEs 
and the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI). The thesis is 
structured into a general Introduction, aimed at guiding the reader 
throughout the thesis and providing a broad conceptual framework, and 
three analytical Parts focusing on (i) MNE greenfield investment location 
strategies, (ii) MNE selection decisions in cross-border acquisitions and 
(iii) impact of MNE operations on host regions.  
In Part I, the location behaviour of MNEs, in the light of the 
specificities of the recipient economies, is carefully analysed. In 
particular, the three Chapters of Part I investigate the location behaviour 
of European MNEs in a set of European Union (EU) neighbouring 
countries over the period 2003-2008, by focusing on different aspects of 
location strategies. In Chapter 1, an initial descriptive analysis is 
produced in order to account for the general determinants of MNE 
location behaviour. This chapter, therefore, offers a quantitative 
assessment of the main drivers of FDI in the EU neighbourhood and it 
also explores sectorial and functional dynamics. Chapter 2 deepens the 
study of MNE location behaviour by developing both a quantitative and a 
qualitative analysis of FDI determinants based on the experience of 
Italian MNEs operating in the EU neighbourhood. This mixed-methods 
approach allows integrating the general insights emerging from the 
analysis of the broad group of Italian investors with the in-depth case 
studies of two specific large Italian MNEs with a strong presence in EU 
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neighbouring countries in recent years. Subsequently, in Chapter 3, 
particular attention is devoted to the empirical analysis of the spatial 
distribution of MNE activities in relation to differences in terms of 
economic institutions of the host locations. This specific line of research 
is based on an innovative quantitative approach to the study of MNE 
location strategies in terms of greenfield FDI in the sample of 
neighbouring countries of the EU. In particular, Chapter 3 focuses on the 
heterogeneous location strategies of MNEs with respect to location 
attributes. Overall, the main findings of Part I of the thesis not only 
suggest that the traditional drivers of FDI emphasised in the existing 
literature, such as market access and cost-saving factors, still represent 
relevant elements for MNE behaviour, but it is also highlighted that MNE 
specificities are crucial to understand investment choices and that 
industry-wide differences can influence both entry modes and the 
location decisions of MNEs. The most innovative contribution of Part I, 
however, is related to Chapter 3, where the quantitative analysis of MNE 
location behaviour by means of Mixed Logit models suggests that MNEs 
have heterogeneous preferences with respect to location characteristics, 
especially economic institutions. This indicates that MNE strategies are 
highly diverse and the previous quantitative literature may have 
underestimated the complexity of the interaction between MNEs 
characteristics and location attributes. 
After exploring the determinants of MNE location strategies, Part II of 
the thesis aims at studying the selection decisions of MNEs engaging in 
cross-border acquisitions. This represents a very novel area of enquiry 
and the objective of Chapter 4 is to quantitatively assess the relevance of 
target firms’ attributes in shaping MNE acquisition choices in the 
framework of their international organisation of production. In 
particular, the aim of this Chapter is to assess whether acquisition 
decisions are associated to the search of strategic assets or to market 
access considerations. Results suggest that, in the sample of EU15 firms 
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under analysis in the period 1997-2013, the latter motivation tends to be 
more relevant. This is in line with market access motives operating at the 
firm level, differently from other studies on FDI and acquisitions focusing 
on the industry- or country-wide level of analysis. Evidence in favour of 
strategic-asset seeking strategies of MNEs acquiring European firms, 
instead, remains weak. Therefore, this Chapter highlights that domestic 
firms engaging in the generation of successful business linkages within 
or across national markets can represent a valuable target for MNE 
cross-border acquisition decisions.   
Finally, building on the previous sections on the determinants of 
location choices and selection patterns in cross-border takeovers, Part III 
of the thesis focuses on the impact of FDI on recipient areas in terms of 
their innovation potential. Chapter 5 is developed as a quantitative 
analysis with the specific objective of isolating the causal effect of MNE 
operations on the innovative performance of host regions. This is 
investigated by employing NUTS-3 level data on Italy for the period 2001-
2006. The empirical analysis is supported by the implementation of an 
Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy in order to tackle potential 
endogeneity bias in the estimation of FDI-induced spillovers. This 
Chapter contributes to the existing debate by focusing on the 
geographical level of FDI externalities, whereas the great majority of past 
studies mainly investigate industry-wide effects. Results suggest that the 
presence of FDI in a location contributes to fostering the innovative 
performance of the local economy. Therefore, MNEs can be seen as 
carriers of superior knowledge and new organisational practices that spill 
over space to the benefit of domestic firms. In a policy-making 
perspective, this provides a clear rationale for the attraction of FDI as an 
international channel for knowledge sourcing. 
The three Parts of the thesis are strongly complementary as the 
strategies of MNEs in Part I and II in terms of FDI (i.e. greenfield and 
acquisitions) are integrated with an assessment of the impact that 
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corporate activities have on recipient economies in Part III. Although the 
broad conceptual background to the work as a whole is provided in the 
general Introduction of the thesis, each Chapter has a section devoted to 
a dedicated and specific review of the literature. Moreover, the thesis also 
contains an acknowledgement of the limitations of the study, which is 
provided in the concluding sections of each Chapter, as well as a 
discussion of the contributions and implications that the analyses 
developed in the various Chapters have for academic research and 
policy-making. 
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Introduction 
 
I. Overview 
This thesis explores how Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) shape the 
international organisation of economic activity through Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), by focusing on a number of relevant aspects that are – 
to different extents – still partially addressed by existing studies, or 
subject to mixed and inconclusive empirical evidence. This thesis aims at 
filling some of the research gaps that characterise the literature, albeit 
this being vast and well-established. The thesis’ structure consists of the 
present introductory section and five empirical chapters divided into 
three conceptual parts associated with different aspects of MNE activity. 
Each chapter of the thesis includes an introduction, a scrutiny of the 
literature with a presentation of the hypotheses, a description of data 
and methodology, a discussion of results and a final section devoted to 
concluding remarks, limitations and future research directions. 
 
The relevance of MNEs in the global economy has dramatically 
increased in the last decades, as evidenced by the astonishing spur in 
the global growth rate of FDI since the mid-1980s and the consequent 
outpacing of world exports and nominal GDP growth rates. Figure 1 
illustrates this noticeable trend employing data from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the well-known 
international organisation that, in response to the unprecedented role 
played by MNEs in the world economy, inaugurated in 1991 a series of 
yearly studies to debate the characteristics, drivers and trends of FDI, 
and currently publishing the 25th edition of the World Investment Report. 
For the purpose of this thesis an MNE is intended in its simplest 
definition as a firm that engages in activities across national borders 
through FDI. In this respect, the firm undertaking FDI is the parent 
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company located in the country of origin, while the firm receiving the FDI 
is defined as foreign affiliate or subsidiary and it is located in the 
destination country1. At the simplest level, FDI modes can be classified 
into greenfield investment and cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). The former encompasses the establishment a completely new 
plant in a foreign location, whereas the latter entails the acquisition of a 
certain stake of ownership in a pre-existing company abroad.  
The objective of this introductory section is to provide a general 
background framework for the thesis, describe its motivation, explain the 
research aims and illustrate the structure and main content of the 
various chapters. In particular, the next section discusses the basic 
ideas that underpin the conceptualisation of MNEs in academic research. 
Subsequently, the structure of the thesis is described and a summary of 
each chapter’s objective, results and original contribution is offered. 
Finally, a concluding section summarises the inner logic of the thesis, its 
novelty and outlines some directions for future research. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
II. Broad conceptual framework 
The existence and importance of MNEs has received the attention of 
scholars for decades, even before the enormous global increase in 
multinational activity. A plethora of conceptual explanations, drawing on 
diverse theoretical traditions, has been provided over the years to 
understand and analyse the behaviour and strategies of MNEs. A 
fundamental theoretical and empirical puzzle that academic research has 
attempted to solve is associated to the existence of firms that decide to 
become multinational. The tentative explanations of this aspect have 
                                                 
1
 For the purpose of this thesis we use the notions of foreign affiliate and foreign subsidiary 
interchangeably. 
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been underpinned by numerous hypotheses formulated over time. The 
aim of this section is to review the main conceptual contributions to this 
debate in order to provide a general framework for the various chapters 
of the thesis, where more detailed aspects of MNEs will be analysed. 
Therefore, this section will clarify the conceptual factors that have been 
hypothesised by scholars as crucial for MNEs to exist, while the specific 
conceptual frameworks associated to the distinct aspects investigated in 
this thesis are developed in dedicated sections within the various 
chapters.  
 
The seminal work of Hymer (1976/1960) and Kindleberger (1969) 
provides the starting point for a conceptualisation that explains 
consistently why some firms engage in cross-border activities. Their basic 
insight is that domestic firms tend to have specific advantages over 
foreign firms when serving their domestic market. These advantages are 
embodied in the domestic nature of local firms and range from better 
information about the local economy and customers’ tastes to greater 
familiarity with the political and legal system. Hence, foreign firms that 
wish to operate in foreign markets have to offset their disadvantages over 
domestic actors by increasing their efficiency. This is possible through 
the acquisition of firm-specific advantages, which may vary from 
economies of scale and product differentiation, to technological 
advantages and access to cheaper factors of production. While insightful, 
this conceptualisation does not help to explain why firms decide to locate 
in a foreign country. In fact, even if foreign firms have specific 
advantages over domestic firms, they may prefer to serve distant markets 
by exports.  
Another seminal contribution to the economic theory of MNEs is the 
product life-cycle model of Vernon (1966, 1979). He considers three main 
stages of a product life-cycle. First, when a product is new it is mostly 
produced and sold by the most innovative firms in the home country 
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(normally a developed country). In the second stage, the product becomes 
mature and it is exported. In this phase, demand grows in foreign 
markets and the firm may decide to invest abroad to serve those markets 
locally: thus, in this stage production gradually moves to foreign 
countries (mainly other developed economies). Third, the product is 
standardised and more firms are able to produce it. As a consequence, 
price competition leads firms to invest in locations that make a reduction 
in production costs possible (mainly developing countries). While this 
theory provides an insightful conceptualisation of MNEs in innovative 
industries, it does not offer a strong explanation for FDI in lower 
technology sectors. Furthermore, this theory entails a simplistic and 
reductive view of the innovation process, overlooking the complexity of 
MNE innovative activities (Iammarino and McCann, 2013) 
The occurrence of FDI has also been explored in terms of attempts of 
firms to limit the market power of their competitors. According to this 
hypothesis, oligopolistic firms follow similar FDI strategies as a way to 
countering the advantages of other competing firms. Therefore, foreign 
investment is considered as an oligopolistic reaction with the aim of 
offsetting the competitive edge of similar firms (e.g. Knickerbrocker, 
1973; Flowers 1976; Yu and Ito, 1988). An important limitation of this 
theory is that its logic implies that more intense competition on world 
markets is very likely to lead to less oligopolistic reaction and, as a 
consequence, lower volumes of FDI. However, direct observation of world 
trends shows that nowadays there is stronger competition and higher 
volumes of FDI.  
A highly relevant contribution to the explanation of why firms become 
multinationals is provided by the hypothesis of internalisation of external 
markets (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Casson, 1979; Rugman, 1981). 
Fundamentally, the existence of imperfect markets implies higher costs 
to link activities and exchanges across geographically separate markets. 
Hence, firms decide to internalise these markets within their 
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organisational structure and to operate exchanges within the boundaries 
of the firm across national borders. In other words, firms become 
multinationals in order to avoid imperfections such as market 
uncertainty, wastes of time and resources and asymmetric information. 
In this sense, some firms prefer to open a subsidiary in another country 
and to trade with it rather than licensing to local firms or exporting.  
Underpinned by the insight of Hymer and Kindleberger on firm-
specific advantages and the idea of internalisation of external markets, 
Dunning (1977, 1980 and 1988) elaborate the most widely accepted and 
comprehensive economic framework of the origin of MNEs. His well-
known OLI eclectic paradigm entails that firms must satisfy three 
conditions to become multinationals: (i) they have to possess owner-
specific advantages (O), (ii) some location-specific advantages should be 
available (L) and (iii) they have to find profitable to internalise the use of 
ownership advantages (I). This seminal conceptualisation made by 
Dunning still provides a coherent and well-established answer to the 
issue of the existence of MNEs. The existence of ownership-specific 
advantages (O) possessed by some firms may lead to the decision to 
internalise (I) these advantages and to locate in foreign markets as a way 
to maximize their productive efficiency and to limit the impact of 
uncertain and imperfect markets on production. In other words, FDI 
occurs when firms possess assets of their own, and consider as more 
convenient to internalise the use of such advantages rather than selling 
or sub-contracting them to external companies. At the same time, these 
firms decide to locate abroad where location-specific factors (L) allow for 
a more profitable utilisation of the afore-mentioned ownership 
advantages. In this perspective the (O), the (L) and the (I) are all 
fundamental conceptual categories to explain the existence of MNEs and 
the reasons why they undertake foreign investments. As a matter of fact, 
according to Dunning himself “the OLI triad of variables […] may be 
likened to three-legged stool: each leg is supportive of the other, and the 
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stool is only functional if the three legs are evenly balanced” (Dunning, 
2009:5). The eclectic OLI paradigm, therefore, provides a convincing and 
flexible conceptualisation of MNE existence and behaviour, although 
being lacking under other aspects. For instance, the geography of MNEs 
remains loosely specified in its (L) advantages, calling for further for 
investigation (Iammarino and McCann, 2013).  
More recently, the study of MNE has also grown in the international 
trade literature, where the combination of the Krugman (1980) model 
based on product differentiation and monopolistic competition with the 
notion of firm heterogeneity (Melitz, 2003) has allowed to overcoming 
formal problems in modelling MNE activity. In this respect, a relevant 
implication of firm heterogeneity for the study of MNE is related to the 
intra-industry diversity of internationalisation modes as a response to 
differences in the accumulation of knowledge across MNEs (Castellani 
and Zanfei, 2006).  
 
III. Aim and structure of the thesis 
While the academic literature studying the operations of MNEs is 
large, this thesis identifies a number of research gaps associated with 
specific aspects of multinational activity. The specific contribution that 
the thesis will offer to the academic debate is discussed in each of the 
chapters that constitute the main body of this work. Nevertheless, in 
explaining the general structure and aims of the thesis, this section will 
briefly discuss the main points of novelty developed in the various 
chapters. In general, this work contributes to the literature on MNEs and 
FDI and, particularly, on the different streams of research that mainly 
contribute to this topic, such as economic geography, international 
economics and international business and management studies. 
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As mentioned above, the thesis is divided into three main parts 
containing five chapters. The first part contains three chapters while the 
remaining two parts are constituted by one chapter each.  
 
Part I - MNE location strategies 
In the first part, this thesis examines the location behaviour of 
European MNEs with respect to a number of drivers that are under-
explored in the literature. The first chapter offers an explorative analysis 
of MNE location choices in countries linked to the ‘core’ of the European 
Union (EU-15) by different degrees of functional, economic and political 
integration: the EU 'New' Member states, Accession and Candidate 
countries, European Neighbourhood Policy countries, as well as Russia. 
Understanding the drivers of Foreign Investment (FDI) in these countries 
is highly relevant in consideration of their increasing integration into the 
global market and the strong influence exerted by the EU on this 
process. By employing data on individual greenfield investment projects, 
this chapter aims at disentangling the drivers of FDI in these countries 
for different industrial sectors, business functions and investment 
origins. The empirical results suggest that FDI in the area tends to follow 
market-seeking and efficiency-oriented strategies, and show path-
dependency and concentration patterns that may reinforce core-
periphery development trajectories in the EU neighbourhood.  
The second chapter narrows the analysis down to a specific case 
study of an ‘old’ EU member country, Italy, investing in the same 
destination area analysed in the first chapter. In so doing, this second 
chapter adopts a mixed methods strategy combining a descriptive 
statistical analysis with interviews with selected MNEs. Thus, the 
analysis investigates the economic integration between Italy and the EU 
neighbouring countries by exploring the location drivers of Italian-owned 
MNEs in 33 destination economies including the New Member States of 
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the EU and the European Neighbouring countries. The paper compares 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking motivations with asset-seeking 
strategies. The quantitative analysis assess the location determinants of 
518 Italian MNEs that invested in the area in the 2003-2008 period, 
while qualitative information on strategic location decisions is collected 
by means of in-depth interviews with executives in two of the largest 
Italian MNEs active in the region. The evidence suggests that market-
seeking considerations are still predominant drivers of Italian MNE 
location decisions in EU Neighbouring Countries, together with resource-
seeking motivations. However, different MNEs are developing diversified 
strategies to increase their access to these areas which are of increasing 
interest for global investors. 
The third chapter offers the most structured analysis of MNE location 
behaviour looking at a neglected factor in the literature. This chapter, in 
fact, examines how the location behaviour of MNEs is shaped by the 
economic institutions of the host countries. The analysis still covers a 
wide set of geographically proximate economies with different degrees of 
integration with the ‘Old’ 15 European Union members: New Member 
States, Accession and Candidate Countries, as well as European 
Neighbourhood Policy countries and the Russian Federation. The 
analysis aims at shedding light on the heterogeneity of MNE preferences 
for the host countries’ regulatory settings (including labour market and 
business regulation), legal aspects (i.e. protection of property rights and 
contract enforcement) and the extent of government intervention in the 
economy. By employing data on 6,888 greenfield investment projects, the 
random-coefficient Mixed Logit analysis here applied shows that, while 
the quality of the national institutional framework is generally beneficial 
for the attraction of foreign investment, MNEs preferences over economic 
institutions are highly heterogeneous across sectors and business 
functions.  
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Part II – Selection patterns in cross-border acquisitions 
After exploring the determinants of MNEs location decisions, this 
chapter addresses the patterns of selection of cross-border acquisition 
operations undertaken by MNEs. This represents a very novel area of 
enquiry and the objective of this chapter is to quantitatively assess the 
relevance of target firms’ attributes in shaping the acquisition choices of 
MNEs in the framework of their international organisation of production. 
By employing firm-level data on EU-15 countries, this fourth chapter 
studies the extent to which different firm-level attributes of domestic 
target companies motivate cross-border takeovers. In so doing, this work 
analyses changes in ownership from domestic to foreign in a sample of 
more than 300,000 firms in EU-15 countries over the period 1997-2013, 
focusing in particular on the productivity of target firms as well as their 
ability to establish successful market linkages. Results suggest that 
selection on target firms’ profitability systematically drives MNE 
strategies of cross-border takeovers: that is, domestic firms that 
experience an increase in their business have a higher probability of 
being acquired in any given year. By contrast, firm efficiency, in terms of 
labour productivity, does not relate to international acquisition decisions, 
but the effect of firm profitability tends to be concentrated in the group of 
more efficient firms. These findings are confirmed also by employing 
different measures of firm performance. Baseline results still hold across 
a large number of checks and extensions, indicating that within-firm 
differences in profitability are relevant drivers of cross-border 
acquisitions.  
 
Part III – The impact of FDI on recipient economies 
Finally, building on previous chapters on the determinants of location 
choices and selection patterns in cross-border takeovers, the third part of 
the thesis focuses on the impact of FDI on recipient areas in terms of 
24 
 
their innovation potential. This analysis is developed as a quantitative 
study having the objective of isolating the causal effect of MNE 
operations on the innovative performance of host regions. In this respect, 
this fifth chapter studies the extent to which knowledge externalities 
arising from FDI foster local innovative performance. The quantitative 
analysis is developed by employing manufacturing data on Italian 
provinces over the period 2001-2006 with the specific objective of 
investigating the causal impact of inward FDI on the local generation of 
innovation. Adopting a Knowledge Production Function approach (KPF), 
the chapter suggests that in the case of Italy the presence of foreign 
investment is beneficial for the innovative performance of the recipient 
local economies. These results are robust to a number of checks, thus 
contributing with new evidence to the literature on the impact of FDI on 
destination countries. In terms of policy consideration, this implies that a 
structured policy for the attraction of external capital might channel 
additional sources of knowledge to complement local capabilities. 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
This thesis focuses on the study of MNE activities in the global 
economy, providing a comprehensive and novel examination of specific 
aspects of corporate operations of crucial relevance for academic and 
policy purposes. In this respect, the thesis is comprehensive since it 
covers both determinants and impacts of MNE activities and FDI, 
considering not only the viewpoint of MNEs but also that of recipient 
economies and domestic firms. The thesis also provides an original 
contribution since it identifies new areas of enquiry within the vast and 
well-established literature on MNEs, by asking novel research questions 
and/or by combining original data sources, methodologies and 
conceptual perspectives to address existing questions on which empirical 
evidence remains mixed or inconclusive. 
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The three parts of the thesis are complementary in addressing various 
and interconnected aspects of MNE strategies and behaviour, thus 
developing and following an imaginary fil rouge that starts from the 
analysis of the location decisions of MNEs undertaking greenfield FDI, 
crossing the patterns of selection in the decisions of MNEs engaging in 
cross-border acquisitions, and ending with the examination of the impact 
of FDI on host economies’ innovative capacity at a detailed geographical 
level. In general, what emerges from the various chapters is that the role 
played by MNEs in the global economy is increasingly relevant and that 
these actors are able to shape the patterns of international investment 
and, ultimately, the trajectories of economic development at both 
national and subnational level. The continuous re-organisation of 
international production in response to MNE strategies and behaviour, 
therefore, deserves further analysis as far as most of the aspects 
addressed in this thesis are concerned, including MNE heterogeneous 
preferences with respect to location-specific attributes such as economic 
institutions, MNE selection strategies underpinning cross-border 
takeovers, and the long-standing but still inconclusive issue of FDI-
induced localised knowledge spillovers. In this sense, this thesis 
contributes to pave the way for further research on aspects of MNEs and 
FDI that are in part overlooked by existing studies or subject to 
conceptual and empirical controversy. 
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Figure 1: Growth of FDI, trade and GDP in the world, 1970-2010 
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Chapter 1 - The geography of foreign 
investments in the EU Neighbourhood  
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the past decades the world economy has been characterised by 
an increasing process of internationalisation of economic activities with 
the involvement of a growing number of countries. According to 
UNCTAD, the world stock of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2010 has 
reached $20 trillion dollars, while the figure for the first half of the 1980s 
was below one trillion.2 The dramatic expansion of international 
investment represents one of the main features of the process of 
globalisation, in which developing and transition economies have been 
progressively more involved (e.g. Moran, 1999; Asiedu, 2002; Iammarino 
and McCann, 2013). 
 
This paper aims to explore the geographical patterns of FDI in a set of 
developing and transition economies linked to the 'core' of the European 
Union (EU-15) by different degrees of functional, economic and political 
integration, and that will be broadly referred to as the ‘EU 
neighbourhood’. Such an area embraces the EU New Member States 
(NMs) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (strongest degree of 
integration with the 'core' of the EU-15), Accession and Candidate 
Countries (ACC), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries, and 
Russia (the latter with the weakest degree of integration with the EU-15, 
stronger autonomy, but crucially important 'gravitation point' for 
investments in the area).3 This group of countries represents a very 
                                                 
2
 http://unctadstat.unctad.org. 
3
 NMs: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; ACC: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia (which joined the EU in 2013), Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey; ENP Southern: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Syria, Tunisia; ENP Eastern: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine. 
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relevant case in terms of patterns of FDI and strategies of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) for its geographical proximity as well as its political 
and economic links to the EU-15 economic core. In this respect, the 
paper offers some new insights on the dynamics of global investment in 
the EU neighbourhood. While this region is relatively under-explored in 
the existing literature on FDI, its importance from a policy perspective is 
rapidly increasing. Policy-makers at the EU and national level are 
especially interested in gaining a better understanding of FDI patterns 
(and their drivers): the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
intensification of economic and institutional relationships with other 
important actors in the area (such as the Russian Federation and 
Turkey, among others) have made apparent the huge potential of the 
entire region in terms of future economic development and integration 
through global value chains. Furthermore, the attractiveness of these 
economies for international investment is of special interest because of 
their relatively recent access to global markets that has often been 
coupled with (or mediated by) a close relationship with the European 
Union, making them unique case studies for the analysis of the 
interaction between globalisation and regionalisation processes. As a 
consequence, from the standpoint of academic research, the investigation 
of MNE behaviour in terms of investment strategies in the EU 
neighbourhood has a particular relevance for a better understanding of 
the economic, social and geographical processes that connect global and 
local actors.  
 
This paper is based on data on individual greenfield investments in 
the EU neighbourhood over the 2003-2008 period and investigates three 
main aspects of the interaction between recipient countries and global 
capital flows. First, the analysis aims to single out which national 
characteristics are relevant for attracting global FDI into the EU 
neighbourhood. Second, the paper examines the role of different FDI 
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determinants across sectors and business activities in order to shed new 
light on the heterogeneous effect of different characteristics of the 
recipient economies on investments of different nature. Third, the 
analysis investigates whether FDI originating from different areas of the 
world responds differently to national features and concentration 
patterns.  
 
The next section provides a brief overview of the empirical research 
that has explored FDI determinants in the EU neighbourhood, while 
Section 3 offers a detailed picture of FDI patterns in this area. Section 4 
introduces the drivers of FDI considered in the econometric section and 
explains the methodology. The main findings are presented and 
discussed in Section 5, whilst Section 6 concludes.  
 
1.2 Literature background: the drivers of FDI 
into the EU neighbourhood 
In recent years, the intensity of the political and economic relations 
between the EU-15 and its neighbouring countries has increased 
substantially. However, the EU relations with its neighbours have been 
far from homogeneous, considering the remarkable differences among 
these countries. Some ex-socialist Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) succeeded in joining the Union in the enlargement 
rounds of 2004 and 2007, while others are still candidate to accession. 
In addition, a heterogeneous group of countries geographically bordering 
the EU has become part of the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy, 
a unified framework aiming at generating peaceful and collaborative 
relationships between the EU and its border countries (Commission of 
the European Communities, 2004). 
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Notwithstanding the variety of economies involved – to different 
degrees – in this process, the attention of most existing studies on FDI 
and their determinants in the area has been focused on CEECs (i.e. the 
countries that gained full EU membership in the 2000s and that are here 
called New Member states – NMs).4 Most existing studies looked at FDI 
flows in the NMs in order to understand whether (and to what extent) 
increasing economic integration can influence FDI drivers. The reason for 
the special attention devoted to this sub-group of countries by the 
existing academic literature is threefold. First, the EU enlargement has 
provided scholars with unprecedented settings for the study of FDI 
patterns. Second, these analyses responded to the widespread concerns 
for the growing de-localisation (and potential job loss) away from the 'old' 
EU members in favour of CEECs (e.g. Boeri and Brücker, 2001). The 
third reason is related to data availability: not only NMs have received a 
much larger share of FDI than all other countries in the EU 
neighbourhood, but empirical analyses have also been fuelled by more 
accessible and comparatively more reliable data.   
 
What emerges from the literature on the determinants of FDI in NMs 
is that internal demand, market potential and labour costs are 
fundamental aspects that foreign firms consider in their investment 
decisions (Resmini, 2000; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Janicki et al., 
2004; Bellak et al., 2008). Other relevant elements for FDI attraction 
include proximity to the EU (Bevan and Estrin, 2004), deepening 
economic integration (Brenton et al., 1999), good institutions (Bevan et 
al., 2004) and tax incentives (Bellak and Leibrecht, 2009). Interestingly 
for the aims of the present paper, Resmini (2000) develops an empirical 
model taking into account sectoral differences in attracting FDI in NMs: 
her findings suggest that the responsiveness of FDI to national 
                                                 
4
 As Croatia joined the EU on the 1
st
 of July 2013, in this paper it is considered Accession country and 
included in the ACC group. 
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characteristics differs substantially across industries. This insight is 
corroborated by the results of Pusterla and Resmini (2007), showing that 
sector-specific drivers influence the investment decisions of foreign 
companies in NMs. The present paper offers a similar perspective for 
countries of the EU neighbourhood, further extending the analysis to 
business functions, following Crescenzi et al. (2014). 
 
In sharp contrast with the abundance of studies on NMs, FDI 
patterns in the EU neighbourhood are much less explored in the 
literature. The limited number of studies on the area converges in 
suggesting that 'traditional' FDI determinants matter the most in this 
context. For instance, studies on the subnational determinants of FDI in 
Turkey suggest that local demand and agglomeration forces are very 
relevant drivers of FDI (Deichman et al., 2003). FDI in the Balkan region 
tends to be encouraged by low labour cost (Louri et al., 2000) and 
political and economic reforms (Sergi, 2004). Some contributions have 
investigated the determinants of FDI in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MENA) countries, showing that growing markets, human capital 
and low risk environments exert a strong attractive influence on global 
investment (Moosa, 2009). The role of market size, trade opportunities 
and institutional variables, along with the availability of natural 
resources, is confirmed by other studies on FDI in MENA countries 
(Hisarciklilar et al., 2006; Mohamed and Sidiropoulos, 2010). Recent 
work by Zvirgzde et al. (2013) on Ukrainian survey data argues that FDI 
in the capital region are mostly market-seeking, and also motivated by 
institutional factors, while FDI in western areas are attracted by the 
proximity to the EU. A strong market-oriented rationale for FDI is also 
found by studies on Russia (Fabry and Zeghni, 2002; Ledayeva, 2009); in 
addition, in the latter case FDI is motivated by both resource-seeking 
strategies and availability of physical infrastructure such as sea ports 
(Ledayeva, 2009). 
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Overall, although the literature on FDI determinants has devoted 
limited attention to the EU neighbourhood, at least in comparison to 
other emerging areas such as China, India or Latin America, existing 
contributions point out that most FDI in the region follows market 
and/or efficiency-seeking rationales.  
 
1.3 Stylised facts on FDI in the EU 
neighbourhood 
In order to broaden the perspective of the existing literature and cover 
both the EU NMs and the broadly defined neighbourhood of the Union 
this paper makes use of homogenous and comparable data on individual 
investment projects undertaken by MNEs in 34 countries in the period 
2004-2008.5 The source of data is FDi Markets-Financial Times Business, 
which represents an increasingly exploited tool of analysis in the 
literature on FDI determinants and location choices (e.g. Crescenzi et al., 
2014).6 Greenfield investments from the entire world into the EU NMs 
and neighbourhood are used to investigate country-level drivers of FDI 
decisions. In what follows we present some descriptive evidence in order 
to contextualize the subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
[Table 1.1 here] 
 
                                                 
5
 Although FDi Markets provides data since 2003, in the present work we consider only the period 2004-
2008. This is due to the econometric exercise requiring lagged independent variables for which data are not 
available prior 2003 (see Section 4 below). 
6
 FDI is identified by Financial Times’ analysts through a wide variety of sources, including nearly 9,000 
media sources, project data provided from over 1,000 industry organisations and investment agencies, and 
data purchased from market research and publication companies. Furthermore, each project is cross-
referenced across multiple sources and more than 90% of investment projects are validated with company 
sources. The dataset is by construction a sample of global FDI, and it is therefore likely to be skewed 
towards the larger firms and projects. However, Crescenzi et al. (2014) show that investment decisions 
captured by this database are highly correlated with other macro-level data on FDI from UNCTAD and the 
World Bank.  
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As is mentioned above, the EU neighbourhood, as considered here, is 
a highly heterogeneous region. NMs have joined the EU in two 
subsequent enlargement rounds in 2004 and 2007, ACC are EU 
candidate or potential candidate, while a large group is involved in the 
ENP, with the exception of Russia. These different degrees of integration 
with the EU signal the large variation in economic and political features 
across the region, as well as in the extent of attractiveness towards global 
capital flows. 
Table 1.1 reports new foreign investments undertaken in the EU 
neighbourhood over the period 2004-2008 by global MNEs. Over half of 
total FDI flows in the area are directed to NMs (52.18%), while ACC, ENP 
Southern and ENP Eastern economies all exhibit lower and similar 
shares: 10.03%, 11.92% and 8.0%, respectively. A relevant share is, 
instead, targeting Russia, which receives 18.11% of total global FDI 
directed in the area. Considering individual countries rather than 
groups, Russia is the most attractive destination for FDI, followed at 
large distance by Romania (11.91%), Poland (9.26%) and Hungary 
(7.16%). In the ACC group, Turkey and Serbia are the most preferred 
destinations, with 3.87% and 2.68% respectively. 
In the ENP Southern region, Morocco and Egypt play a leading role 
with 2.39% and 2.25% of total FDI, whilst in the ENP Eastern region 
Ukraine attracts the great majority of investments with 4.67% of the 
total. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of global FDI 
distribution in the EU neighbourhood over the period 2004-2008. 
 
[Figure 1.1 here] 
 
There are different motives behind investment decisions and they are 
intimately connected to the functions and sectors in which MNEs operate 
their foreign activities. Although the original dataset reports several 
typologies of business functions and a large number of industrial sectors, 
35 
 
due to the low number of observations in some countries for certain 
activities and industries, data are aggregated into three groups of 
business functions and two broad economic sectors. With respect to the 
former, Table 1.2 presents figures on investment in the following broad 
functional categories: (i) Headquarter and Innovation activities (HQ & 
Inno); (ii) Sales, Marketing, Logistic and Distribution (SMLD) and (iii) 
Production. Table 1.3 instead provides an outlook on the macrosectoral 
aggregations: (i) Manufacturing and (ii) Services. 
Table 1.2 shows that NMs attract the large majority of FDI in all 
business functions. However, Russia remains the single most important 
country in terms of attractiveness across all functions. Surprisingly, ENP 
Southern countries receive a relatively large share of FDI in 
Headquarters and Innovative activities (16.7%), due in particular to the 
large role played by Israel (3.8%). Among NMs, Romania attracts the 
largest share of FDI in all business functions, while Turkey and Serbia 
lead the ACC group. As far as ENP Eastern is concerned, Ukraine 
unsurprisingly plays the most relevant role. What emerges from these 
figures is that global FDI tends to be concentrated in a few locations 
across the EU neighbourhood, and that variations in foreign investors’ 
preferences exist according to different business functions. For instance, 
Poland is one of the main destinations of global FDI in the area, but only 
5.9% is in Headquarters and Innovation, while the share almost doubles 
when looking at FDI in Production activities.  
 
[Table 1.2 here] 
 
Table 1.3 reports the distribution of FDI towards the EU 
neighbourhood for the two industrial macro-aggregates, which also show 
remarkable differences. FDI in manufacturing concentrates in NMs 
(56.3%), whilst the attractiveness of ENP Eastern, ENP Southern and 
ACC groups in this respect is relatively weak (5.8%, 8.7% and 9.5%, 
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respectively); the Russian Federation alone attracts 19.7% of 
manufacturing FDI. As far as service activities are concerned, the shares 
of ENP Southern and ENP Eastern are higher (14.8% and 9.9% 
respectively) while NMs still attract about half the volume of service FDI 
(47.9%). 
 
[Table 1.3 here] 
 
 
1.4 FDI in the EU neighbourhood: methodology  
In order to investigate the role (and relative importance) of national 
characteristics for the attraction of FDI in the EU neighbourhood, this 
paper relies upon regression techniques. In particular, following the 
literature on the quantitative analysis of MNE location, the empirical 
analysis relies on a count data model where national characteristics 
explain the number of FDI projects received by each country in each 
year.7 With a count response variable, it is customary to employ a 
Poisson regression technique. However, we detect over-dispersion in our 
count variable, which makes this methodology less appropriate: we 
therefore apply a negative binomial model, which allows us to adjust 
estimates for over-dispersed data8 9. The time span covers the period 
2004-2008 and includes a total of 11,262 greenfield FDI. In line with the 
relevant literature, independent variables enter the analysis with a one-
year lag, as specified below. Thus, data for 2003 are employed to 
construct lagged explanatory variables. 
 
                                                 
7
 Alternatively, a conditional logit model can be adopted, as common in similar studies. Nevertheless, the 
equivalence of the coefficients provided by these classes of models is well established in the literature 
(Guimarães et al., 2003).  
8
 An additional problem with count data models can derive from the large number of zeros in the data. 
However, this is not a relevant issue in our dataset. 
9
 We also run a Poisson regression (not reported here) which confirmed the main results of the Negative 
Binomial. 
37 
 
The following empirical model is estimated: 
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡−1, 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖) 
 
Where:  
 
FDIit is the count of foreign investment in destination country i in year 
t.  
Demandit-1 represents internal market size and external market 
potential (MP) of country i in year t-1; both variables enter the model in 
log form. The size of the market in the host economies is viewed as a 
major driver of FDI (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Billington, 1999). The 
larger the national market in the recipient country, the larger the local 
demand for goods and services and, consequently, market opportunities 
for the investor. National GDP at constant prices (US dollars 2005) is 
included as a proxy, with one-year lag, and comes from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank.  
FDI might also be aimed at exploiting external market potential (e.g. 
Head and Mayer, 2004; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004): in other words, 
some countries can play the role of platforms for exports towards other 
proximate locations. In order to control for countries’ external market 
potential we follow the literature (Harris, 1954) and compute the 
following indicator: 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 = ∑ (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐
𝑑𝑖𝑐
⁄ )
𝑐≠𝑖
 
 
where market potential (MP) of location i is the distance-weighted 
internal demand of neighbouring countries c. This indicator is included 
in the analysis with a one-year lag. 
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Institutionsit-1 stands for ‘Control of corruption’ in country i in year t-1. 
This part of the model tests whether FDI is sensitive to national 
institutional environments, which are highly heterogeneous in the EU 
neighbourhood. Institutions are proxied with a measure that captures a 
very relevant aspect of the national environment when considering the 
strategies of foreign investors, namely ‘Control of corruption’ as provided 
by the World Bank in its World Governance Indicators (WGI). As for 
previous variables, institutions enter the analysis with a one-year lag. As 
is suggested by the existing literature, we expect that good institutional 
quality plays a positive role in attracting foreign capital since it increases 
certainty in market transactions and stability (e.g. Altomonte, 2000; Wei, 
2000; Bénassy Quéré et al., 2007). 
 
Labourit-1 includes proxies for the education level and average wage in 
country i in year t-1. This section of the model looks at the 
characteristics of the workforce and labour market. First, a measure of 
the average education level in the host economy is included, that is the 
ratio between secondary school age population and total population 
provided by UNESCO. This is the only available measure of education for 
the countries of interest. In line with studies highlighting the beneficial 
effects of human capital on FDI attraction, we expect that this indicator 
is positively linked to inward FDI (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001). Second, we 
include per capita GDP as a proxy for average wage employing data on 
GDP and population from WDI (Alsan et al., 2006). Although this is an 
indirect measure for salaries, wages for most countries under 
observation are not available. We expect that higher values of this 
indicator discourage foreign investors, since saving on input costs 
represents a strong rationale for FDI in emerging and developing 
economies (Resmini, 2000).  
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Colocationit includes several stock variables for FDI in country i 
calculated as a cumulative count according to country of origin, sector 
and business function, all expressed in log. These variables capture the 
extent to which foreign investments co-locate in the same country; that 
is, using data at the investment level, we generate the stock of all FDI 
with similar characteristics to those of each specific investment (e.g. 
Defever, 2006). Then, when constructing our dataset at the country level, 
we consider the cumulative average stock of FDI in a specific country in 
a specific year. The FDi Markets database allows constructing stock 
measures of FDI according to (i) nationality of the investor, (ii) sector and 
(iii) business function. We are thus able to investigate the importance of 
similar FDI in determining new flows of investment, exploring FDI path-
dependency along these three different dimensions. Similarly, two 
additional stock variables are built by crossing both sectors and business 
functions with information on origin countries, allowing to test whether 
FDI in one sector or business activity originated from a certain country 
attracts more FDI with similar features.  
Finally, Pi is a set of country dummies included in order to account 
for any factor not explicitly controlled for in the model that might have an 
effect on countries’ attractiveness towards global FDI. These include any 
time-invariant country-level driver of FDI such as geographical and 
cultural characteristics. The full list of variables is reported in Appendix 
A. 
 
1.5 Results  
The first objective of our empirical exercise is to analyse the relevance 
of different FDI determinants in the EU neighbourhood. Therefore, we 
estimate a negative binomial model by including all FDI directed towards 
the 34 countries in the area of interest over the period 2004-2008.  
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[Table 1.4 here] 
 
The results of this first estimation are reported in Table 1.4. The 
coefficients are mostly in line with expectations, and consistent across 
different model specifications. Traditional drivers of FDI, such as size of 
the internal market and external market potential, are strongly and 
positively correlated with the decision to undertake new investments. 
This confirms that global FDI flows towards the EU NMs and 
neighbourhood have a prominent market-seeking rationale. In other 
words, MNE strategies in the area are strongly based upon market access 
considerations in terms of both the exploitation of domestic demand in 
the recipient economies and the opportunity to constitute platforms for 
exports towards third countries (see Neary, 2007). As far as the national 
institutional environment is concerned, ‘Control of corruption’ exhibits a 
positive and weakly significant relationship with FDI in only two 
specifications out of five: overall, according to this first set of results, 
global investors do not appear overly concerned about choosing locations 
where the institutional setting confers stability to their operations and 
transactions.  
 
With respect to workforce characteristics, the model does not detect 
any relevant relationship between FDI and education level, indicating 
that, in general, MNEs do not invest in the EU neighbourhood in order to 
take advantage of local competences. Conversely, our proxy for wage 
levels reveals that investors look for cheap labour in the region. The 
robustness of the coefficient on this feature across all specifications 
suggests an efficiency-seeking rationale for foreign companies investing 
in the area. This indicates that the conclusions reached by previous 
studies arguing that cost-saving on labour is among the main drivers for 
FDI in CEECs (Resmini, 2000) may be extended to the broader EU 
neighbourhood. 
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As far as FDI path-dependency is concerned, we enter the different 
colocation variables separately given the high level of correlation among 
them. The first three columns test the relevance of colocation patterns 
associated with common nationality of the investor, sector and business 
function respectively. Columns 4 and 5, instead, test the effect of 
colocation of FDI in the same sector and business by nationality. Results 
in Table 1.4 suggest that FDI tends to follow previous investment flows 
with similar features, with the only exception of functional colocation. 
Moreover, regressions in columns 4 and 5 indicate that FDI from the 
same country of origin tends to select the same location according to 
their sector and business activity performed abroad. 
 
Foreign investment might be motivated by different determinants 
depending on the specific function operated abroad or the particular 
sector in which the FDI is undertaken. Therefore, we run separate 
regressions for the three types of business functions (Table 1.5) and the 
two macro-aggregates of economic activity (Table 1.6).  
 
[Table 1.5 here] 
 
As is shown in Table 1.5, when considering the number of FDI in 
specific business functions as response variable, FDI patterns are 
significantly associated with a smaller number of determinants, which 
are particularly important for a specific function. Therefore, in the case of 
‘HQ & Inno’, the education level of countries appears to be the main 
relevant driver of FDI. This is not surprising considering that activities in 
‘HQ and Inno’ are likely to be related to higher skill-intensity. Conversely, 
in the case of ‘SMLD’ results suggest that a lower level of education is 
attractive of FDI, plausibly signalling that these activities require less 
skilled workers. As far as Production activities are concerned, a 
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favourable institutional environment plays a major role in driving FDI 
patterns in the EU neighbourhood. With respect to colocation variables, 
path-dependency in FDI inflows emerges clearly in the case Production. 
This is not surprising considering that production activities are likely to 
be associated with the occurrence of agglomeration economies and 
localised backward and forward linkages. However, in the case of ‘HQ & 
Inno’ the coefficients turn out to be negative and significant: this might 
be due to the fact that, while corporate headquarters tend to concentrate 
in large urban agglomerations (particularly capital cities) mainly for 
political networking and lobbying reasons, this is not normally the case 
for innovation activities (Iammarino and McCann, 2015). Previous 
research has shown that MNE technological and innovation operations 
are unlikely to be located in the vicinity of those of competitive rivals 
(see, among others, Cantwell and Santangelo, 1999; Alcácer, 2006; 
Verbeke et al., 2009) and tend rather to follow the location of production 
operations (Defever, 2006) or to reflect a value chain logic (Crescenzi et 
al. 2014) 
 
[Table 1.6 here] 
 
Table 1.6 presents results of negative binomial estimates by 
macrosector. Interestingly, and not entirely unexpectedly, the signs of 
the significant coefficients are opposite in manufacturing and services, a 
plausible outcome in the set of countries that constitute the EU 
neighbourhood. As far as manufacturing industries are concerned, the 
strong and negative significance of the education level signals that 
foreign MNEs tend to look for low-skilled workforce, reasonably because 
the kind of manufacturing activities localised in the EU neighbourhood 
by MNEs is mostly concentrated in the more basic segments of the value 
chain. Differently, service activities are associated with a more educated 
workforce in relation to the nature itself of the service sector, which 
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requires relative higher standards of skills than basic manufacturing. 
Table 1.6 also suggests that the institutional setting of the host countries 
matters for FDI decisions, again with different signs in the two 
aggregates considered. In particular, manufacturing activities are 
associated with less favourable institutional conditions: this, particularly 
in the case of emerging and developing economies such as those in the 
EU neighbourhood, might be explained by cross industry heterogeneity 
in MNEs’ preferences over institutional attributes. In other words, it has 
been argued that some MNEs tend to prefer locations with weaker 
economic institutions because they aim at bypassing transparent market 
mechanisms in their operations abroad (e.g. Helmann, 1998; Helmann et 
al., 2000; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002; Sonin, 2003). Indeed, weaker 
institutions might facilitate rent-seeking or moral hazard behaviour, or 
simply allow capturing a share of host countries’ public resources, 
through lobbying, subsidies or less legalized channels – such as, in the 
case here, corruption. Such MNE behaviours has proved to differ across 
sectors and functions: previous research has shown that MNEs in high 
or medium technology manufacturing choose to locate in places where 
the institutional environment is more adequately protected, while MNEs 
operating in low-technology and less sophisticated sectors may consider 
strong regulation in business as an obstacle.10 Hence, mechanisms of 
institutional subversion (Helmann, 1998) might be easily reflected in our 
results for manufacturing considering the highly heterogeneous group of 
countries analysed, that include both transition and developing 
countries, often characterised by notable institutional flaws. On the 
contrary, the institutional environment takes the expected positive sign 
when the analysis shifts to FDI in services, which include operations 
aiming to provide financial and business services, soft infrastructure and 
more knowledge-intensive content activities – as also the attractiveness 
                                                 
10
 To be noted that our manufacturing aggregate includes also extraction and processing of coal, oil and 
natural gas, which may prove particularly reactive to less regulated institutional settings. 
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of stronger human capital in the sector seems to point out – and that 
tend to take into consideration business regulation, transparency and 
enforcement of contracts as pre-requisites for their location. 
 
1.6 Conclusions 
This paper aimed at providing a first investigation of the drivers of 
global FDI in the broadly defined EU neighbourhood. The area 
constitutes an interesting case in terms of attractiveness towards global 
MNE investments, both for its geographical closeness and its political 
and economic linkages with the ‘core’ of the European Union. The 
different degrees of integration with the EU, and the relatively recent 
access of most neighbourhood countries to global markets, reflect their 
large heterogeneity in terms of economic, social and political 
characteristics, which also entails large variation in their attractiveness 
towards foreign capital. 
By employing data on greenfield investment projects occurred in the 
EU NMs and neighbourhood in the period 2003 to 2008, we explored the 
drivers of FDI by sector and business function. What emerges from the 
general empirical analysis is a clear market-seeking and efficiency-
oriented rationale behind FDI in the EU neighbourhood. Interestingly, 
strong co-location patterns of FDI appear along different axes – national 
origin of the investor, industrial sector, and business function – 
supporting the existence of path-dependency, cumulative causation 
mechanisms and possible virtuous (or vicious) cycles in the impact of 
globalisation on the EU neighbourhood.  
The findings of this paper are largely in line with previous empirical 
evidence highlighting the significance of global capital flows towards EU 
NMs as compared to other areas in the EU neighbourhood. In fact, EU 
NMs are characterised by large and growing internal demand, a 
comparatively stable institutional environment, and relatively low labour 
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costs. Most importantly from a political point of view, they benefit from 
the EU membership. However, Russia is the single country that receives 
most foreign investment in manufacturing and services, plausibly due to 
the relevance of its huge internal demand for MNEs’ strategies.  
In interpreting our empirical results and the descriptive evidence 
presented, we notice that the rest of the EU neighbourhood tends to 
remain peripheral in the strategies of MNEs, with few exceptions 
represented by countries such as Turkey and Ukraine, and to a lesser 
extent, Egypt and Morocco. These economies are far less integrated both 
politically and economically with the ‘core’ of the EU, but they are central 
economic actors in their regions and it is likely that MNEs oriented 
towards the exploitation of new markets and low-cost labour force will 
look at them with growing interest.  
The present study provides an initial investigation of the patterns of 
FDI in the EU neighbourhood which can be informative for policy makers 
at the EU, national and regional levels in both areas. The growing 
importance of the ENP and the intensification of the economic and 
institutional relationships between the EU and other important actors in 
the area, such as the Russian Federation, Turkey, the Balkans and the 
economies in North Africa, should be accompanied by a better 
understanding of the economic processes at work. In this respect, the 
evidence about the role of internal markets of destination and the 
educational levels of the workforce in attracting FDI can be framed within 
national and EU-wide regional and industrial policies to encourage, on 
the one hand, the internationalisation of European firms – particularly 
those in the current EU periphery – towards their neighbours and, on the 
other, the upgrading of skills and capabilities in the recipient economies. 
Policies supporting human capital and skill formation and training – at 
different educational levels – are indeed crucial not only to spur 
technological and innovation progress in the neighbourhood, but also to 
support shifts to higher value-added activities and skill renewal 
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potentially offered by offshoring to the EU peripheral regions 
geographically closer to the ENP area. Furthermore, improving 
institutional quality in the neighbourhood is imperative in order to 
reduce rent-seeking and inefficiencies that are detrimental to the host 
economies, and tend to increase internal inequality through the 
reinforcement of the dominant elites: enhancing the quality of 
institutions may also attract more sophisticated activities and reduce the 
current emphasis on purely market-seeking investments. Further 
research-based evidence is certainly needed to inform policy intervention 
on which specific tools are best suited to leverage global flows to upgrade 
local tangible and intangible assets and reinforce regional growth on both 
sides of the EU border. 
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Table 1.1: FDI into the EU neighbourhood 
Country Investment projects % 
New Member States 
Bulgaria 735 6.53 
Czech Republic 651 5.78 
Estonia 207 1.84 
Hungary 806 7.16 
Latvia 293 2.60 
Lithuania 236 2.10 
Malta 8 0.07 
Poland 1,043 9.26 
Romania 1,341 11.91 
Slovakia 446 3.96 
Slovenia 109 0.97 
Subtotal 5,875 52.18 
Accession and Candidate countries 
Albania 49 0.44 
Bosnia and H. 96 0.85 
Croatia 183 1.62 
Macedonia 45 0.40 
Montenegro 19 0.17 
Serbia 302 2.68 
Turkey 436 3.87 
Subtotal 1,130 10.03 
ENP Southern countries 
Algeria 208 1.85 
Egypt 253 2.25 
Israel 120 1.07 
Jordan 111 0.99 
Lebanon 66 0.59 
Libya 88 0.78 
Morocco 269 2.39 
Syria 88 0.78 
Tunisia 137 1.22 
Subtotal 1,340 11.92 
ENP Eastern countries 
Armenia 47 0.42 
Azerbaijan 113 1.00 
Belarus 80 0.71 
Georgia 69 0.61 
Moldova 43 0.38 
Ukraine 526 4.67 
Subtotal 878 8.00 
Russia 2,039 18.11 
Total 11,262 100 
Source: Authors' elaborations on FDi-Markets data 
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Table 1.2: FDI into the EU neighbourhood by business function 
Country HQ & Innovation SMLD Production 
  Investment % Investment % Investment % 
New Member States 
Bulgaria 82 4.5 328 6.9 325 6.9 
Czech Republic 101 5.6 271 5.7 279 5.9 
Estonia 34 1.9 103 2.2 70 1.5 
Hungary 118 6.6 349 7.3 339 7.2 
Latvia 25 1.4 191 4.0 77 1.6 
Lithuania 28 1.6 153 3.2 55 1.2 
Malta 1 0.06 3 0.06 4 0.08 
Poland 107 5.9 394 8.3 542 11.5 
Romania 223 12.4 568 12.0 550 11.7 
Slovakia 48 2.7 159 3.4 239 5.1 
Slovenia 14 0.8 65 1.4 30 0.6 
Subtotal 781 43.1 2,584 59.4 2,510 53.3 
Accession and Candidate countries 
Albania 9 0.5 19 0.4 21 0.5 
Bosnia and H. 13 0.7 32 0.7 51 1.1 
Croatia 16 0.9 94 2.0 73 1.6 
Macedonia 3 0.2 9 0.2 33 0.7 
Montenegro 1 0.06 8 0.2 10 0.2 
Serbia 52 2.9 119 2.5 131 2.8 
Turkey 91 5.1 171 3.6 174 3.7 
Subtotal 185 10.2 452 10.4 493 10.5 
ENP Southern countries 
Algeria 50 2.8 77 1.6 81 1.7 
Egypt 43 2.4 91 1.9 119 2.5 
Israel 69 3.8 30 0.6 21 0.5 
Jordan 23 1.3 44 0.9 44 0.9 
Lebanon 15 1.3 33 0.7 18 0.4 
Libya 18 1.0 18 0.4 52 1.1 
Morocco 33 1.83 104 2.2 132 2.8 
Syria 20 1.1 18 0.4 50 1.1 
Tunisia 32 1.8 33 0.7 72 1.5 
Subtotal 303 16.7 448 10.3 589 12.5 
ENP Eastern countries 
Armenia 19 1.1 14 0.4 14 0.3 
Azerbaijan 32 1.8 50 1.1 31 0.7 
Belarus 19 1.1 45 1.0 16 0.3 
Georgia 17 0.9 32 0.7 20 0.4 
Ukraine 132 6.5 237 5.0 168 3.6 
Moldova 4 0.2 14 0.3 14 0.3 
Subtotal 223 12.3 392 9.0 263 5.6 
Russia 319 17.6 866 19.9 854 18.1 
Total 1,811 100  4,350 100  4,709 100  
Source: Authors' elaborations on FDi-Markets data 
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Table 1.3: FDI into the EU neighbourhood by macro-sector 
Country Manufacturing Services 
  Investment % Investment % 
New Member States 
Bulgaria 358 6.0 323 6.8 
Czech 
Republic 401 6.7 226 4.8 
Estonia 112 1.9 90 1.9 
Hungary 476 7.9 292 6.2 
Latvia 174 2.9 117 2.5 
Lithuania 125 2.1 100 2.1 
Malta 6 0.1 2 0.04 
Poland 605 10.1 413 8.7 
Romania 748 12.5 552 11.6 
Slovakia 310 5.2 125 2.6 
Slovenia 59 1.0 43 0.9 
Subtotal 3,374 56.3 2,283 47.9 
Accession and Candidate countries 
Albania 18 0.3 23 0.5 
Bosnia and H. 48 0.8 48 0.8 
Croatia 100 1.7 100 1.7 
Macedonia 16 0.3 19 0.3 
Montenegro 3 0.05 3 0.05 
Serbia 171 2.9 122 2.6 
Turkey 214 3.6 200 4.2 
Subtotal 570 9.5 515 10.8 
ENP Southern countries 
Algeria 89 1.5 102 2.2 
Egypt 102 1.7 127 2.7 
Israel 49 0.8 65 1.4 
Jordan 44 0.7 65 1.4 
Lebanon 18 0.3 47 1.0 
Libya 21 0.4 39 0.8 
Morocco 108 1.8 152 3.2 
Syria 25 0.4 48 1.0 
Tunisia 68 1.1 61 1.3 
Subtotal 524 8.7 706 14.8 
ENP Eastern countries 
Armenia 14 0.2 26 0.6 
Azerbaijan 35 0.6 64 1.4 
Belarus 31 0.5 46 1.0 
Georgia 17 0.3 39 0.8 
Moldova 19 0.3 20 0.4 
Ukraine 229 3.8 276 5.8 
Subtotal 345 5.8 471 9.9 
Russia 1,180 19.7 792 16.7 
Total 5,993 100 4,767 100 
Source: Authors' elaborations on FDi-Markets data 
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Table 1.4: FDI determinants into the EU neighbourhood 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dep Var: FDI count 
                 
Market size 2.80*** 2.89*** 2.74*** 3.21*** 3.11*** 
 
(0.909) (0.936) (0.917) (0.846) (0.866) 
Market potential 2.64** 2.62** 2.91*** 2.12** 2.47** 
 
(1.103) (1.124) (1.094) (0.999) (1.027) 
Control of corruption 0.47* 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.44* 
 
(0.273) (0.274) (0.278) (0.248) (0.260) 
Education level 1.28 1.33 1.28 1.11 1.27 
 
(0.848) (0.876) (0.890) (0.757) (0.786) 
Average wage -3.15*** -3.18*** -3.10*** -3.49*** -3.53*** 
 
(0.863) (0.879) (0.874) (0.803) (0.811) 
National colocation 0.004** 
    
 
(0.0016) 
    Sector colocation 
 
0.004** 
   
  
(0.00214) 
   Function colocation 
  
0.001 
  
   
(0.000781) 
  Sector colocation by nationality 
   
0.062*** 
 
    
(0.0124) 
 Function colocation by 
nationality 
    
0.027*** 
     
(0.00660) 
      Observations 170 170 170 170 170 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.29 
log likelihood -573.4 -573.8 -574.7 -564.7 -569.1 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1.5: FDI determinants in the EU neighbourhood by business function 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dep Var: FDI count HQ & Inno SMLD Production 
                    
Market size 9.11 8.15 8.90 -1.11 -1.16 -1.29 -0.96 -0.087 -0.37 
 
(6.577) (6.321) (6.500) (5.929) (6.122) (6.273) (3.141) (3.187) (3.156) 
Market potential -1.21 -1.24 -2.84 -5.77 -5.87 -6.07 1.20 0.10 0.65 
 
(5.315) (5.179) (5.285) (6.632) (6.911) (6.949) (3.552) (3.484) (3.451) 
Control of corruption 0.56 0.69 0.44 -1.02 -0.91 -0.92 2.27** 2.10** 2.22** 
 
(1.323) (1.334) (1.328) (0.995) (0.986) (0.987) (0.992) (1.001) (0.998) 
Education level 14.24*** 15.19*** 14.25*** -3.60** -3.64** -3.74** 3.11 4.88 5.17 
 
(4.476) (4.775) (4.580) (1.624) (1.639) (1.648) (3.588) (3.624) (3.555) 
Average wage 6.36 9.57 9.39 2.71 2.56 2.77 0.43 -0.05 -0.09 
 
(6.390) (7.011) (7.111) (3.785) (3.823) (3.903) (2.307) (2.312) (2.330) 
National colocation -0.02 
  
-0.01 
  
0.01 
  
 
(0.012) 
  
(0.009) 
  
(0.010) 
  Sector colocation 
 
-0.04** 
  
-0.01 
  
0.025* 
 
  
(0.02) 
  
(0.011) 
  
(0.014) 
 Function colocation 
  
-.015*** 
  
-0.002 
  
0.011** 
   
(0.005) 
  
(0.003) 
  
(0.005) 
          Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 
log likelihood -56.40 -55.30 -55.34 -100.1 -100.2 -100.2 -95.21 -94.57 -94.38 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 52 
 
Table 1.6: FDI determinants in the EU neighbourhood by macro-sector 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: FDI count Manufacturing Services 
              
Market size -1.96 -1.63 -1.61 4.06 4.13 4.26 
 
(3.725) (3.737) (3.720) (3.832) (3.688) (3.683) 
Market potential -2.37 -2.92 -2.91 0.43 0.45 0.11 
 
(3.745) (3.755) (3.639) (3.154) (3.059) (3.106) 
Control of corruption -3.19*** -3.16*** -3.15*** 1.55** 1.51** 1.46* 
 
(0.923) (0.930) (0.933) (0.776) (0.750) (0.754) 
Education level -5.00*** -4.75** -4.71** 4.22** 4.33** 4.28** 
 
(1.919) (1.983) (2.000) (2.012) (2.016) (2.015) 
Average wage 0.67 0.47 0.44 -1.93 -1.49 -1.15 
 
(2.374) (2.365) (2.385) (3.157) (3.133) (3.155) 
National colocation -0.003 
  
-.0004 
  
 
(0.007) 
  
(0.010) 
  Sector colocation 
 
0.001 
  
-0.008 
 
  
(0.009) 
  
(0.012) 
 Function colocation 
  
0.0004 
  
-0.004 
   
(0.003) 
  
(0.004) 
       Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.12 
log likelihood -104.4 -104.4 -104.4 -107.9 -107.8 -107.7 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: List of variables 
Variable Description  Source 
 
Dependent   
FDIit Count of FDI in country i at time t FDi 
Markets 
 
Independent   
Demand 
Market Sizeit-1 GDP of country i at time t-1. WDI 
Market Potentialit-1 Sum of distance-weighted GDP of all third 
countries c from location i at time t-1. 
WDI / 
CEPII 
Institutions 
Control of Corruptionit-1 Composite indicator ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, 
with higher values associated to more control of 
corruption in country i at time t-1. 
WGI 
Labour  
Education Levelit Ratio between secondary school age population 
and total population in country i at time t-1. 
UNESCO 
Average Wageit Per capita GDP in country i at time t-1. WDI 
Co-location 
National Co-locationit Cumulative average stock of investment in 
country i from the same country of origin. 
FDi 
Markets 
Sector Co-locationit Cumulative average stock of investment in 
country i in the same sector of activity. 
FDi 
Markets 
Function Co-locationit 
 
Sector Co-locationit by 
nationality 
Function Co-locationit by 
nationality 
Cumulative average stock of investment in 
country i in the same business function. 
Cumulative average stock of investment in 
country i in the same sector of activity from the 
same country of origin. 
Cumulative average stock of investment in 
country i in the same business function from the 
same country of origin. 
FDi 
Markets  
 
FDi 
Markets 
 
FDi 
Markets 
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Chapter 2 – What drives European 
multinationals to the EU neighbouring 
countries? A mixed methods analysis of 
Italian investment strategies 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The progressive enlargement of the European Union (EU) has made 
the economic and political relationships with its neighbours a highly 
sensitive policy issue. With the EU Enlargement the security, political 
stability and economic prosperity of larger shares of the Union are 
progressively more intertwined with that of Candidate and Neighbouring 
countries. Following the 2004 and 2007 eastward enlargements, the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and other regional and multi-
lateral cooperation initiatives (Eastern Partnership; the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership; the Black Sea Synergy and the EU-Russia 
strategic partnership) have been aimed at strengthening the links 
between the EU and its neighbourhood in institutional, political, social 
and economic terms. The sharp increase in trade flows (according to the 
European Commission total trade between the EU and its ENP partners 
was worth € 230 billion in 2011) and labour mobility (the EU issued 3.2 
million Schengen visas to ENP partners in 2012) has been accompanied 
by a generalized increase in Foreign Investments in particular towards 
the ENP-South countries. Before the 2007 economic crisis, FDI in the 
Mediterranean region accounted for 2.8% of the world total (2006) while 
investments in Eastern countries remained largely concentrated in 
Ukraine, ranging between 0.5 and 1% of the world total (DRN, 2013): the 
EU accounts on average for 34% of total investments in the 
Mediterranean countries (while no comparable data are available for 
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Eastern countries, but EU FDI account for around 80% of the total in 
Ukraine) (DRN, 2013).  
While “corruption has been identified as a major obstacle to 
investment and business, both in eastern and southern ENP countries” 
(European Commission, 2013: 10), very limited systematic research has 
been conducted so far on the relative importance of other investment 
drivers/barriers that might play an important role in this emerging 
context. Corruption and poor institutional quality remain fundamental 
cross-country issues for the entire region (see Chapter 3 for a more 
detailed discussion of this), but market-seeking (associated with 
increasing market size), resource-seeking and efficiency-seeking 
(associated with cheap skilled labour) motives remain strong 
countervailing pull factors that interact with geographical and 
(increasing) institutional proximity, sustaining the increasing flow of EU 
investments in the region. 
This paper aims to shed new light on the strategic decisions of 
European MNEs when balancing the repulsive and attractive forces that 
shape the geography of their investments in the EU neighbouring 
countries (NCs) and in the ‘new’ member states (NMs) of the EU. The 
coverage of 33 destination countries among NCs and European NMs11 
makes it possible to analyse the full spectrum of economic and 
institutional integration with the ‘core’ of the EU-15, from the full 
economic and political integration into the Union and the single market 
of the NMs, to the looser association of the ENP East and South. In terms 
of origin of the investments the focus of the paper will be on the case of 
Italy. The focus on investments originating from one single country will 
make possible to ‘net out’ any ‘home market’ bias in MNE behaviour, 
                                                 
11
 In this paper NCs are (i) Accession and Candidate Countries (ACC): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey; (ii) ENP Southern countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Libya, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia; (iii) ENP Eastern countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine; and (iv) Russian Federation. EU NMs are all 2004 and 2007 European 
enlargement countries except Cyprus. 
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allowing us to compare their strategies with reference to the highly 
diversified context of the NCs and NMs. The case of Italy is particularly 
appropriate for this purpose: Italy is a founding member of the European 
Union that forms part of the ‘core’ of the Union but, at the same time, 
benefits from closer geographical proximity with both NMs and NCs than 
other ‘old’ EU members. In addition, Italian foreign and commercial 
policies have historically devoted a special attention to the role of the 
country as a ‘bridge’ between the ‘Old’ Europe and the EU neighbourhood 
(Bank of Italy, 2000) 
The analysis of investment strategies in both NMs and NCs needs to 
take into account not only the variety of contextual conditions of the host 
economies but also the diversity of the entry modes of foreign firms into 
the local markets (European Commission, 2014). As a consequence, this 
paper will adopt a mixed methods approach to the analysis of the 
location strategies of Italian investments in the area. Drawing on 
Dunning’s Ownership-Localization-Internalization (OLI) eclectic 
paradigm, the paper uses regression analysis in order to assess the 
different role of national drivers in affecting Italian greenfield 
investments’ location behaviour. This section of the analysis is based on 
detailed data at the level of individual investment project. However, in 
order to capture the complex interaction between greenfield investments 
and other entry modes (in particular joint ventures and acquisitions) the 
quantitative analysis is complemented by two in-depth firm-level case 
studies covering two of the largest Italian multinational enterprises 
operating with different modalities in both the EU NMs and NCs areas. 
Interviews are collected at the level of headquarters with top level 
managers and executives, presenting a rich informative basis on the 
strategic behaviour and organisational choices of MNEs in their cross-
border operations in NCs and NMs.  
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In terms of contribution to the existing debate, the paper rests on the 
idea that MNE investments play a central role in the on-going process of 
integration between the EU and its neighbouring countries. Such a 
critical role has been rarely investigated with mixed methodologies, 
which instead offer the opportunity to analyze more in-depth the 
interaction between patterns of economic integration and business 
strategies of MNEs. Therefore, the contribution of the present study is 
essentially empirical. In this respect, the paper aims at providing a 
structured analysis of associations between recipient countries’ 
attributes and corporate behavior in the quantitative part, fundamentally 
assessing the role of location advantages (L) of the eclectic OLI paradigm 
to motivate Italian MNEs to pursue internalization (I) strategies. 
Subsequently, the qualitative section of the article zooms into the 
investment behavior of two selected Italian multinationals, capturing the 
full complexity that is typical of MNE organizational choices and that is 
rarely incorporated in existing quantitative studies. In this respect, we 
are also able to explore MNE characteristics as drivers of their location 
choices, with the aim of capturing the forms of ownership advantages (O) 
that lead to internalization (I). Therefore, by combining quantitative and 
qualitative insights in a novel way, this article provides new empirical 
evidence on the location strategies of MNEs taking into account the 
interdependence between the different components of Dunning’s OLI 
paradigm, that is destination country determinants and firm-level 
organizational features that drive cross-border corporate strategies.  
The main findings of the mixed-methods analysis for Italian MNEs in 
the EU neighbourhood suggest that, while some common elements for 
localisation – such as market access considerations as well as sensitivity 
to cost factors – can be generalised, there is evidence of an intrinsic 
heterogeneity in the strategies of MNEs along sector and functional axes, 
ranging from the role of inter-governmental agreements to the 
importance of institutional assimilation of the MNE in the local context. 
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This diversity across corporate strategies suggests that the development 
of ‘framework conditions’ within the picture of further integration 
between the EU and its neighbourhood is at least as important as the 
reinforcement of more typical FDI attractors. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly outlines the 
characteristics of Italian foreign investment in EU NMs and NCs. Section 
3 introduces the quantitative analysis of Italian MNEs location strategies: 
the empirical model is presented and justified and the results of the 
regression analysis are discussed. Section 4 briefly introduces the 
corporate profile of the Italian MNEs covered in the study, whilst section 
5 analyses the evidence from the in-depth interviews with the executives. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Italian Foreign Investments in EU New 
Member States and Neighbouring Countries 
Italy is a key player in global investments towards the EU NMs and 
NCs. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Italy’s global 
outward investment has reached $535 billion in 2012 with $69.42 billion 
(approximately 13% of the total) going to the area of interest for this 
paper, suggesting that the region is extremely relevant to Italian foreign 
operations. Table 2.1 shows Italian investments in the countries of the 
area combining information from the Coordinated Direct Investment 
Survey of the International Monetary Fund12  in the most recent available 
year with data on Italian new investment projects in the period 2003-
2008 from the FDi Markets database created by Financial Times 
Business13. IMF macro-economic FDI data provide us with a complete 
                                                 
12
 http://cdis.imf.org/ 
13
 FDi Markets is the leading source of information on Foreign Direct Investments, providing data to the 
UNCTAD report and the World Bank. For each project detailed information is available on the investor 
(name and state/country of origin and sector of activity, including both manufacturing and services), on the 
destination area (country, state and city), and the main business function (including manufacturing, sales 
and marketing, R&D, logistic, headquarter and business services) involved in the investment abroad. 
 59 
 
and updated picture of all Italian FDI flows in the area. However, IMF 
data are only available after 2009 and they do not include any detail on 
the nature of the investments. Conversely, FDi Markets data include 
detailed micro-level information on new foreign investment project 
undertaken in the region with sector and function breakdown based on 
the combination of a variety of local and media sources. The two data 
sources are highly correlated (65% correlation for the individual 
countries’ shares of total investments; 93% correlation for the regional 
sub-totals reported in Table 2.1) confirming that FDi Markets micro-data 
– used here in the quantitative analysis – offer a reliable picture of 
investment patterns in the area, which has remained largely unchanged 
after the 2008 economic crisis as confirmed by the high correlation with 
IMF 2012 data. 
Table 2.1 shows that the majority of Italian foreign operations in the 
region are concentrated in EU NMs (46.82% of total operations in the 
area according to the IMF; 45.39 in FDi Markets), followed by ACC 
countries (15.43% for the IMF; 18.52% in FDi Markets), ENP Southern 
(20.48% and 10.62% respectively) and ENP Eastern (2.09 for IMF and 
6.37% for FDi Markets). Furthermore, a notable share of greenfield 
investment from Italy locates in Russia (15.18% in IMF and 19.11% in 
FDi Markets). The table suggests that FDi Markets is under-estimating 
the share of investments in the ENP Southern countries (ENP-S): indeed, 
the dataset looks at the number of new investment projects, and not at 
their financial value. The difference between the two measures suggests 
that Italian investments in the ENP-S (as will be confirmed by the 
interviews) tend to be relatively more capital intensive than in the eastern 
countries (ENP-E). Table 2.1 also highlights the importance of Russia as 
a destination: it is the single most attractive country in the area under 
analysis and, as such, it is an important benchmark for the assessment 
of alternative investment locations in the area. Other very relevant 
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locations for Italian foreign operations are Romania, Bulgaria and Poland 
in the EU NMs area, with shares equal to 11.2%, 9.65% and 7.92% 
respectively. Ukraine in the ENP-E area (4.25%) and Tunisia in the ENP-
S (3.28%) represent the main regional destinations. With respect to the 
ACC countries, Italian operations appear more evenly distributed among 
regional actors, with an important role played not only by Turkey (4.4%) 
and Serbia (4.05%), but also by countries such as Albania (3.47%) and 
Croatia (3.28%). 
 
[Table 2.1 here] 
 
Table 2.2 shows Italian foreign investment in the area by business 
activity (only available from FDI markets). Following Nielsen (2008) in 
classifying activities in core and support business functions, it becomes 
apparent that 48.45% of Italian foreign operations in the area involve 
‘core business functions’, while 51.53% can be defined as ‘support 
activities’. Core functions are strongly dominated by investment in 
manufacturing activities (42.47% of total), suggesting that most Italian 
MNEs target the area for their ‘production’ activities. With respect to 
support functions, investments are dominated by ‘marketing, sales and 
after sales servicing’ (32.23%) and ‘administrative and management 
functions (13.12%)’. Within the former category, investments are strongly 
concentrated in ‘retail’ activities (23.36%) and ‘sales, marketing and 
support’ (8.49%), whereas the ‘business services’ sub-category (12.93%) 
dominates the latter. The functional classification of the investments 
suggests that Italian MNEs are attracted in the area by two fundamental 
forces: low-cost production sites (manufacturing investments) and large 
and growing markets (sales-related investments).  
 
[Table 2.2 here] 
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Table 2.3 reports Italian MNEs investment projects by broad sector of 
activity. The large majority of investment is concentrated in the industrial 
manufacturing sector (67.95%), while services represent a smaller share 
(26.45%). The majority of manufacturing investments is concentrated in 
medium-low technology sectors (47.3%, with textiles accounting for 
26.64% of the total) but there is also a relevant share of operations 
carried out in high-medium technology sectors (20.66%). In the service 
industries, investment in high knowledge-intensive services (16.6%) is 
higher than low knowledge-intensive services (9.85%) and it is mostly 
dominated by financial services (13.71%). The sectoral analysis suggests 
that while business functions are polarised around two key activities, a 
broader variety of sectors are involved in the internationalisation process 
of Italian investors in the area.  
 
[Table 2.3 here] 
 
This preliminary descriptive evidence on the geography of Italian 
investments in the area reflects the more general trends highlighted in 
the existing literature. Technological change and the process of EU 
integration have favoured a process of structural re-organisation of 
Italian foreign investments in traditional sectors such as textiles and 
footwear, with the search for new investment targets and international 
value chain networks (Amighini and Rabellotti, 2006; Carabelli et al. 
2009; Dunford, 2006). EU NMs and NCs have benefitted from this 
reorganization of production, receiving a relevant share of Italian 
‘production’ and ‘sales’ investments. Italian ‘production’ investments 
have been pushed by the strong labour-intensive specialization of the 
Italian industrial base confronted with increasing domestic labour-costs 
and reduced profit margins in the absence of the competitive 
devaluations of the Italian Lira typical of the 1980s and early 1990s 
(Resmini, 2000). Conversely, ‘sales’ investments reflect the increasing 
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pressure for access to new (often less sophisticated) markets for Italian 
products and services. On a European scale, it has been suggested that 
ENP countries strongly benefit from EU foreign investment, which carry 
more advanced technological knowledge and managerial practices 
(Monastiriotis and Borrell, 2013). This geography of foreign investment is 
also reflected in the nature of the trade flows between the EU and NMs 
and NCs (Boschma and Capone, 2013; Petrakos et al., 2013; Pinna, 
2013), with the latter specializing in less technologically advanced 
labour-intensive goods. 
The quantitative analysis will explore these processes in a systematic 
way making it possible to identify the investments drivers after 
controlling for sectoral and functional factors. 
 
2.3 Quantitative analysis 
2.3.1 Empirical model and data 
In line with existing empirical literature on the location choices of 
foreign firms (e.g. Schmidheiny and Brülhart, 2011), a Poisson regression 
model is adopted to investigate the relationship between a set of country-
level attributes and the location decisions of 518 Italian greenfield 
investment in the region in the period 2003-200814. The number of 
investments attracted by each country is modelled as a function of a 
number of national characteristics that can be referred back to two key 
investment motives discussed below – market-seeking and efficiency and 
resource-seeking motives – after controlling for general rule-of-law 
conditions and geographical and institutional proximity.  
 
The following equation is estimated: 
                                                 
14
 2003 is first year covered by the FDi Markets database. 2008 is the last year not affected by the economic 
crisis. Post-economic crisis data are still not available/sufficiently reliable in the FDi Markets database. The 
comparison with 2012 IMF investment data has confirmed that FDi Markets data offer a reliable picture of 
the geography of Italian investments in the area. 
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𝐼𝑡𝑎 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑔𝑜𝑣. 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝐼
+ 𝛽4𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑛𝑎𝑡. 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖 + 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
where the dependent variable Ita investit is the count of Italian 
investment in recipient country i in year t. The explanatory variables are 
explained in what follows.  
 
Market-seeking  
Market sizeit-1 is the log of National GDP at constant prices (US dollars 
2005) in country i with a one-year lag, built on United Nations data. This 
is meant to capture the effect played by the internal demand on the 
choice of Italian MNEs to locate in recipient countries. There is wide 
acknowledgement in the empirical literature that this is a relevant pull 
factor for FDI and MNEs strategies (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Chen and 
Moore, 2010). 
Government consumptionit stands for general government final 
consumption expenditure as a share of GDP in country i and year t. This 
represents a proxy for the propensity of the government to incur in 
public spending and it might represent a relevant demand factor for 
MNEs, although a larger government role is frequently associated to 
inefficiencies and rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). This measure 
is taken from World Development Indicators. 
Agglomerationit represents the role of agglomeration economies in 
attracting foreign investment and it is measured by the share of urban 
population in country i and year t, as reported in World Development 
Indicators. There are good reasons to believe that more agglomerated 
areas are more attractive for foreign investors due to virtuous cycles of 
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externalities (Guimarães et al., 2000). However, considering the 
characteristics of Italian MNEs activities in the area, that are strongly 
skewed towards Medium-Low technology manufacturing, we might also 
expect that these operations are located far from cities to avoid 
congestion costs.  
 
Efficiency- and resource-seeking 
Average wageit is indirectly measured by means of log per capita GDP 
in county i and year t, calculated on data on GDP and population 
provided by the World Bank. Data on wages for most countries in the 
area are not available or not homogeneous. Existing empirical evidence 
on FDI in Central and Eastern European countries suggest that MNEs 
tend to locate in these areas for the large supply of cheap labour 
(Resmini, 2000). This hypothesis seems reasonable in the present 
context, also keeping in mind that investment of Italian MNEs is mostly 
concentrated in basic activities. 
Educationit is meant to capture the average education level in the host 
economy i in time t. This is the log of the ratio between secondary school 
age population and total population provided by UNESCO. Considering 
the wide and particular set of recipient countries under analysis, this is 
the only available measure for plausibly catching an education effect. The 
empirical evidence points out that FDI are attracted by locations 
endowed with higher human capital (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; Crescenzi 
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, considering that Italian MNEs tend to invest 
in manufacturing and retail as well as Medium-Low technology 
manufacturing, as Tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show, we might also expect 
that they do not look for relevant human capital in the area. 
Natural resourcesit indicates total rents from natural resources as a 
share of GDP in country i and year t. The literature has evidenced the 
existence of foreign operations from MNEs aimed at exploiting host 
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national natural resources (Asiedu, 2006). This is relevant to test here 
considering the set of countries under analysis, which includes large oil 
and natural gas producers. This measure is taken from World 
Development Indicators. 
 
National Framework Conditions 
Control of corruptionit-1 and Rule of lawit-1 are proxy variables for 
quality of the national institutional environment in host country i in year 
t-1, based on World Governance Indicators. These are aggregate 
indicators of different aspects of governance and countries’ institutional 
context ranging from 2.5 to -2.5 with higher values associated with more 
effective control of corruption and rule of law, respectively. Existing 
empirical evidence on the role of institutional factors in determining FDI 
and MNEs location behaviour tend to suggest that foreign investors 
search for stable and reliable institutional settings to locate their 
operations (Altomonte, 2000; Phelps and Waley 2004; Rabbiosi and 
Santangelo 2014) 
 
Degree of Integration/Institutional Proximity 
Exportsit stands for the value of exports of goods and services as a 
share of GDP in country i and year t. We expect a positive correlation of 
Italian MNEs location decisions and the importance of exports in host 
nations as a sign that MNEs interact with recipient countries also 
through trade: in fact, they might locate operations in recipient countries 
and re-export goods and services, suggesting an export-platform 
rationale of foreign investment (Ekholm et al., 2007). This measure is 
based on World Development Indicators. 
Italian presenceit, is a stock variable generated on the basis of 
previous investment in the same destination country i by nationality (i.e. 
other Italian investment). This is to detect any pattern in the decisions of 
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Italian MNEs that my follow national lines. This measure is constructed 
with data from FDi Market. 
EU membershipit and colonyi are dummy variables that capture 
specific characteristics of host countries in term of integration or political 
ties (Phelps, 1997). These are provided by CEPII. The former indicates 
whether country i is an EU member in year t, as membership to the 
Union provides countries with privileged economic and political links 
with Italy. The latter indicates whether country i had a past colonial 
relationship with Italy. 
 
Geographical Proximity 
DistanceiI refers to the geographical distance between host country i 
and Italy I, as provided by CEPII. The literature has emphasized the 
importance of geographical distance in affecting trade and FDI via 
transaction, management and communication costs, arguing that most 
proximate locations are generally preferred (e.g. Silva and Tenreyro, 
2004). 
Finally, δ represents country-year dummies and εit is a random error 
term. 
 
2.4 Results and discussion 
Table 2.4 shows the results for the estimation of the Poisson 
regression model.  The regression diagnostics confirm the robustness of 
the results and the goodness-of-fit of the model. Column 1 includes all 
investments drivers: proxies for market-seeking, efficiency and resource-
seeking, national institutions, degree of integration and institutional and 
geographical proximity. In columns 2 and 3 additional controls for degree 
of integration/institutional proximity are included: the pre-existing stock 
of Italian investments and EU membership together with a control for the 
colonial past of the country.  
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Market-seeking factors exert a significant influence on the attraction 
of Italian foreign operations in the countries of the area: ceteris paribus 
countries with larger internal markets are more likely to be chosen by 
Italian investors. In addition, as will be supported by the interviews in 
the qualitative section, not only private demand exerts a crucial role for 
investments in the area but also public procurement remains central in a 
number of sectors and fields of activity: the intensity of government 
consumption is a positive and strongly significant predictor for the 
presence of foreign operations in a country of the area. The evidence on 
the role of both ‘private’ and ‘public/government-led’ demand is robust to 
the inclusion of additional controls for the degree of integration/ 
institutional proximity between the various countries and Italy (columns 
2 and 3). What becomes negative and statistically significant after 
controlling for the pre-existing links between Italy and the destination 
country (as proxied by the pre-existing Italian presence) is the degree of 
concentration of the population in urban areas (‘Agglomeration’).  
Countries with large densely populated metropolitan areas are – ceteris 
paribus – less attractive to MNE investments. This suggests that size of 
the national market is a very relevant ‘attraction’ force but its 
concentration in large urban areas might rapidly increase congestion 
costs (in a context of still un-developed basic infrastructure) discouraging 
foreign investments.  
The high sensitivity of foreign investments to cost factors and 
efficiency motives is confirmed by the negative and strongly significant 
impact of average wage levels: high wages discourage investments. The 
negative impact of higher wages is not mitigated by higher average skill-
levels. On the contrary, countries with a larger share of secondary 
educated people tend to attract – ceteris paribus – less foreign 
investments. The coefficient of the ‘Education’ proxy is always negative 
and becomes significant in column 2, after controlling for the stock of 
pre-existing investments. Once other Italian MNEs have invested in the 
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country – facilitating the upgrading of local suppliers and the provision of 
key standardised skills – the overall level of education of the population 
discourages new investments. This aspect will be further investigated 
with the case study analysis. Finally, the presence of natural resources 
exerts a positive and highly significant impact on foreign investments in 
all specifications of the model. Resource-seeking motives are still an 
important part of the story when considering foreign investments in the 
area. 
When it comes to the general national ‘framework conditions’ for 
foreign investments in the area,  ‘control of corruption’ and ‘rule of law’  -  
identified by the exiting literature and international organisations as the 
key obstacles for foreign investment take off in the region – are positive 
and significant predictors for new investments. Countries with more 
effective corruption control systems seem to be more attractive to Italian 
investments (positive and significant coefficient in column 1). However, 
once the stock of pre-existing Italian investments is accounted for, the 
more general ‘rule of law’ becomes a positive and significant attractor of 
investments, while the specific control of corruption turns out 
insignificant.  
The final set of regressors control for the degree of economic 
integration and institutional proximity between sending and receiving 
country.  Pre-existing trade flows positively influence subsequent 
greenfield investments (column 1) but the direct presence of previous 
Italian investments is far more important, making the trade coefficient 
almost non-significant. The results highlight a significant path-
dependent aspect in Italian MNEs location behaviour (that will be 
confirmed by the case studies), with new investment replicating past 
location choices in order to benefit from existing formal and informal 
local networks and suppliers linkages. As far as the role of EU 
membership is concerned, the regression analysis does not detect any 
effect on investments. It is very likely that the most of this effect has been 
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anticipated in the 1990s and early 2000s, as the literature has 
highlighted (e.g. Resmini, 2000).  
 
[Table 2.4 here] 
 
2.5 Qualitative analysis 
The overall picture of the drivers of Italian investments in the area 
and their location strategies developed with the quantitative analysis 
needs to be complemented with more in-depth qualitative analysis of 
specific case studies of Italian Multinationals with multiple investments 
in the EU-15 (the core of the EU) and in the countries of the area under 
analysis. Two major Italian MNEs fulfilling these criteria have been 
selected for the case studies: Finmeccanica and Saipem. A short 
presentation of these companies and their activities in the area will be 
followed by the analysis of the interviews15 with key executives in both 
firms. A copy of the guidelines/questionnaire used for the semi-
structured interviews with the executives is included in Appendix B. 
 
2.5.1 MNEs profiles 
Finmeccanica 
Finmeccanica is a major Italian corporate group active in seven high-
technology sectors including Helicopters, Defence and Security 
Electronics, Aeronautics, Space, Defence Systems, Energy and 
Transportation. As a holding company, Finmeccanica owns 9 
enterprises16 operating in these sectors and it also participates into 8 
                                                 
15
 Interviews with executives were conducted at the company Head Quarters on April 2, 2013 and May 31, 
2013 (Finmeccanica, Rome); June 3, 2013 (Finmeccanica, London); 8 April, 2013 (Saipem, Milan). 
16
 AgustaWestland, DRS Technologies, Selex ES, Alenia Aermacchi, Oto Melara, WASS, Ansaldo Breda, 
Ansaldo STS, BredaMenarinibus. 
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joint ventures17 through its controlled companies. According to the 2013 
Finmeccanica Group Profile, it is Italy’s leading industrial company in 
high-technology activities and ranks amongst the top ten global players 
in Aerospace, Defence and Security. As emerged in the interviews to 
executives, 30.2% of Finmeccanica is owned by the Italian Treasury, 
which is the largest shareholder of the group. This implies a strong 
connection between corporate strategies and the international relations 
between Italy and third countries. This is a very relevant feature of this 
corporate group, which operates in highly sensitive sectors for Italian 
strategic interests.  
The international presence of Finmeccanica has strongly increased in 
recent years: it employs about 67,000 people in 230 industrial and 
technical sites and in 322 commercial and marketing offices in over 50 
countries. In terms of sales, Finmeccanica sells its products in nearly 
150 nations. From an organizational point of view, it is headquartered in 
Italy and has a relevant industrial and commercial presence particularly 
in four markets: Italy, UK, USA and Poland. As far as its economic 
performance is concerned, revenues in 2012 have reached 17.2 billion 
Euros, of which 32% is attributed to Defence and Security Electronics, 
24% to Helicopters and 17% to Aeronautics. 
As highlighted in the interviews with executives, Finmeccanica is a 
large and very complex corporate group, in terms of typology of sectors 
and customers, since it has strong ties to both civil and military actors. 
This implies highly diversified commercial strategies and approaches 
across geography according to the political, institutional and business 
profiles of the recipient countries.  
 
Saipem 
Saipem is a large multinational company and one of the main world-
                                                 
17
 NHIndustries, ATR, Eurofighter GmbH, SuperJet International, Telespazio, Thales Alenia Space, 
MBDA, Ansaldo Energia. 
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wide contractors in the oil & gas industry. It operates mainly in energy-
related activities in remote areas and deep-water, and it is considered a 
world leader in the provision of engineering, procurement, project 
management and construction services. Saipem’s core business is design 
and execution of large-scale offshore and onshore projects with relevant 
technological competencies in terms of gas monetization and heavy oil 
exploitation18.  
In terms of ownership structure, Saipem is part of the ENI (Ente 
Nazionale Idrocarduri) group that currently owns approximately 43% of 
Saipem. From an organisational standpoint Saipem is organized in two 
Business Units: Engineering & Construction and Drilling.  
As emphasized during the interview with executives, Saipem is a 
global contractor with strong local presence in several European 
countries (with key strategic subsidiaries in France, UK, and in new 
member states such as Croatia and Romania), but also in emerging areas 
such as West Africa, North Africa, Central Asia, Middle East, and South 
East Asia. More recently the company has pursued the vigorous 
development of production sites in Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, as well 
as engineering and project management centres in Algeria, Azerbaijan, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Canada. 
A relevant feature of Saipem is that it operates through a highly 
decentralized organizational structure in order to take advantage of local 
strengths and respond to location-specific needs and sustainability 
issues. The company invests substantially in local facilities, ranging from 
engineering centres and support yards (for maintenance and storage of 
construction equipment) to fully-fledged fabrication yards, where sections 
of major projects are assembled for onshore field construction or offshore 
                                                 
18
 ‘Gas monetisation’ is the development of different typologies of gas from ‘natural resources’ into ‘final 
products’ ready for the international markets. This process implies the transformation of the product so as 
to match specific modes of transport (e.g. liquid gas transported via dedicated pipelines). Similar challenges 
apply to ‘heavy oil exploitation’: heavy crude oil requires prior transformation in order to flow to 
production wells. These operations and processes require high technological competences. 
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installation. It also contributes to local employment as a way to enriching 
the diversity of Saipem workforce and to recruiting young talents from 
around the world. 
 
2.5.2 Analysis of the interviews with executives 
The interviews with key executives in both Finmeccanica and Saipem 
suggest that market-seeking and resource-seeking investment dominates 
the strategies of these two Italian MNEs in the area of interest. These 
companies, although being substantially different in terms of sector of 
activity, internal organisation and objectives, offer interesting and 
illustrative examples of location strategies and modalities of crucially 
important MNEs from the same country of origin in the EU-15 towards 
EU NMS and NCs.  
 
Mode of Entry 
While the quantitative analysis can only look at greenfield 
investments (for which systematic data are available) the interviews made 
it possible to shed some light on alternative modes of entry of MNEs into 
the local markets. Executives in Finmeccanica highlighted in their 
interviews that trade connections act as an initial link, but partnerships 
with local firms are crucially important to enter new markets. Alliances, 
joint ventures, partnerships and M&As are all components of a 
diversified strategy to establish a presence in the local markets with new 
subsidiaries as the very final step (e.g. in the case of Poland by means of 
a key acquisition). Very similar approaches were highlighted by 
executives in Saipem. Subsidiaries are used in more sophisticated 
relational-intensive contexts in the EU-15 (UK and France), and where 
wider markets are expected to be served by means of stable regional 
hubs in the NMs (Croatia and Romania). Conversely, in ENP-S and ENP-
E countries partnerships and joint-ventures with local firms are 
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considered the key modes of entry into the local economies (e.g 
Azerbaijan or Egypt). The establishment of local offices normally follows 
the formation of partnerships in key countries (e.g. Libya with 
approximately 100 employees, or Algeria with more than 500) as part of a 
gradual expansion strategy in the foreign market. 
 
Market-seeking operations 
Regression results suggest that the presence of Italian MNEs in EU 
NMs and NCs is higly influenced by the size of national markets. 
Moreover, the analysis provides indication that government consumption 
is also important as a pull factor for Italian investment. Interviews with 
Finmeccanica’s executives reveal that a large share of its operations in 
the countries under analysis responds to market-seeking motives. 
However, the interviews offer a more nuanced picture of this type of 
investment driver.  
When looking at investments in NMs, Finmeccanica interviewees 
stressed the importance of the acquisition of the Polish firm PZL-Świdnik 
in 2010 via its fully-owned sister company AgustaWestland. This 
acquisition followed a 20-year long Finmeccanica presence in Poland 
through several of its fully-owned companies. Therefore, Finmeccanica 
had developed connections and direct experience of the Polish market 
during two decades before entering the national market with a direct 
acquisition. Before the latter, PZL-Świdnik was already a supplier of 
AgustaWestland for several components of helicopters (e.g. fuselage) and, 
at the time of the acquisition, around 60% of the activity in PZL-Świdnik 
was connected to Finmeccanica. However, according to the interviewees, 
the objective of the acquisition was not the in-sourcing of part of the 
production chain, but rather a step in a wider strategy aimed at gaining 
a strong and more stable presence not only in the Polish market but also 
in other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) leveraging 
Poland as a regional hub. In fact, as far as the Defence sector is 
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concerned, Poland has made substantial investments in the last years 
and it represents the main market in the CEECs area. According to 
figures of the European Defence Agency, the Defence expenditure of 
Poland has increased by 41.3% between 2005 and 2011, reaching €6,557 
million in 2011, and it is followed by that of Czech Republic which 
stands at only €1,843 million. Also in relative terms, the Defence 
expenditure of Poland in 2011 had the largest weight on national GDP 
among CEECs, amounting at 1.77%. As compared to the Defence 
expenditure of the EU-15 countries, Poland ranks immediately after the 
main ‘old’ members: the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the 
Netherlands. Therefore, there are strong indications that the presence of 
Finmeccanica in Poland is connected to market-seeking strategies in 
response to both private and government-related demand. In this 
respect, the preferred mode of entry has entailed the acquisition of a pre-
existing domestic firm, in line with the strategies of most MNEs aiming at 
accessing CEECs markets since the later 1990s (Uhlenbruck, 2004). 
With respect to NCs, Finmeccanica has a remarkable interest for local 
markets in Turkey, Russia and several Northern African countries, such 
as Libya, Egypt and Algeria. Expansion in all these countries needs a 
constant institutional support of both the Italian and the host 
governments, given the strategic national defence importance of some of 
Finmeccanica’s products. However, within the complex set of 
institutional and political relationships, the selection of the target 
countries for Finmeccanica investment is largely driven by market size 
considerations and in particular by the importance in the Defence 
market. This is especially the case for Finmeccanica-owned firms in 
Turkey and Russia, all with a strong commercial orientation towards the 
local market.  
Market-seeking motives have a very different nature for Saipem given 
the specific nature of its goods and services (i.e. engineering, 
procurement, project management and construction services). For 
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Saipem – as discussed below – location strategies are closely linked to 
the location of natural resources that attract its products and services to 
particular locations. However, this demand is often anticipated and 
matched by means of appropriately tailored products thanks to constant 
interactions established with the key potential customers. These complex 
network of contacts and linkages takes place through the subsidiaries 
located in London and (to a lesser extent) in the regional hubs in NMs in 
Croatia and Romania. Large representative offices in Algeria (ENP-S) and 
Azerbaijan (ENP-E) pursue similar – although more peripheral and lower-
level – functions of ‘anticipation and matching of potential demand’.  
 
Efficiency and Resource-seeking operations 
From the interviews with Finmeccanica executives it clearly emerged 
that the key driver for the selection of Poland as a key hub in the NMs 
was the abundant supply of high quality engineers. Given the 
significantly lower average wages in Poland vis á vis the other major 
locations of Finmeccanica (Italy, UK and USA), the conjugation of market 
(discussed above) and efficiency-seeking motives is immediately 
apparent. Conversely, the technology and competence gap with the NCs 
seems to make it impossible to leverage local human capital in any 
significant form.  Access to natural resources does not seem to play a 
particular role for Finmeccanica given the global and versatile nature of 
its value chain. 
Conversely, Saipem interviewees suggested that the main rationale for 
the location behaviour of their company is linked to the presence of oil 
and gas resources and their markets. The time horizon of Saipem 
operations in a certain country tends to be more long-term the more 
important the location is in terms of energy markets. In the set of 
countries under analysis, Saipem has different strategies for different 
locations according to their relative importance in terms of resource 
endowments. Therefore, Saipem mostly operates in places such as the 
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Russian Federation, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and Azerbaijan as well as 
other locations including Morocco and Tunisia. Hence, as interviewees 
pointed out, the main motivation behind the location strategies of Saipem 
is not attached to traditional considerations such as efficiency- or purely 
market-oriented investment, but it is entirely dependent on the presence 
of natural resources. Once operations in a location are established, 
Saipem aims at a long-lasting presence, given that natural resources are 
immobile. Therefore, labour cost, fiscal incentives, local demand or other 
determinant factors for operations in other sectors tend not to be the 
primary concern of the location strategy of Saipem in the area 
investigated, although they might have a complementary impact. Indeed, 
over 75% of total employment in Saipem around the world is represented 
by personnel from developing countries where natural resources are 
located, suggesting that efficiency-seeking motivations remain important 
for the Italian MNE. 
 
National Framework Conditions, Degree of Integration/Institutional and 
Geographical Proximity 
In line with official policy documents by the European Commission 
(2013) and with the results of the quantitative analysis, interviewees at 
both Finmeccanica and Saipem agree on the importance of rule of law 
and stable and reliable institutions for their operations in the countries 
of the region. Highly convergent are also the views of executives in both 
MNEs on the very limited influence of geographical proximity for their 
location strategies. Both companies highlighted the ‘global’ search for 
investments opportunities that is rarely constrained by spatial distance 
considerations, although one of the Saipem interviewees highlighted 
geographical proximity as an additional factor justifying the selection of 
Croatia for one of their subsidiaries.  
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What remains remarkably distinctive in the strategies of both MNEs 
is their approach to the ‘development’ of institutional proximity with their 
target countries. 
A noticeable example of the complex interaction between market-
seeking motives and institutional factors (i.e. the importance of bilateral 
inter-governmental relations and agreements) comes from the case of 
Finmeccanica in Egypt, where some of the companies owned by 
Finmeccanica have experienced a rapid growth in the last few years. 
Egypt is a strategic country in the region of Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA), with strong political ties with the US. As mentioned in the profile 
section, Finmeccanica is also a US ‘domestic’ group by virtue of its 
acquisition of the US-based DRS Technologies in 2008. Furthermore, a 
number of other controlled or owned companies have strong interests in 
the US market. Therefore, Finmeccanica could benefit synergistically 
from the strong role played by the US in Egypt and, at the same time, 
from the bilateral agreements between Italy and Egypt to operate in this 
country. 
 
Saipem has instead adopted a completely different strategy to develop 
relationships and integration with its host countries, centred on the 
importance of local actors in its activities. Saipem interviewees revealed 
that the success of the presence of Saipem in a country is directly 
connected to the intensity of interactions with local social and 
institutional actors, highlighting the importance of these resources for 
the final product. This strategy is based on a trust-building process with 
local agents through partnerships, sub-contracting practices and 
training of local workforce, leading to the development of a local network 
of collaborations that supports corporate activities and objectives. 
Successful operations require a certain degree of embeddedness in local 
contexts to gain some competitive advantage and secure a long-term 
presence in a relevant location.  
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This clearly recalls what has been recently suggested by scholars in 
terms of network relationships between MNEs and agents within the 
local context (e.g. Crescenzi et al. 2013; McCann and Mudambi, 2005; 
Meyer et al. 2011; Iammarino and McCann, 2013), where MNEs embed 
their practices in local contexts through their foreign affiliates according 
to both corporate objectives and social, economic and institutional 
features existing in the specific local environments. Furthermore, 
training and employing local workers allows foreign affiliates to generate 
and take advantage of new local competitive advantage (Cantwell, 2009; 
Phelps and Waley 2004) as well as incorporating local profiles and 
competences in MNEs activities and objectives. Following this line of 
argument and balancing it with efficiency-seeking considerations, 
Saipem’s strategy is to maximize the employment of local personnel. 
Indeed, over 75% of total employment in Saipem around the world is 
represented by personnel from developing countries where natural 
resources are located. The maximization of what the company defines as 
“local content” of the activities carried out in foreign markets is one of the 
main features of Saipem’s business philosophy. The “local content” 
strategy is aimed at providing considerable social benefits to the host 
country, in terms of investments, employment, development of 
subcontractors and other factors. 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the key evidence emerging from the case 
studies analysis presenting the material in a comparable fashion with the 
quantitative regression analysis. 
 
[Table 2.5 here] 
 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
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This paper analysed the location strategies of Italian Multinationals in 
EU NMs and NCs by means of a mixed-methods approach that allowed 
us to gain a comprehensive picture of both host location and firm-level 
characteristics, which jointly determine MNE choices and strategies. The 
regression analysis assessed the relative importance of alternative 
country-level features as drivers of location choices, whilst the in-depth 
case studies focused on two of the largest Italian MNEs – Finmeccanica 
and Saipem – providing relevant insights and complementing the 
econometric investigation.  
The quantitative and qualitative analyses offer a clear and convergent 
picture of the Italian MNE behaviour in the area. However, the case 
studies highlighted also significant sectoral and functional differences 
across the two firms that would have otherwise remained ‘hidden’ in the 
idiosyncratic components of the regression.  
The overall results show that market-seeking strategies are still 
predominant in driving foreign investments in the EU NMs and NCs. 
Both private and government-related demand exerts a very relevant 
influence. However, the predominantly low-medium tech production 
investments that dominate capital flows between Italy and the area tend 
to be discouraged by congestion costs: increasing urbanisation has a 
negative impact on investments. The high sensitivity of MNEs to cost 
factors (efficiency-seeking) is confirmed by the strong attractive power of 
low wages and natural resources; the quality of the general business 
environment and the rule of law are, as expected, key facilitating factors 
for foreign operations.  
If some ‘common’ factors can be generalised from both the 
quantitative and the qualitative analyses, the ways in which MNEs enter 
the local markets and develop new institutional and functional proximity 
with the local economy tend to remain highly diversified. Multinationals’ 
strategies are influenced by their sector of activity, organisational 
structure, strategic management of the value chains and business 
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culture. In the case of Finmeccanica inter-governmental networks and 
bilateral international agreements are leveraged to enter local markets 
and develop the necessary integration with the target economies. As far 
as Saipem is concerned, institutional assimilation with local markets is 
developed by means of special arrangements such as local training 
initiatives and employment of local workforce (‘local content’), and place-
specific sustainable activities.    
 
In this context the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), by 
strengthening the links between the EU and its neighbourhood in 
institutional, political, social and economic terms, can possibly facilitate 
the development of the ‘framework conditions’ needed for EU MNEs 
investments in the area. More direct interaction with the European Union 
can also facilitate institutional reforms and the pro-investment change in 
the individual countries of the area. However, the results presented in 
this paper suggest that substantial technological upgrading is still 
necessary in order to attract more sophisticated functions and reduce the 
current emphasis on purely market seeking investments. In this context, 
policies supporting human capital and training (and re-training) of the 
local labour force might play a very relevant role.   
A note of caution in interpreting these results is needed, as the 
different methodologies here implemented can offer only a partial view of 
the complexity of MNE strategies. In fact, while the quantitative analysis 
provides a picture of the location attributes that drive MNE choices and 
the qualitative analysis offers a focus on MNE diversity, generalising 
these findings to other contexts can be a misleading exercise. More 
research is certainly needed to explore the interaction between location 
advantages and MNE heterogeneity in determining FDI decisions for 
other samples of countries or regions within countries. 
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Table 2.1: Italian new foreign operations in the EU NMs and NCs 
Country Number of New 
Investment Projects 
(2003-2008)* 
% Outward Direct 
Investment 
Positions 
(USD, Millions) 
2012** 
% 
EU New Member States (NMs) 
Bulgaria 50 9.65 1015.19 1.46 
Czech Republic 15 2.9 1986.65 2.86 
Estonia 2 0.39 63.69 0.09 
Hungary 29 5.6 2683.77 3.87 
Latvia 9 1.74 31.22 0.04 
Lithuania 2 0.39 0.08 0.00 
Malta 1 0.19 693.60 1.00 
Poland 41 7.92 15757.23 22.70 
Romania 58 11.2 4749.54 6.84 
Slovakia 22 4.25 3887.00 5.60 
Slovenia 6 1.16 1634.90 2.36 
Subtotal 235 45.39 32502.85 46.82 
EU Accession and Candidate Countries (ACC) 
Albania 18 3.47 1491.64 2.15 
Bosnia and H. 11 2.12 231.80 0.33 
Croatia 17 3.28 1063.57 1.53 
Macedonia 2 0.39 175.83 0.25 
Montenegro 4 0.77 239.12 0.34 
Serbia 21 4.05 1074.12 1.55 
Turkey 23 4.44 6435.62 9.27 
Subtotal 96 18.52 10711.70 15.43 
ENP Southern Countries (ENP-S) 
Algeria 6 1.16 5889.20 8.48 
Egypt 10 1.93 5723.42 8.24 
Israel 3 0.58 447.40 0.64 
Lebanon 5 0.97 56.11 0.08 
Libya 5 0.97 278.38 0.40 
Morocco 8 1.54 403.55 0.58 
Syria 1 0.19 421.96 0.61 
Tunisia 17 3.28 997.21 1.44 
Subtotal 55 10.62 14217.22 20.48 
ENP Eastern Countries (ENP-E) 
Armenia 1 0.19 186.77 0.27 
Azerbaijan 4 0.77 175.60 0.25 
Belarus 1 0.19 48.81 0.07 
Georgia 2 0.39 39.20 0.06 
Moldova 3 0.58 122.57 0.18 
Ukraine 22 4.25 879.26 1.27 
Subtotal 33 6.37 1452.21 2.09 
Russia 99 19.11 10536.55 15.18 
Total 518 100 69420.53 100.00 
* Source: FDi Markets data; **Source: IMF data 
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Table 2.2: Italian new foreign operations in the EU NMs and NCs by business 
activity 
Business Activity n % 
CORE BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 251 48.45 
Construction 27 5.21 
Manufacturing 220 42.47 
Other 4 0.77 
SUPPORT BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 267 51.54 
Distribution and Logistics 28 5.41 
Marketing, sales and after sales servicing 167 32.23 
Retail 121 23.36 
Sales, Marketing & Support 44 8.49 
Other 2 0.38 
ICT Services 0 0 
Administrative and management functions 68 13.12 
Business Services 67 12.93 
Other 1 0.19 
Engineering and related technical services 2 0.39 
R&D 2 0.39 
Total 518 100 
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Table 2.3: Italian new foreign operations in the EU NMS and NCs by sector 
Sector n % 
MANUFACTURING 352 67.95 
High-Medium Technology  107 20.66 
Automotive Components 12 2.32 
Automotive OEM 20 3.86 
Consumer Electronics 17 3.28 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment & Tools 20 3.86 
Other 38 7.34 
Medium-Low Technology 245 47.3 
Building & Construction Materials 16 3.09 
Consumer Products 16 3.09 
Food & Tobacco 18 3.47 
Textiles 138 26.64 
Other 57 11.00 
SERVICES 137 26.45 
High Knowledge-Intensive 86 16.6 
Financial Services 71 13.71 
Other 15 2.9 
Low Knowledge-Intensive 51 9.85 
Hotels & Tourism 14 2.7 
Real Estate 16 3.09 
Transportation 15 2.9 
Other 6 1.16 
PRIMARY 29 5.6 
Total 518 100 
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Table 2.4: Poisson regression results 
Dep.Var.: Investment count 1 2 3 
Market-Seeking       
Internal market size t-1 2.776*** 1.873*** 1.703*** 
 0.511 0.561 0.612 
Government consumption 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 
 0.011 0.01 0.01 
Agglomeration -0.054 -0.111** -0.100** 
 0.04 0.0432 0.044 
Efficiency- and Resource-Seeking    
Average wage -1.651** -3.411*** -3.241*** 
 0.656 0.596 0.63 
Education -0.447 -1.029** -1.019** 
 0.502 0.504 0.493 
Natural resources rents 0.037*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 
 0.004 0.003 0.003 
National Framework Conditions    
Control of corruption t-1 0.519*** 0.149 0.14 
 0.148 0.154 0.148 
Rule of law t-1 0.024 0.814*** 0.833*** 
 0.194 0.164 0.164 
Degree of Integration/Institutional Proximity    
Exports 0.009** 0.008* 0.008* 
 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Italian presence  0.450*** 0.458*** 
  0.0534 0.054 
EU membership   -0.044 
   0.055 
Ex-Colony   2.427 
   2.392 
Geographical Proximity    
Distance 0.007*** -0.005* -0.005* 
 0.002 0.003 0.003 
Constant -63.0*** -6.3 -3.6 
  10.43 14.13 14.95 
Observations 518 518 518 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes 
log likelihood -3286 -3068 -3065 
pseudo R-squared 0.908 0.914 0.915 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2.5: Summary Table of Case Studies 
 SAIPEM FINMECCANICA 
  NMs ENP NMs ENP 
Entry mode 
Subsidiary 
(Croatia, 
Romania) 
Partnerships 
and 
representative 
offices (e.g. 
Algeria, 
Azerbaijan) 
Acquisition 
(Poland) 
Joint-Ventures 
/Partnerships 
      
Market-Seeking 
Hubs for wider 
regions 
0 
Government 
Demand / 
Hubs for wider 
regions 
+ 
     
Efficiency- and 
Resource-Seeking 
0 
+ for Natural 
Resources 
+ for Human 
Capital 
0 
     
National Framework 
Conditions 
+ + + + 
     
Degree of 
Integration/Institutional 
Proximity 
EU 
Local 
embeddedness 
and 'local 
content' 
EU 
Bilateral inter-
governmental 
agreements 
     
Geographical Proximity 
Relevant for the 
choice of 
Croatia 
0 0 0 
     
Source: based on interviews with executives       
Legend: + Relevant; 0 neutral/not relevant    
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Appendix B 
 
GUIDELINES/QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
TO 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
 
SECTION 1: GENERAL INFORMATION ON CORPORATE GROUP 
1.Key facts about your Enterprise (e.g. general info, presentation, industrial 
sector, core strategy / aim, main facts and figures, etc.) 
 
2.Enterprise structure (e.g. geographical distribution of functions/activities) 
 
3.Where does your Enterprise have operations in the European 
Neighbouring Policy (ENP) area? 
 
Northern Africa / Middle East East and Caucasus 
□ Morocco □ Ukraine 
□ Algeria □ Belarus 
□ Tunisia □ Moldova 
□ Libya □ Georgia 
□ Egypt □ Armenia 
□ Syria □ Azerbaijan 
□ Lebanon  
□ Jordan  
□ Palestine  
□ Israel 
 
 
SECTION 2: LOCATION  
(When answering this question please refer to ENP countries as 
indicated in question 3b) 
 
4. What are the main considerations behind the selection of a location for 
investment within the ENPs? (e.g. natural resources, new markets, 
costs/efficiency, strategic assets/competences, etc.) 
 
5. What are the functions or activities that your Enterprise locates in the 
ENPs? (Headquarter, R&D, marketing/sales, production, logistic & 
distribution, etc.) 
 
6. Your presence in the UK and in the ENP area is part of a larger strategy? 
How? (e.g. creation of a corporate global network, penetration vs. 
consolidation, relations with competitors, relations with partners, 
customers/suppliers, etc.) 
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7. What are the entry modes of your Enterprise in the ENPs? (e.g. joint 
venture, M&A, sub-contracting, other business agreements, etc.) 
 
SECTION 3: LOCAL LINKAGES 
 
8. What are the localised social and economics actors your Enterprise 
establishes relationships with in the ENPs? (e.g. local firms, other foreign 
subsidiaries, universities/research centres, trade unions, industry 
associations, other organisations, etc.) 
 
9. What is the aim of establishing relationships with local actors in the 
ENPs? (e.g. suppliers/customers, competitors, technological 
collaborations/training/joint research projects, institutional 
support/bureaucracy, etc.) 
 
10. To what extent relationships with local actors are formalised in the 
ENPs? (e.g. formal vs. informal, trust-based/control, permanent vs. 
temporarily relationships, etc.) 
 
11. Does co-location (in the same subnational region/locality) play a role in 
determining what local actors are selected for establishing relationships with 
in the UK? And in the ENPs? 
 
12. To what extent relationships with local actors in the ENPs contribute to 
the innovation activities of your Enterprise? (e.g. what kind of knowledge is 
transmitted through such relationships? Product/process innovation, 
solutions to technical problems, project support, basic vs. advanced 
knowledge, etc.) 
 
SECTION 4: LOCAL CONTEXT 
 
13. What are the strengths and weaknesses of the ENPs in the long-term 
strategy of your Enterprise? Please indicate the importance of the following 
points from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very strong): 
 
□ Labour cost; 
□ Quality of human capital; 
□ Competition; 
□ Political framework; 
□ Regulation/bureaucracy; 
□ Institutional quality; 
□ Technological/scientific base; 
□ Business culture 
□ Other (please specify) 
 
14. How does your Enterprise reacts to the above mentioned weaknesses in 
the ENP 
context? (e.g. training, lobby, etc.) 
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Chapter 3 – Economic Institutions and 
the Location Strategies of European 
Multinationals in their Geographical 
Neighbourhood 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades the European Union (EU) has strongly 
intensified economic and political relationships with its geographically 
neighbouring countries. Two rounds of enlargement in 2004 and 2007 
brought several ex-socialist economies under the aegis of the EU, Croatia 
joined in 2013, and more countries are currently candidate to 
membership. In addition, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was 
launched in 2004, with the aim of creating a ring of countries across the 
Mediterranean and the East of Europe with which the EU could intensify 
economic linkages as well as develop peaceful and cooperative 
relationships (COM, 2004; Wesselink and Boschma, 2012). The complex 
set of connections that the EU has established with a wide range of 
actors in the area has gradually enhanced the economic and institutional 
integration between the EU itself and its counterparts. While full 
economic integration was attained with the New Member States (NMS), 
the interactions with candidate countries and ENP countries are still 
growing.  
In this scenario, Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) from the Old EU-
15 members have had wide and increasing opportunities to expand their 
operations within the continent and beyond its immediate borders. The 
aim of this paper is to study the location of investments undertaken by 
EU-15 MNEs towards a wide set of locations integrated or linked to 
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different extents the Union: NMS, Accession and Candidate Countries as 
well as ENP countries and the Russian Federation.19 This is a highly 
heterogeneous group of EU members, transition and developing 
countries, the latter two groups having in common their geographical 
proximity to the EU. This entails a set of privileged relationships with the 
Union, ranging from full membership in the case of NMS, accession 
treaties, action plans within the ENP framework, and bilateral 
agreements in the case of Russia. 
 
In particular the paper aims to analyse the role of economic 
institutions in shaping MNE greenfield investment location decisions 
once new opportunities and geographical options are made available by 
tighter economic integration or more favourable preconditions for foreign 
investments as a result of formal agreements. By exploiting the unique 
conditions offered by the selected group of countries with varying degrees 
of economic integration with the EU and highly heterogeneous 
institutional conditions, the paper focuses on three key dimensions of 
the recipient economies: (i) regulatory characteristics connected to both 
national labour markets and business conditions; (ii) legal aspects 
relevant in market transactions, i.e. property rights protection and 
degree of contract enforcement; (iii) weight of government intervention in 
the host countries’ economies.  
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it innovatively 
combines the literature on institutional conditions with the analysis of 
MNEs location strategies by focusing, differently from other existing 
works, on economic institutions and their different dimensions. In fact, 
although the institutional environment of recipient countries has been 
the object of analysis of a number of studies, the great majority of this 
                                                 
19
 The countries here considered are 21, namely: (a) NMS: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia; (b) Accession and candidate countries: 
Albania, Croatia (which joined the EU in July 2013) and Turkey; (c) ENP: Ukraine; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia; (d) Russian Federation. 
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literature focuses on political, rather than economic, features of the 
national institutional setting (e.g. Campos and Kinoshita, 2003). Second, 
the paper acknowledges right from the start the high heterogeneity of 
MNE behaviour with reference to economic institutions, therefore making 
use in the empirical strategy of a random-coefficient Mixed Logit (MXL) 
model (still rarely employed in this field of research)20 in order to fully 
capture this heterogeneity and its drivers.21 The investigation of the 
diversity of MNE preferences is still an underdeveloped area of enquiry, 
especially as far as quantitative analyses are concerned, while qualitative 
approaches have already started to explore such a dimension (e.g. Phelps 
and Wu, 2009). Hence, this work contributes to the ongoing scholarly 
debate by empirically testing the nature and magnitude of MNE 
preferences with respect to recipient countries’ institutions. In so doing, 
the paper also explores how heterogeneous preferences in MNE 
localisation strategies vary across different sectors of economic activity 
and business functions. Third, notwithstanding the increasing geo-
political and economic importance of the EU ‘neighbourhood’, there is 
very limited empirical evidence on the (evolving) position in global 
investment networks of this set of countries. Filling this gap is crucially 
important for the design of appropriate development policies by the 
European Union, as well as for national governments and a number of 
international organisations active in the area (e.g. United Nation 
Development Programme and the World Bank among others). 
The analysis is based on the combination of data on 6,888 greenfield 
investment projects undertaken between 2003 and 2008 by MNEs from 
EU-15 countries into a set of 21 destination countries, and Fraser 
Institute data on their economic institutional conditions. The paper 
firstly applies a standard Conditional Logit model in order to maximise 
                                                 
20
 See Defever (2006; 2012) and Cheng (2008) for previous modelling of MNEs location choices with 
random-coefficient Mixed Logit.  
21
 This methodology allows to model variation of preferences over location attributes in MNEs strategies. 
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comparability with existing studies and, in a subsequent step, explores 
MNEs’ behavioural heterogeneity by means of random-coefficient Mixed 
Logit. Although we should refrain from any causal interpretation of the 
results, the empirical analysis suggests that economic institutions play a 
highly significant role in shaping greenfield investment decisions after 
controlling for other economic characteristics of the host economies, 
showing significant heterogeneity in MNEs’ preferences over different 
institutional settings both by sector and by function of the MNE. 
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of 
the relevant literature on MNE location behaviour and on the role of 
economic institutions in attracting foreign investors, identifying the main 
research questions and hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 describes data 
and a variable used in the analysis, and provides some descriptive 
evidence about the location of European foreign investment in the group 
of countries of interest and their institutional conditions. The 
methodology is discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Finally, some concluding remarks and tentative policy 
implications are drawn in Section 6.   
 
3.2 MNEs location strategies, host economy 
advantages and institutional conditions 
3.2.1 MNEs and host economy advantages  
The analytical framework for the analysis of MNE location decisions is 
Dunning (1977, 1988)’s Ownership-Location-Internalisation (OLI) eclectic 
paradigm. The OLI framework implies that the existence of ownership-
specific advantages (O) possessed by some firms may lead to the decision 
to internalise (I) activities and to undertake operations in sites endowed 
with location-specific advantages (L). Consequently, the combination of 
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(O), (L) and (I) advantages justifies MNEs’ existence and their ability to 
maximize their productive efficiency while minimising the impact of 
uncertain and imperfect markets on their operations.  
However, whilst the interactions between ownership and 
internalisation advantages have been extensively investigated (see for 
example the seminal work by Buckley and Casson, 1976; Teece, 1977; 
Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982), the study of location advantages has 
suffered from a number of conceptual and empirical constraints, among 
which the problematic conceptualisation of space and the severe 
restriction in data availability (McCann and Mudambi, 2005; Iammarino 
and McCann, 2013).  
 
In the traditional empirical economics literature attention has been 
directed to factor endowments in a broad sense, including, among other 
location drivers, physical infrastructure (e.g. Coughlin et al., 1991), tax 
differentials (e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 1998), policy instruments (Basile 
et al., 2008), and labour costs (e.g. Liu et al., 2010). Urban and regional 
economics contributions have focused on agglomeration economies, 
spatially bounded externalities and the geographical concentration of 
economic activity as drivers of MNEs’ location behaviour (e.g. Head et al. 
1995; 1999; Guimarães et al., 2000; Crozet et al., 2004; Disdier and 
Mayer, 2004; Devereux et al., 2007; Mayer et al. 2010; Hilber and Voicu, 
2010; Spies, 2010). Furthermore, empirical studies within the New 
Economic Geography have shown that not only MNEs tend to replicate 
the location decisions of previous firms with similar attributes, but 
agglomeration effects also act through demand linkages (Head and 
Mayer, 2004) as well as specialised inputs supply (LaFountain, 2005).  
 
The Economic Geography literature has more recently focussed on 
the fragmentation of international activities of MNEs along functional 
lines. This stream of research has highlighted that MNE location 
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behaviour and the fragmentation of production processes into different 
functions respond to spatial concentration mechanisms (Defever, 2006 & 
2012; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009). The concept of Global Value 
Chains has been more recently added to this debate with the analysis of 
the linkages between MNEs location behaviour along value chains and 
the innovative and socio-economic environment of host locations 
(Crescenzi et al., 2014). These analyses suggest that MNE location of 
different business functions/Global Value Chain stages may follow 
different corporate strategies according to the characteristics of the 
investor, the location and the specific operation offshored. Besides, the 
location choice is influenced by the phase of firms’ life cycle, leading to a 
co-evolution of location decisions and accumulation of firms’ capabilities 
(Stam, 2007). Entry modes of MNEs into foreign markets are also shaped 
by spatial heterogeneity through the interaction between the strength of 
local externalities and firms’ competencies (Mariotti et al., 2014). 
 
Technological regimes and systems of innovation conditions have 
been extensively analysed in the literature at the intersection between 
Economic Geography and International Business (Beugelsdijk and 
Mudambi, 2013). The international spatial allocation of MNE activities 
tends to be marked by the existence of ‘core and periphery’ patterns 
according to the complexity of activities (McCann and Mudambi, 2005), 
leading to differences in territorial trajectories and growth dynamics and 
to cumulative causation mechanisms (e.g. Cantwell and Iammarino, 
1998 & 2001). Since technological development tends to be cumulative in 
nature and characterised by elements that are bounded in specific 
places, it is suggested that MNEs establish networks for innovation 
across locations by tapping into regional profiles of specialisation and 
strengthening local technological competencies, thus feeding a regional 
hierarchy of centres across and within national boundaries (Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2003). The interactions between regional knowledge bases 
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and MNEs technological strategies are investigated in terms of knowledge 
spillovers and externalities, particularly in the European (e.g. Cantwell 
and Santangelo, 1999; Cantwell and Piscitello, 2005) and the US context 
(Almeida, 1996).  
3.2.2 Economic institutions and MNEs investments  
The importance of economic institutions for economic performance 
and investments is widely acknowledged in the political economy 
literature (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2005). Economic institutions affect the structure of incentives 
in the economy, influencing the stability and predictability of market 
(and non-market) transactions. In this sense they play a crucial role in 
shaping capital accumulation and (public and private) investments at all 
levels (Acemoglu et al., 2005). However, empirical research has primarily 
focused on domestic capital formation, with limited attention to the 
importance of economic institutions in driving foreign MNE investment 
decisions. Institutions influence MNEs’ operations abroad by a) directly 
shaping the returns on their investments and the associated risk (direct 
effect); b) indirectly impacting upon other key investment drivers such as 
human capital and infrastructure (indirect effect) (see Knack and Keefer, 
1995).  
In particular the existing literature – still rather limited in terms of 
geographical coverage – has failed both to agree on the direct importance 
of institutional conditions versus other location drivers, and to reach a 
clear consensus on what typologies of institutions matter (if at all) for 
MNE investment decisions. The seminal contribution by Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) – looking at foreign investments of US Multinationals – 
combines a number of institutional indicators (including ‘stability of 
labour’, ‘red tapes’, ‘quality of the legal system’, etc.) and compares them 
with ‘classical’ factor endowment, agglomeration and ‘openness’ 
indicators. The empirical analysis concludes that US investments abroad 
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are not driven by the institutional environment of the recipient 
economies but by other factors only indirectly influenced by institutions: 
even though sectoral and geographical heterogeneity turns out to be 
significant, factor endowments and openness remain the key investment 
drivers. 
 
This evidence has been challenged by a number of subsequent 
studies that try to open the institutional ‘black-box’, aiming to 
disentangle the relative importance of specific sub-components of the 
host institutional environment and its ‘distance’ from that of the MNE’s 
home country. Very diverse sets of institutional conditions have been 
tested in different studies under the constraint of data availability for 
different groups of countries and time periods. Wei (2000) is the first 
study to re-open the debate by means of a comprehensive data set on 
bilateral FDI flows: his results suggest a negative relationship between 
corruption in the host country and FDI. Henisz (2000) looks at the 
negative impact of governance costs, while Campos and Kinoshita (2003) 
suggest that bureaucracy quality and rule of law are relevant drivers of 
FDI. In a similar vein, Globerman and Shapiro (2002) look at both inward 
and outward FDI in a large sample of countries, finding a significant and 
positive association between MNEs’ investments and a composite 
indicator of institutional quality. Meon and Sekkat (2004) investigate the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economies suggesting that it is 
political risk in general, rather than one particular institutional aspect, 
which limits FDI into a given country in the area. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007) – who look at the link between bilateral FDI flows and institutional 
quality (captured by means of Fraser Institute indicators as in the 
present paper) – conclude that “good institutions almost always increase 
the amount of FDI received” (p.780), at the same time stressing the 
heterogeneity associated to distance in terms of institutional 
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arrangements between the origin and the destination country of the 
investment.   
A few complementary studies have looked at MNE location strategies 
at the sub-national level: within countries the degree of economic 
integration is higher and (formal) institutional arrangements are 
generally more homogenous, making it easier to capture the impact of 
other aspects of governance quality. Phelps et al. (2003), Phelps (2004), 
and Fuller (2005) find evidence of the importance of sub-national 
supportive institutions in different areas of the UK. Du et al. (2008) 
investigate the location decisions of US MNEs investing in Chinese 
provinces over the period 1993-2001 by looking at several indices of 
economic institutions. Using a conditional logit model the authors 
suggest that US MNE location behaviour reacts positively to stronger 
protection of property rights, relatively limited role of government in 
business, lower government corruption and more adequate contracting 
environment. These elements provide strong incentives to US MNEs to 
locate in Chinese provinces.  
 
Another small number of studies have concentrated their attention on 
specific economic institutions and MNE behaviour. Three key dimensions 
emerge as the core components of economic institutions with a potential 
direct impact on the location decisions of foreign investments: regulatory 
framework conditions (with reference to both labour and capital 
investments, i.e. labour market and business regulations respectively), 
the legal environment (property rights and contracts’ enforcement) and 
the role of public expenditure in the economy. 
 
Labour market regulation 
Existing literature on the relationship between labour market 
regulation and foreign investment is scant. Using OECD data, Dewitt et 
al. (2003) highlight that unfavourable employment protection differential 
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between destination and origin countries is harmful for investment. 
Other studies suggest that more flexible labour markets in recipient 
countries are positively correlated to higher inflows of investment from 
abroad (Cooke, 1997; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2005). On the other 
hand, locating in a country with a more regulated labour market could 
be associated with a firm’s higher productivity: thus, some stages of 
production or certain sectors will tend to locate in more regulated labour 
markets (Haucap et al., 1997).  
Therefore, beyond the conventional belief and weak evidence that 
more rigid labour markets represent a cost for foreign investors, it is 
possible to argue that countries with different labour market regulations 
attract different types of foreign investment. For instance, Lee (2003) 
suggests that the existence of labour unions positively affects firms’ 
greenfield location of new plants in the Korean automotive industry. 
Delbecque et al. (2014) – evaluating the impact of labour market 
institutions on the location strategies of French MNEs in the OECD 
countries – suggest that labour market rigidity might reduce FDI 
attractiveness, but the magnitude of the effect is limited when compared 
to other investment drivers such as market potential. 
 
Business regulation 
The empirical literature on the role of business regulation in general 
economic performance has only recently appeared (Djankov et al., 2006). 
In this respect, the quality of the business environment is a crucial 
determinant of performance since it stimulates investment. Accordingly, 
more business-friendly environments can be attractive for MNEs, which 
can operate in a context where bureaucratic and administrative costs are 
less relevant. Daude and Stein (2007) suggest that the regulatory quality 
is the single most important investment driver. Similar conclusions are 
reached by Kaditi (2013) looking at South-eastern European countries. 
Positive effects of a more deregulated business environment are also 
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suggested by Kaplan et al. (2011): however, the latter study also 
highlights that such effects are only temporary and much less important 
than conventional wisdom holds. Globerman and Shapiro (2002) 
conclude that it is not regulation per se that matters but the 
effectiveness of its implementation and enforcement. 
 
Property rights 
The role of property rights is widely debated in the existing literature 
on economic institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) claim that the protection 
of property rights plays a crucial role in shaping long-run development 
trajectories. First, more secure property rights both encourage 
individuals to invest and raise return rates by protecting against 
expropriation from the government or powerful groups (Besley, 1995; 
Goldstein and Udry, 2008). Secondly, uncertain property rights may 
determine costs that individuals have to pay to protect their property. 
Thirdly, secure property rights may facilitate gains from trade by 
enabling the mobility of assets as factors of production (Besley, 1995). As 
a consequence, MNEs may prefer locations where property rights are 
better acknowledged and rightfully protected by the legal system. Again 
there is no consensus in the empirical literature on the practical 
importance of this particular institutional aspect: Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007) and Du et al. (2008) find a positive and significant effect, while 
Daniele and Marani (2011) suggest that only organised crime works as a 
deterrent for foreign investments while there is no effect of other property 
rights infringements. 
 
Contract enforcement  
The importance of contract enforcement relies on the fact that market 
transactions and the general functioning of the economy are more 
predictable when economic agents know that contracts will be legally 
binding and they can use courts to resolve business disputes. In this 
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respect, Markusen (2001) suggests that MNEs benefit from locations with 
strong and reliable contract enforcement since they can credibly commit 
to investment. Daude and Stein (2007) find a positive and significant 
impact in a large cross section of world economies, Kaditi (2013) 
confirms this result for Southern-European countries and Du et al. 
(2008) find evidence that better contract enforcement in Chinese regions 
attracts US multinationals.  
 
Government Intervention  
From a conceptual point of view, a large role of government could lead 
to inefficiencies and rent-seeking (Shleifer and Vishny, 1999). Therefore, 
MNEs may prefer location where governments play a relatively marginal 
role in the economy. For instance, Du et al. (2008) argue that stronger 
government intervention in business operations tends to discourage 
MNEs from locating in a particular region. Pogrebnyakov and Maitland 
(2011) reach similar conclusions looking at the telecommunication 
market in Europe and South America. On the other hand, however, 
governments often buy products from foreign firms, either directly or 
through state-owned enterprises, or purchase goods from domestic firms 
that are vertically connected with MNEs’ subsidiaries. In this sense, 
larger public sector consumption may be an appealing feature for MNEs 
since it increases the size of host countries’ markets.  
 
3.3 Data 
3.3.1 MNE Investment 
We employ information on individual investment projects undertaken 
by MNEs over the period 2003-2008 provided by the FDi Markets-
Financial Times Business database, which includes all cross-border 
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greenfield and brownfield investment.22 Foreign firms’ operations are 
identified by Financial Times analysts through a wide variety of sources, 
including nearly 9,000 media sources, project data from over 1,000 
industry organisations and investment agencies, and data purchased 
from market research and publication companies. Furthermore, each 
project is cross-referenced across multiple sources and more than 90% of 
investment projects are validated with company sources. In addition, 
Crescenzi et al. (2014) show that investment decisions captured by this 
database are highly correlated with other macro-level data on FDI from 
UNCTAD and the World Bank.  
 
Specifically, this paper makes use of investment projects originated in 
EU-15 countries and directed towards EU New Member States (NMS) and 
European Neighbouring Countries (NCs), the latter being Accession 
Countries (ACC), European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries and 
the Russian Federation.23 Since the aim of the analysis here is to 
investigate MNE location choices, only data on greenfield investment are 
considered, since the location of brownfield investment is clearly a 
function of greenfield investments undertaken in previous periods: 
hence, only greenfield investment are subject to a choice based on 
location attributes.  
Table 3.1 provides information on new investment projects in 2003-
2008 originating from EU-15 countries in NMS (panel A) and NCs, that is 
Balkan and Eastern countries (panel B) and Northern African and Middle 
East countries (panel C). It is not surprising that about 62% of EU-15 
investors still choose to remain in the EU by selecting a destination 
                                                 
22
 In this database joint ventures are tracked only when they lead to new physical operations, whereas 
Mergers & Acquisitions as well as other equity investment are not included. Overall, the inclusion in the 
dataset is conditional on the fact that investment projects generate new employment or capital investment. 
23
 Investment from the EU-27 and the whole world towards the same destination countries are also 
employed to test the attractiveness of the countries of interest with different samples. 
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among NMS.24 In this area, Romania, Poland and Hungary are the top 
three destinations, with about 14.7%, 10.9% and 9.8% of EU-15 
investment, respectively. The trend over the 2000s, however, suggests 
that the huge attractiveness of NMS reached its peak in anticipation to 
the full EU membership and it is now declining, replicating a pattern 
rather typical of previous EU enlargements and restructuring. In the 
NCs, instead, MNEs’ presence has increased particularly since the mid-
2000s. In terms of cumulative inflows, the most selected destination 
outside the European Union is Russia, with a share of 19%. The rest of 
the Balkans and the East attracts an additional 10% of EU-15 
investment in the area, whilst Northern Africa and Middle East account 
for about 8%.  
 
[Table 3.1 here] 
 
3.3.2 Institutional Conditions 
A large number of institutional variables are publicly available, 
ranging from measures of governance to political indicators. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in previous sections, this paper is primarily 
concerned with the notion of economic institutions. The aim is in fact 
covering some aspects of national institutional settings that directly 
characterise a country’s economic life and affect the degree of 
attractiveness towards foreign investment.  
In line with other existing studies on foreign investments and 
institutions (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007; Delbeque et al. 2011), we 
employ data from the Fraser Institute as it provides information for all 
countries covered in our analysis. This dataset contains a number of 
indicators reflecting several economic dimensions of national 
institutional contexts. In particular, we employ the following four 
                                                 
24
 Most of NMS entered the EU in 2004, while Romania and Bulgaria joined in 2007. 
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measures of institutional quality: labour market regulation, business 
regulation, protection of property rights, and legal enforcement of 
contracts. In addition, we use data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) to include the relevance of government 
expenditure in destination countries. With these five indicators we cover 
three main areas of the economic-institutional environment: (i) regulatory 
aspects (in labour market and business), (ii) legal aspects (property rights 
and contract enforcement), and (iii) extent of public intervention in the 
economy.  
Labour market regulation: our variable for labour market regulation 
proxies the flexibility of national labour markets. This is an index 
encompassing information on countries’ hiring and firing rules, collective 
bargaining, worker dismissal costs, conscription, working hours and 
minimum wage. Higher values of the index are associated to more flexible 
regulatory settings.  
Business regulation: this indicator includes costs associated to 
bureaucracy, taxes, bribes and other administrative burdens that may 
discourage MNEs from starting a business in a country. As above, this is 
an index with higher values reflecting a less regulated environment.  
Protection of property rights: we measure property rights protection by 
means of an index assuming higher values when property rights are 
more protected.  
Legal enforcement of contracts: this aspect refers to the capacity and 
effectiveness of courts to enforce rules and contracts between parties. 
This is measured with an index taking higher values for countries with 
better contracting environments.  
Government intervention: we employ the percentage of general 
government’s final consumption expenditure on GDP, as provided by the 
World Bank’s WDI.  
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Table 3.1 above includes information on the characteristics of the 
economic institutions of the countries under analysis. Institutional 
conditions are heterogeneous across the countries of the EU geographical 
vicinity but generally comparable. The NMs show, on average, higher 
values of the institutional indicators and generally higher shares of 
public expenditure in total GDP when compared to other countries in the 
group. The Balkans and the East, in comparison with the NMs, show 
lower average values for the economic institution indicators: this group 
includes some countries candidate to EU membership, a process that 
formally requires gradual institutional convergence towards EU 
standards. The final set of countries includes Northern Africa and the 
Middle East. In this group average values of the institutional indicators 
are upward biased by Israel and Jordan: after excluding these latter two 
countries, the average institutional quality of the area is lower than in 
the other groups. Overall, the countries covered in the analysis offer an 
ample variety of institutional arrangements that is deemed particularly 
suitable to test the location behaviour of MNEs. 
 
3.3.3 Other location drivers 
The analysis of the link between MNE location choices and economic 
institutions requires taking into account other relevant characteristics of 
the host economies. In line with the literature on MNE location choices, 
this paper employs several control variables that reflect different 
potential drivers for the localisation strategies of MNEs.  
 
First, demand is considered as one of the main factors attracting 
European investors into foreign markets. Both internal and external 
demand is taken into account. Internal demand fundamentally reflects 
the market size of the host countries and it is measured through their 
own GDP at constant prices, in 2005 US dollars. In line with theory and 
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existing evidence, it is expected that a larger market size will attract more 
foreign investors (Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Billington, 1999). External 
demand is instead captured by means of a standard market potential 
(MP) indicator á la Harris (1954), as customary in the literature. Similar 
to the internal market demand, it is expected that market potential is 
positively associated with the location strategies of MNEs. 
 
Trade costs are controlled for by employing a measure of geographical 
distance between the most populated cities of origin and destination 
countries in the sample: intuitively, greater geographical distance is 
expected to discourage foreign investors (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; 
Kleinert and Toubal, 2010). Furthermore, a dummy variable indicating 
national border contiguity between origin and destination countries is 
included.  
 
Some characteristics of national labour markets are also controlled 
for. The education level of host countries is taken into account by means 
of the ratio of secondary school age population to total population. 
Notwithstanding the existence of better proxies of human capital at the 
national level, this appears to be the only available indicator for the 
destination countries in our sample. A positive relationship is expected 
between this variable and the location of MNEs. Moreover, the effect of 
average wage is indirectly captured through per capita GDP (see Alsan et 
al., 2006). Indeed, wage data are rarely available for most destination 
countries in the sample and per capita GDP may represent a fair 
alternative. A negative relationship is expected between this proxy for 
input cost and MNEs location behaviour. 
 
Furthermore, different measures of agglomeration economies are 
considered. The percentage of urban population on total population is 
included to control for the relative importance of cities in generating 
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externalities (Glaeser et al., 1992; Head et al., 1995). An indicator for the 
stock of past foreign investment in location j is constructed. This 
measure captures firm-specific agglomeration effects that may derive 
from the advantages accruing to an MNE by locating where other MNEs 
have previously invested. Hence, the existing stock of investment should 
inform whether firms’ past experience drives further location decisions 
(Basile et al., 2008). In constructing this variable available information 
on brownfield investment is also considered because corporate 
expansions signal to a new investor that previous multinational firms 
attach additional importance to a specific location. Since the mere count 
of investment projects undertaken in previous years does not reveal 
much about investors’ behaviour, the analysis takes into consideration 
the potential occurrence of a ‘national ownership’ effect in each time 
period, which would suggests the existence of patterns in the strategies 
of MNEs on the basis of their nationality. Therefore, a stock variable is 
generated for each location according to the MNEs’ country of origin: in 
line with studies exploring the role of agglomeration externalities, a 
positive relationship is expected with the location choice (Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Barrel and Pain, 1999). 
 
A set of cultural variables includes dummies indicating whether 
origin and destination countries share cultural characteristics, thereby 
controlling for whether countries speak common official or unofficial 
languages, had a common colonizer after 1945, had a colonial 
relationship after 1945, and have been a single national entity. These 
variables are frequently employed in studies on the internationalisation 
decisions of firms (Rauch, 1999; Perez-Villar and Seric, 2014).  
 
Finally, national fixed effects are included to control for any 
unobserved factor that operates at the country level and may play a role 
in attracting foreign investment.  
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Appendix C provides a description of all variables employed in the 
analysis; all are available for years from 2003 to 2008. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Capturing MNEs heterogeneous preferences for economic 
institutions: Mixed Logit Models 
Following McFadden (1974), the great majority of the empirical 
literature on investment location decisions implies that MNE strategies 
are fundamentally driven by individual maximization choices. In other 
words, it is thought that MNEs select locations on the basis of the 
expected utility or profit that each site may yield on the basis of the 
characteristics of the host economies. Conditional Logit (CL) models allow 
exploring the effect of alternative-specific attributes on the probabilities 
that firms select a particular location among the set of alternatives. The 
main assumption in the CL is the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
(IIA), which implies that the error term εij is independent across 
locations.  
An extension of the analysis of MNE location behaviour is developed 
by implementing a Mixed Logit (MXL) model. This is basically a 
generalization of the standard logit and offers the possibility to relax 
completely any restriction associated with the IIA. The existing literature 
on MNE location choices has rarely employed MXL, despite the 
advantages associated to it. Notable exceptions are relatively recent and 
include works by Defever (2006; 2012), Cheng (2008) and Basile et al. 
(2008). The present analysis implements a random-coefficient derivation 
of the MXL, in line with Defever (2006; 2012) and Cheng (2008), with the 
aim of analysing whether MNEs have heterogeneous preferences over 
location attributes when they strategically select a location for greenfield 
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investment.25 The analysis of the literature has shown that it is 
unrealistic to expect unambiguous results. Indeed, this paper aims to 
test if the lack of consensus on the role of specific institutional features 
of host economies might be explained precisely by the heterogeneity of 
MNEs’ preferences over specific institutional attributes. It is plausible 
that some MNEs tend to prefer locations with weaker economic 
institutions because they aim at bypassing or eluding transparent 
market mechanisms when undertaking business operations abroad. For 
instance, weaker economic institutions might facilitate rent-seeking or 
moral hazard behaviour, the creation of monopolistic positions, or simply 
allow capturing a share of host countries’ public resources, through 
lobbying, subsidies or less legalized channels, such as corruption. This is 
particularly relevant in the case of the present study since the locations 
of interest encompass several transition and developing economies that 
are characterized by little transparency, weak democratic decision-
making processes as well as strong vested interests that may influence 
market mechanisms. To take this into consideration, random coefficients 
are attached to variables of economics institutions, while fixed 
coefficients are kept for the remaining location drivers. 
 
Accounting for heterogeneity of MNE locations’ characteristics 
formally means that the parameter β, associated with an observable 
characteristic x of location j, can vary randomly across MNEs.  Formally, 
the profit equation that each firm maximizes when investing abroad can 
be specified as: 
 
(1)                                                            𝜋𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
 
                                                 
25
 Basile et al. (2008) adopt an error-component derivation aimed at investigating substitution patterns 
among alternative locations. 
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where the vector of parameters β′  for firm i reflects firm’s preference over 
observable location attributes x. Thus, in the setting of random-
coefficient MLX parameters β are not fixed as in CL, but they can reveal 
MNEs’ taste variation regarding location characteristics. Coefficients vary 
across MNEs in the population with distribution density f (β). Following 
Train (2003), each MNE knows its own βi (as well as εij) for all alternatives 
and select the location that offers higher profit. However, random 
coefficients βi remain unobserved and it is only possible to specify a 
distribution for them26. By doing this, parameters θ (i.e. mean b and 
standard deviation s) of the coefficients βi can be estimated. In this 
paper, a normal distribution is specified for random coefficients 
associated with economic institutions. Thus, the analysis will inform 
whether MNEs exhibit heterogeneous tastes over different economic 
institutional settings. The unconditional choice probability to be 
estimated takes the following form: 
 
(2)                                               𝑃𝑖𝑗 = ∫ (
𝑒𝛽
′𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝛽′𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘
) 𝑓(𝛽|𝜃)𝑑𝛽 
 
This is the MXL probability, which basically consists of a weighted 
average of the product of logit equations evaluated at different values of β 
and where weights depend on the density f (β | θ) (Train, 2003). As 
mentioned, the aim is to estimate parameters θ, which is possible by 
means of simulation methods, which allow approximating probabilities 
for any given value of parameters θ. Thus, the simulated probability SP is 
initially computed as an average probability at different levels of β: 
 
(3)                                                           𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
1
𝑅
∑
𝑒𝛽
𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝛽𝑟𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑘
𝑅
𝑟=1
 
                                                 
26
 If the researcher knows βi, this would allow estimating a choice probability similar to CL. 
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where R is the number of draws, or replications. Basically, for 
calculating the SPij, the logit equation (2) is computed with each draw r, 
and eventually averaged. In the present analysis, R=500. Successively, 
SPij is entered into the log-likelihood function to obtain the following 
simulated log-likelihood SLL: 
 
(4)                                                       𝑆𝐿𝐿 = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
where yij=1 if firm i chooses location j, zero otherwise. Therefore, it is 
possible to obtain the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) estimator 
which takes the value of θ that maximizes SLL.  
 
3.5 Empirical Results  
All estimations are conducted for EU-15 MNEs investing in European 
New Member States, Candidate/Accession, ENP countries and the 
Russian Federation. Additionally, estimations on investment from the 
EU-27 and the whole world are also run as a benchmark and robustness 
check in order to increase the size of the sample of foreign investments.27  
 
3.5.1 Baseline results 
Table 3.2 presents the results from CL estimations. Column 1 
provides information for the baseline specification. The results suggest 
that three out of five indicators of the quality of economic institutions 
exhibit a positive and statistically significant relationship with the 
location decisions of MNEs: business regulation, government expenditure 
and legal enforcement of contracts. Conversely, labour market regulation 
and property rights protection are not significant. This specification 
                                                 
27
 CL results are qualitatively identical to EU-15 results and are available upon request. The main MXL 
results are included in the tables. 
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includes controls for market demand variables, proxies for trade costs 
(i.e. geographical distance between origin and destination countries and 
a dummy for contiguity), as well as dummies for cultural characteristics. 
All controls show the expected sign. Next, in columns 2 and 3, labour 
market characteristics such as education level of the population and 
average wage are included. Both enter the regression with the expected 
signs, although average wage is only weakly significant. Finally, we take 
into account agglomeration forces in the last two columns of Table 3.2. 
These turn out to be strongly correlated with the location strategies of 
MNEs. With the gradual inclusion of all our controls, the relevance of 
economic institutions evidenced in column 1 remains unchanged. MNEs 
from EU-15 appear to be sensitive to some aspects of the national 
economic institutional setting of host countries. More favourable 
business regulation, a stronger presence of the state in the economy and 
an appropriate contracting environment play a positive role in shaping 
the strategic behaviour of MNEs.  
 
[Table 3.2 around here] 
 
Moreover, our more extended specification (column 5) suggests that 
internal market size is positively associated with MNE decisions, whereas 
market potential becomes non-significant. Similarly, education loses 
importance, probably indicating that MNEs from EU-15 delocalize in the 
area of interest some business functions for which more basic skills are 
needed. Average wage is statistically insignificant. Finally, both measures 
of agglomeration are strongly and positively associated with the 
dependent variable. This suggests that agglomeration economies are 
likely to play a role in attracting MNEs. Similarly, a pattern of localization 
that follows national ownership lines emerges. In other words, MNEs 
from the same country of origin tend to undertake investment projects in 
the same locations.  
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Overall, the CL estimations are in line with the existing literature. 
While it is impossible to find any association between MNEs and the 
functioning of national labour markets, a less regulated business 
environment seems to attract foreign investment. Similarly, with respect 
to the legal aspects of economic institutions, different elements play 
different roles: the enforcement of contracts is a relevant institutional 
aspect for MNEs behaviour suggesting that MNEs are sensitive to the 
respect of formal contracts. On the other hand, property rights protection 
does not appear to be a driver of location decisions. Finally, the role of 
the state is considered as a positive determinant in MNE choices, 
presumably because they can take advantage from public intervention in 
the economy or because national governments expenditure is also aimed 
at consumption. These results suggest that a further investigation of the 
heterogeneity of MNE preferences is appropriate: thus, the following 
analysis explores the relationship between MNE strategic behaviour and 
the economic institutional environment of recipient economies by means 
of MXL. This approach makes it also possible to relax the IIA assumption 
that treats the substitution of alternative locations rather unrealistically. 
 
3.5.2 Preference heterogeneity 
In the MXL estimations heterogeneity is allowed to occur only for 
coefficients associated with economic institutions (variables of interest), 
while other regressors are kept fixed. Therefore, MXL estimates 
coefficient parameters θ, namely means b and standard deviations s, for 
variables that are specified to be random. MXL estimation results are 
presented in Table 3.3, where the extended specification is run for EU-
15, EU-27 and world MNEs (columns 1, 3, and 5, respectively). As far as 
economic institutions are concerned, previous results are largely 
confirmed by the estimated means b of coefficients. Regulation is a driver 
of MNEs location choices in the context of national business 
 112 
 
environments, but not in labour markets, although the mean coefficient 
for the latter is weakly significant when we consider MNEs from the 
whole world. A strong role of government expenditure in neighbouring 
countries is perceived as a positive signal by EU-15 MNEs and world 
MNEs, while it does not seem to be very relevant for the EU-27 sample 
(possibly because some of these investors are from NMS, which may be 
relatively more deterred by a large government role in the host economy). 
With respect to the national legal framework, a more effective contracting 
environment represents an important location determinant for foreign 
investment for all MNEs across specifications; as in previous results, 
property rights protection exhibits insignificant mean coefficients. 
The MXL estimation also provides standard deviations s for the 
coefficients of economic institutions, which are specified to vary 
randomly. Some of the estimated standard deviations of these coefficients 
are statistically significant, suggesting that parameters do vary across 
the population of MNEs under analysis. Therefore, standard deviations 
can be interpreted as heterogeneity terms and suggest that different 
MNEs attach different importance to economic institutions, explaining 
the lack of consensus in the existing literature on the importance of some 
of their components. Values of b and s are employed in columns 2, 4 and 
6 in order to gain insights on the extent of the heterogeneous preferences 
of MNE strategies over economic institutions. For instance, in the case of 
EU-15 MNEs, the variable for business regulation takes parameters 
b=0.475 and s=0.472, such that for 84.4% of the MNE population the 
parameter is above zero, while for the 15.6% it is below. In other words, 
the large majority of FDI originating in the EU-15 systematically locates 
where doing business is characterised by weaker bureaucratic burdens, 
while the rest prefers to locate where business is more strongly 
regulated. This figure only varies slightly when EU-27 and world MNEs 
are considered (80.2% and 76.1%, respectively). More heterogeneous 
preferences emerge when we look at parameters related to the protection 
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of property rights. In the case of EU-15 and EU-27 MNEs, estimates 
indicate that the population is indeed split into two halves. This balance 
between shares of the population with respect to opposite preferences 
over property rights protection also explains the insignificance of the 
mean coefficient. Finally, as far as the legal enforcement of contracts is 
concerned, taste variation over this aspect of economic institutions is far 
less pronounced, with most MNEs preferring locations where the 
contracting environment is generally certain. Nevertheless, there is a very 
small portion of MNEs in the population that decides to locate where 
contract enforcement is weaker. 
 
[Table 3.3 here] 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts probability density functions for economic 
institutions by employing parameters estimated by MXL: the graphs refer 
to those aspects of economic institutions that exhibit significant 
heterogeneity terms s. 
 
[Figure 3.1 here] 
 
The heterogeneity of these relationships, particularly regarding 
property rights, poses interesting questions on MNEs strategies and their 
motives for investing abroad. The source of heterogeneous tastes may be 
associated with unobserved factors operating at the firm-level. Therefore, 
in order to explore the systematic nature of heterogeneity of preferences 
over economic institutions, the MXL models are run by exploiting 
information for sectors and business activities of the investment projects 
undertaken by MNEs. Data in FDi Markets provides information on these 
aspects. On this basis, following the NACE (rev.1.1) classification, we 
group sectors into four categories: High-Medium Technology 
Manufacturing, Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing, Knowledge-
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intensive Services (KIS) and Less-knowledge-intensive Services (LKIS). 
Similarly, following Crescenzi et al. (2014), we generate three alternative 
groups of business functions: Headquarters and innovative activities (HQ 
& Inno); Services, sales and logistics (SSL); Production.28 Tables C.2 and 
C.3 in Appendix C show the classification of sectors and business 
functions, respectively. 
Table 3.4 presents the results for MXL estimations of EU-15 location 
decisions performed for different sectors, whilst Figure 3.2 plots the 
heterogeneous relationships that emerge from such estimations. 
 
[Table 3.4 here] 
 
[Figure 3.2 here] 
 
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.4, regressions are run for High-
Medium Technology Manufacturing sectors. The MXL reveals that 
regulation of labour markets does not matter for MNE decisions, while 
the intervention of the regulator in business has an ambiguous impact: 
the majority of MNEs in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing sectors 
prefer locations where administrative and bureaucratic aspects of 
running a business are less invasive (62.9%), while the rest prefers 
countries where businesses are subject to more regulation. Government 
expenditure does not play any role in driving MNEs’ behaviour in these 
sectors. As far as legal aspects are concerned, MNEs in High-Medium 
Technology activities do attach importance to property rights protection 
only in 33% of cases. This result might seem surprising since it implies 
that a large group of MNEs from EU-15 investing in the area of 
neighbouring countries is driven by less robust property rights. However, 
                                                 
28
 Differently from Crescenzi et al. (2014), we generate three groups of functions instead of five due to the 
low number of observations in certain MNE activities in the countries here considered. Therefore, we 
aggregate together certain functions into the same category (e.g. headquarters with innovative activities). 
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this suggests that MNEs operating in High-Medium Tech sectors might 
strategically exploit a weaker enforcement of property rights to facilitate 
domestic firms’ upgrading and learning (for example in the area of 
intellectual property rights, IPRs), while MNEs rely on internal firm-level 
protection mechanisms (see Wu 2000 for the case of IPRs in China). With 
respect to the legal enforcement of contracts, almost three quarters of 
MNEs in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing systematically locate 
in places where this aspect of economic institutions is more adequately 
protected.  
Columns 3 and 4 report results for Medium-Low Technology 
Manufacturing. EU-15 MNEs in these activities react more 
homogeneously to the quality of national economic institutions than 
those in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing sectors. Indeed, a very 
large share of MNEs considers strong regulation in business as an 
obstacle (87.1%). Also the coefficient on labour market regulation turns 
to be marginally significant and positive, suggesting that MNEs in these 
activities tend to prefer countries where labour markets are more flexible, 
although the statistical relevance of this relationship remains weak. This 
finding is perfectly plausible since we are considering EU-15 MNEs that 
localise in the EU neighbourhood area operations characterised by a 
lower level of sophistication. This is also evidenced by the strongly 
negative coefficient associated to our proxy for average wage, signalling 
that MNEs in Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing sectors are 
motivated by the supply of inexpensive workforce that is generally low-
skilled. With respect to government expenditure, we find that the mean 
coefficient b is not significant and the standard deviation s is only weakly 
significant. Although these parameters provide a figure of 99.9% of MNEs 
driven by more public spending, they should be cautiously interpreted 
given their very low statistical significance. MNEs in Medium-Low 
Technology Manufacturing activities do not seem to be sensitive to the 
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degree of protection of property rights, while they uniformly attach a 
great importance to the possibility to enforce legal contracts.  
 
With respect to control variables, MNEs in High-Medium and 
Medium-Low Manufacturing sectors seem to be motivated by different 
rationales. Geographical distance and the previous presence of MNEs 
from the same origin country are the only common trait in MNEs 
strategies. MNEs in High-Medium Technology Manufacturing activities 
are substantially attracted by agglomeration forces, suggesting that 
MNEs tend to concentrate this kind of activities in urban areas where 
they can access a larger supply of labour and competences. Surprisingly, 
the education level of the population does not seem to be a relevant 
location driver, although our proxy for human capital only takes into 
account secondary education, which is probably inadequate for High-
Medium Technology activities. MNEs in Medium-Low Technology 
Manufacturing activities, instead, seem to be essentially motivated by 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking rationales, as suggested by the 
strongly significant coefficients of market size and average wage. This 
finding is in line with the great majority of literature on FDI in transition 
economies, which highlight that foreign investors search for new markets 
as well as cheap labour in Central and Eastern European countries 
(Resmini, 2000). 
The right-hand part of Table 3.4 reports results for services: columns 
5 and 6 regard KIS, whilst columns 7 and 8 present results for LKIS. 
MNEs in KIS tend invariably to take into consideration business 
regulation and the legal enforcement of contracts. Again, parameters on 
property rights suggest that this element is an ambiguous factor in 
determining EU-15 MNE strategies in EU neighbouring countries. As far 
as LKIS activities are concerned, results only slightly vary. The 
enforcement of contracts turns out to be unimportant for this kind of 
services, whilst LKIS seem to positively react to labour markets that are 
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more regulated and to larger government spending. Control variables in 
these regressions reveal that KIS benefit of a more educated workforce 
and also that location choices globally follow nationality patterns.  
 
Table 3.5 presents the results of MXL performed for different groups 
of business functions, while the corresponding Figure 3.3 illustrates the 
variation of preferences across them.  
 
[Table 3.5 here] 
 
[Figure 3.3 here] 
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3.5 refer to operations of MNEs in HQ and 
Inno activities. Parameters on economic institutions are only significant 
with respect to business regulation and property rights protection. The 
former exhibits a weak and positive mean coefficient b, while the latter is 
still affected by a significant heterogeneity term s that splits the 
distribution of preferences into two halves. Our proxy for human capital, 
although positive, is not statistically significant, likely due to the fact 
that we only consider secondary education. In general, we do not detect 
strong drivers of location decisions of MNEs as far as HQ & Inno 
activities are concerned. A different picture emerges instead for SSL 
activities (columns 3 and 4). A more flexible regulation of business 
operations is a positive driver of location decisions for the great majority 
of MNEs (83.4%); whilst for the regulation in the labour market almost 
60% of MNEs have a positive perception of flexibility, the rest seem to 
prefer more regulated frameworks. With respect to legal aspects, nearly 
all MNEs find that the legal enforcement of contracts is a crucial element 
(92.1%). In addition, SSL are clearly market-seeking motivated, and 
MNEs look for a relatively educated and less expensive labour force to 
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employ in these functions. Finally, columns 5 and 6 provide MXL results 
for production activities, whose picture appears less complex than for 
other business functions. Economic institutions have a very 
homogeneous impact and heterogeneity terms are never relevant: more 
flexible regulation in business, stronger government spending and 
relative easiness in enforcing legal contracts represent attraction forces 
for MNE production operations. Moreover, control variables tell that 
production activities of EU-15 MNEs are attracted by larger national 
markets and tend to exploit local low-skilled and cheap labour.  
 
3.6 Conclusions 
In recent years the EU has intensified economic and institutional 
integration with its neighbouring countries, though with different 
intensity. Some countries have become EU members, some are candidate 
for membership, and some others are part of the European Neighbouring 
Policy. In this scenario of growing integration, European MNEs have 
increased their operations in neighbouring countries through the setting 
up of new foreign affiliates.  
This paper has examined how recipient countries’ economic 
institutions shape the location strategies of EU-15 MNEs in a large set of 
developing and transition countries that are geographically close to the 
EU. The empirical analysis starts with a standard CL model, as 
customary in the literature, and is successively extended to a random-
coefficient MXL, rarely adopted in studies on firms’ location decisions. 
Results are robust across specifications with different data samples as 
well as across methodologies.  
Table 3.6 provides an overall summary of the results on MNE 
heterogeneous preferences for economic institutions. In line with the 
existing literature our results confirm that the flexibility of the labour 
market – one of the top items in ‘traditional’ institutional reform 
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packages – is not systematically associated with the attraction of foreign 
investments. On the contrary, favourable business regulation is clearly 
an important driver of MNE location choices: when looking at the entire 
sample of MNEs large part of the distribution attaches a positive value to 
this characteristic. In addition the heterogeneity of preferences seems to 
be largely linked to the most sophisticated activities in sectoral (High-
Medium tech sectors) and functional (HQs and Inno) terms.  
The analysis of the role of the protection of property rights explains 
why the existing literature has so far failed to reach a clear consensus on 
its importance: MNEs are indeed strongly divided with reference to this 
specific dimension, particularly in the case of the most sophisticated 
sectors and functions. Conversely, for the enforcement of contracts the 
results highlight clear-cut MNEs’ preferences for more ‘certain’ 
framework conditions across sectors (with the exception of LKI sectors) 
and functions. Finally, the relevance of public expenditure seems to be 
limited to production activities, where the government plays an 
important role in supporting demand. 
 
[Table 3.6 here] 
 
These results should be interpreted with caution. First, it is important 
to bear in mind that the methodology makes it impossible to draw any 
causal conclusions. The analysis of location patterns is able to control for 
a large number of possible confounding factors but reverse causality is 
still a possibility. Second, the time span covered by the analysis is still 
limited and the global economic crisis started in 2008, as well as the 
dramatic political changes in some of the countries covered in the 
analysis, call for extra care in the interpretation of the findings. Third, 
even though the innovative use of quantitative methods makes it possible 
to shed new light on the heterogeneous behaviour of MNEs with reference 
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to economic institutions, more qualitative work is necessary (and is in 
our agenda for future research) in order to explore the firm-specific 
determinants of MNEs’ diversified preferences. 
 
Having acknowledged these limitations, our results provide policy 
makers with relevant insights to support institutional reform and 
institution building initiatives as tools to favour (and complement) 
internationalisation processes. The empirical results suggest that some 
MNEs prefer locations where specific dimensions of economic institutions 
are weaker. This may appear counterintuitive, but indeed there could be 
situations in which economic actors may prefer loose economic 
institutions in order to gain selective economic rewards. This 
institutional subversion phenomenon is particularly documented in the 
case of transition economies, where political and economic elites 
replicate a system of flawed institutional environments that provide them 
with various types of advantage over the rest of the local population 
(Helmann, 1998; Helmann et al., 2000). Similarly, weak property rights 
allow wealthier foreign actors to benefit from unproductive activities such 
as rent-seeking, at the same time maintaining expropriation instruments 
over the rest (Sonin, 2003). The subversion of economic institutions is 
also intimately associated with within-country inequality, and less secure 
property rights and weaker legal systems favour a country’s power 
establishment, which aims at perpetuating the mechanisms that allow 
the concentration of power and wealth (Glaeser et al., 2003). In this vein, 
it is argued that political incumbents support imperfect institutions in 
order to maintain their benefits (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002). On the 
basis of these considerations, often made with respect to transition and 
developing countries, it can be argued that some MNEs are oriented 
towards locations where they can establish influential connections with 
political and economic elites, which in turn allow them taking advantage 
of institutional poorness by obtaining rents or circumventing market 
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rules. A similar argument is proposed in the management literature: 
pervasive government corruption can influence the entry modes of MNEs, 
which can find it beneficial to enter new markets via FDI by engaging in 
corrupt behaviour (Rodriguez et al., 2005). Again, this may represent one 
explanation for the heterogeneity of results associated to the protection of 
property rights in particular. However, validating these results and 
investigating further the relationship between economic institutions and 
MNEs remain an open research field and a crucial challenge for policy 
design in a growing number of countries and regions worldwide.  
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Table 3.1: EU-15 investment projects and quality of economic institutions, 2003-2008. 
 MNEs Investments Quality of Economic Institutions 
Host Countries N of investment % investment 
Labour market 
regulation 
Business 
regulation 
Protection of 
property rights 
Legal 
enforcement of 
contracts 
 
Government 
expenditure 
A. New Member States 
Bulgaria 551 8.00 6.96 5.60 4.09 4.77 17.97 
Czech Republic 443 6.43 7.47 5.16 5.72 3.59 21.46 
Estonia 142 2.06 5.87 7.37 7.25 6.02 17.58 
Hungary 674 9.79 6.84 6.12 6.51 7.06 22.45 
Latvia 152 2.21 6.43 6.29 5.88 7.25 18.50 
Lithuania 139 2.02 5.45 6.50 5.80 7.35 19.04 
Poland 748 10.86 6.52 5.49 4.66 4.27 18.12 
Romania 1,012 14.69 5.91 6.54 4.77 5.17 12.19 
Slovakia 319 4.63 7.61 5.85 5.98 4.59 18.42 
Slovenia 100 1.45 5.44 6.34 6.27 3.93 18.46 
Subtotal / 
Average* 4,280 62.14 
6.45* 6.13* 5.69* 5.40* 18.42* 
B. Balkans and the East 
Albania 38 0.55 5.79 5.67 3.30 5.17 9.31 
Croatia 139 2.02 5.65 5.62 4.70 5.40 19.95 
Russia 1,315 19.09 6.03 4.73 3.34 7.53 17.38 
Turkey 298 4.33 4.09 6.29 5.06 6.16 12.34 
Ukraine 263 3.82 6.22 4.08 3.40 5.29 18.18 
Subtotal / 
Average* 2,053 29.81 
5.56* 5.28* 3.96* 5.91* 15.43 
C. Northern Africa and Middle East 
Algeria 105 1.52 4.96 5.62 4.25 4.39 12.43 
Egypt 84 1.22 5.01 5.06 5.77 3.41 12.03 
Israel 37 0.54 4.84 6.64 6.98 3.46 25.71 
Jordan 23 0.33 8.38 6.45 7.18 3.38 22.01 
Morocco 203 2.95 3.62 6.09 5.62 4.3 18.31 
Tunisia 103 1.50 6.30 6.79 7.00 4.88 16.67 
Subtotal /Average* 555 8.06 5.52* 6.11* 6.13* 3.97* 17.86* 
Total / Average* 6,888 100 5.97* 5.92* 5.41* 5.11* 17.55* 
Source: own elaboration based on FDi Markets – FT Business and Fraser Institute Data
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Table 3.2: Conditional Logit estimation of EU15 MNEs location behaviour 
Dep.Var.: Location choice (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Labour Market Regulation 0.018 0.028 0.044 -0.004 -0.010 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.049) 
Business Regulation 0.401*** 0.393*** 0.382*** 0.371*** 0.434*** 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Government Expenditure 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.0623*** 0.067*** 0.045*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Protection of Property Rights 0.0017 0.012 0.026 0.010 0.005 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Legal Enforcement of 
Contracts 0.567*** 0.559*** 0.560*** 0.683*** 0.591*** 
 
(0.128) (0.129) (0.127) (0.138) (0.139) 
ln Market Size t-1 -0.455 0.352 1.189 0.919 2.441** 
 
(0.781) (0.837) (0.961) (0.974) (0.988) 
ln Market Potential t-1 1.728** 2.405*** 2.591*** 2.044** 0.979 
 
(0.860) (0.891) (0.896) (0.911) (0.917) 
Distance -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ln Education Level 
 
1.291*** 0.977** 0.487 0.709 
  
(0.470) (0.495) (0.527) (0.530) 
ln Average Wage 
  
-1.343* -0.402 -0.963 
   
(0.777) (0.854) (0.860) 
Urban Agglomeration 
   
0.149** 0.151*** 
    
(0.058) (0.058) 
National Ownership 
    
0.003*** 
     
(0.001) 
Observations 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 148,783 
Cultural dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Geographical contiguity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
National dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.193 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.196 
log likelihood -17084 -17080 -17078 -17075 -17037 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.3: Mixed Logit estimation of MNEs location behaviour 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
    EU15 MNEs      EU27 MNEs      World MNEs 
Dep. Var.: Location Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
                
Labour Market Regulation b 0.007 
 
0.024 
 
0.072* 
 
  
(0.051) 
 
(0.049) 
 
(0.039) 
 
 
s 0.015 
 
0.171 
 
0.008 
 
  
(0.036) 
 
(0.192) 
 
(0.016) 
 Business Regulation b 0.475*** 84.4% 0.522*** 80.2% 0.403*** 76.1% 
  
(0.064) 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.047) 
 
 
s 0.472*** 
 
0.613*** 
 
0.567*** 
 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.074) 
 Government Expenditure b 0.035** 
 
0.021 
 
0.025** 
 
  
(0.016) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.012) 
 
 
s 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Protection of Property 
Rights b 0.002 50.4% 0.035 54.4% 0.001 
 
  
(0.043) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.032) 
 
 
s 0.229** 
 
0.322*** 
 
0.133 
 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.085) 
 
(0.103) 
 Legal Enforce of Contracts b 0.570*** 98.4% 0.500*** 94.7% 0.467*** 89.3% 
  
(0.148) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.110) 
 
 
s 0.265*** 
 
0.309*** 
 
0.376*** 
 
  
(0.097) 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.069) 
 ln Market Size t-1 
 
1.963* 
 
2.688*** 
 
2.148*** 
 
  
(1.018) 
 
(0.748) 
 
(0.563) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
1.247 
 
1.080 
 
-0.588 
 
  
(0.977) 
 
(0.885) 
 
(0.680) 
 ln Education Level 
 
0.536 
 
1.184** 
 
0.708* 
 
  
(0.552) 
 
(0.478) 
 
(0.392) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
-1.490* 
 
-1.997*** 
 
-1.662*** 
 
  
(0.887) 
 
(0.729) 
 
(0.576) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.146** 
 
0.0754* 
 
0.098*** 
 
  
(0.060) 
 
(0.041) 
 
(0.031) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 Observations 
 
148,783 
 
165,724 
 
251,276 
 N of Cases 
 
6,888 
 
7,709 
 
11,745 
 Geographical contiguity  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood   -17030   -18974   -29437   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.1: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 3 
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Table 3.4: MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behaviour by sector 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Manufacturing Services 
  High-Medium Tech. Medium-Low Tech. Knowledge-intensive  Less-knowledge-int. 
Dep. Var.: Location 
Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
Labour Market 
Regulation b -0.030  0.149*  0.002  -0.246**  
  (0.128)  (0.083)  (0.112)  (0.123)  
 s -0.105  0.005  0.013  0.206  
  (0.688)  (0.020)  (0.026)  (0.244)  
Business Regulation b 0.232 62.9% 0.572*** 87.1% 0.383**  0.406***  
  (0.160)  (0.106)  (0.157)  (0.152)  
 s 0.707***  0.507***  0.310  -0.014  
  (0.265)  (0.145)  (0.405)  (0.020)  
Government Expenditure b -0.013  0.043 99.9% 0.022  0.086**  
  (0.040)  (0.026)  (0.034)  (0.039)  
 s -0.016  0.002*  0.008  -0.000  
  (0.026)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.001)  
Protection of Prop. Rights b -0.189** 33.0% 0.086  -0.011 49.2% 0.046 55.6% 
  (0.093)  (0.069)  (0.099)  (0.105)  
 s 0.423*  -0.019  0.528***  0.333*  
  (0.217)  (0.019)  (0.113)  (0.178)  
Legal Enforc. of  b 0.539 72.6% 0.740***  0.725**  0.095  
Contracts  (0.381)  (0.239)  (0.325)  (0.318)  
 s 0.894**  0.229  0.235  -0.004  
  (0.389)  (0.221)  (0.234)  (0.025)  
ln Market Size t-1 
 
-0.648 
 
4.576*** 
 
0.910 
 
0.450 
 
  
(2.518) 
 
(1.242) 
 
(1.742) 
 
(1.814) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
2.338 
 
0.720 
 
3.135 
 
0.717 
 
  
(2.752) 
 
(1.593) 
 
(1.922) 
 
(2.377) 
 ln Education Level 
 
-1.262 
 
0.286 
 
2.844** 
 
0.101 
 
  
(1.400) 
 
(0.830) 
 
(1.286) 
 
(1.367) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
0.593 
 
-3.821*** 
 
-0.234 
 
-0.905 
 
  
(2.172) 
 
(1.289) 
 
(1.799) 
 
(1.764) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.432*** 
 
0.105 
 
-0.029 
 
-0.021 
 
  
(0.142) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.090) 
 
(0.107) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.003*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
          Observations 
 
31,039 
 
56,795 
 
28,065 
 
27,357 
 Geographical contiguity 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood   -3497   -6394   -3230   -3039   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.2: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62.9%37.1%
mean=0.232
sd=0.707
3sd2sd 1sd0-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
High-Medium Technology Manufacturing
Business Regulation
87.1%12.9%
mean=0.572
sd=0.507
3sd2sd mean 1sd0-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
Medium-Low Technology Manufacturing
Business Regulation
33.0%67.0%
mean=-0.189
sd=0.423
3sd2sd 1sd0-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
High-Medium Technology Manufacturing
Protection of Property Rights
49.2%50.8%
mean=-0.011
sd=0.528
3sd2sd 1sd0-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
Knowledge-intensive Services
Protection of Property Rights
55.6%44.4%
mean=0.046
sd=0.333
3sd2sd 1sd0-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
Less Knowledge-intensive Services
Protection of Property Rights
72.6%27.4%
mean=0.539
sd=0.894
3sd2sd 1sd0 mean-1sd-2sd-3sd
Probability Density Function
High-Medium Technology Manufacturing
Legal Enforcement of Contracts
 128 
 
Table 3.5: MXL estimation of EU-15 MNEs location behaviour by business function 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
HQ & Inno SSL Production 
Dep. Var.: Location 
Choice θ Value % > 0 Value % > 0 Value % > 0 
                
Labour Market  b -0.003 
 
0.069 58.7% -0.078 
 Regulation 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.081) 
 
(0.077) 
 
 
s 0.011 
 
0.312* 
 
0.037 
 
  
(0.008) 
 
(0.185) 
 
(0.089) 
 Business Regulation b 0.328* 
 
0.527*** 83.4% 0.443*** 
 
  
(0.190) 
 
(0.109) 
 
(0.088) 
 
 
s 0.512 
 
0.541*** 
 
0.265 
 
  
(0.369) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.239) 
 Government 
Expenditure b -0.029 
 
0.015 
 
0.083*** 
 
  
(0.041) 
 
(0.025) 
 
(0.024) 
 
 
s -0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.006 
 
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.005) 
 Protection of Prop.  b -0.015 48.8% 0.071 
 
-0.070 
 Rights 
 
(0.118) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.064) 
 
 
s 0.550*** 
 
-0.097 
 
0.193 
 
  
(0.138) 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.159) 
 Legal Enforce of  b -0.027 
 
0.544** 92.1% 0.764*** 
 Contracts 
 
(0.397) 
 
(0.221) 
 
(0.207) 
 
 
s -0.271 
 
0.386** 
 
0.203 
 
  
(0.231) 
 
(0.157) 
 
(0.155) 
 ln Market Size t-1 
 
0.816 
 
4.108*** 
 
2.505** 
 
  
(2.070) 
 
(1.234) 
 
(1.094) 
 Distance 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 ln Market Potential t-1 
 
0.794 
 
1.960 
 
-1.596 
 
  
(2.199) 
 
(1.522) 
 
(1.433) 
 ln Education Level 
 
1.849 
 
1.839** 
 
-1.458* 
 
  
(1.559) 
 
(0.767) 
 
(0.880) 
 ln Average Wage 
 
0.953 
 
-2.382* 
 
-2.790** 
 
  
(2.117) 
 
(1.219) 
 
(1.153) 
 Urban Agglomeration 
 
0.037 
 
0.099 
 
0.116* 
 
  
(0.106) 
 
(0.069) 
 
(0.063) 
 National Ownership 
 
0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
  
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
        Observations 
 
19,994 
 
64,381 
 
64,408 
 Geographical contiguity 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 Cultural dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 National dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 log likelihood   -2293   -7372   -7204   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3.3: Probability Density Functions for economic institutions exhibiting 
significant standard deviation in Table 5 
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Table 3.6: Summary Table of the Results on MNEs heterogeneous preferences for Economic Institutions 
 
All MNES 
Sectoral Heterogeneity 
Functional Heterogeneity 
Manufacturing Services 
High-
Medium 
tech 
Medium-
low tech 
Knowledg
e 
Intensive 
Less 
Knowledg
e 
Intensive 
HQ & 
Inno 
SSL Production 
Regulatory settings 
Labour 
Market 
Regulation 
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Business 
Regulation 
+*** 
s*** 
(84%) 
 
s*** 
(63%) 
+*** +** +*** NO 
+*** 
s*** 
(83%) 
+*** 
 
Legal Framework 
Property 
Rights 
 
s*** 
(50%) 
-** 
s* (33%) 
NO 
 
s***(49%) 
NO 
 
s*** 
(49%) 
NO NO 
Enforcement 
of Contracts 
+*** 
s***(98%) 
 
s**(73%) 
+*** +** NO NO 
+** 
s**(92%) 
+*** 
Weight of the Government 
Share of 
Public 
Spending 
+** NO NO NO NO NO NO +*** 
+/- denotes the sign of the estimated b coefficients in tables 3,4 and 5. Asterisks denote significance as in 
original tables. Percentages reported in parentheses are %>0 in the preferences distribution. ‘NO’ stands for 
‘No significance’ 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C.1: Variable definitions and sources   
Variable Description  Source 
 
Dependent   
Location Choice Dummy indicating location choices among 23 
destination countries 
FDi Markets 
 
Independent   
Economic Institutions 
Labour Market 
Regulation 
Index (0-10) indicating the flexibility of labour market 
in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Business 
Regulation 
Index (0-10) indicating the administrative and 
bureaucratic burdens for business in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Protection or 
Property Rights 
Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which government 
protects property rights in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Legal Enforcement 
of Contracts  
Index (0-10) indicating the extent to which contracts 
are enforced by courts in location j. 
Fraser 
Institute 
Government 
expenditure 
Percentage of general government final consumption 
expenditure on GDP in location j. 
WDI 
Demand 
Ln Market Sizet-1 Log of GDP of destination j at time t-1. WDI 
Ln Market 
Potentialt-1 
Log of the sum of distance-weighted GDP of all 
countries c within 1,000km from location j at time t-1, 
i for each c≠j. 
WDI / 
CEPII 
Trade Costs 
Geogr. Distance Physical distance measured in km. CEPII 
Geogr. Contiguity Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and 
destination j are contiguous. 
CEPII 
Labour Market 
Ln Education Level Log of the ratio between secondary school age 
population and total population in location j. 
UNESCO 
Ln Average Wage Log of per capita GDP in location j. WDI 
Agglomeration 
Urban 
Agglomeration 
Percentage of urban population on total population. WDI 
National 
Ownership 
Stock of investment in location j from the same 
country of origin r of firm i. 
FDi Markets 
Culture 
Official Language Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j 
share an official common language. 
CEPII 
Unofficial 
Language 
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j 
share an unofficial common language. 
CEPII 
Common Colonizer 
after 1945 
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j 
had a common colonizer after 1945. 
CEPII 
Colonial Link after 
1945 
Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j 
had a colonial tie after 1945. 
CEPII 
Same Country Dummy equal to 1 if country of origin r and location j 
have been part of the same country in the past. 
CEPII 
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Table C.2: Classification of sectors 
Manufacturing 
High-Medium Technology Medium-Low Technology 
Aerospace Beverages 
Automotive components 
Building and Construction 
Materials 
Automotive OEM Consumer Products 
Biotechnology Food and Tobacco 
Business Machines and Equipment Metals 
Ceramic and Glass Minerals 
Chemicals Non-Automotive Transport OEM 
Consumer Electronics Paper, Printing and Packaging 
Electronic Components Plastics 
Engines and Turbines Rubber 
Industrial Machinery, Equipment and 
Tools Textiles 
Medical Devices Wood Products 
Pharmaceuticals 
 Semiconductors 
 
Services 
Knowledge-Intensive Less Knowledge-Intensive  
Business Services Hotels and Tourism 
Communications Leisure and Entertainment 
Financial Services Real Estate 
Healthcare Transportation 
Software and IT Services Warehousing and Storage 
Space and Defence 
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Table C.3: Classification of business functions 
Headquarters and innovative activities 
Business Services 
Headquarters 
Design, Development and Testing 
Education and Training 
Research and Development 
 
Services, Sales and Logistics 
Customer Contact Centre 
Logistic, Distribution and Transportation 
Maintenance and Servicing 
Recycling 
Retail 
Sales, Marketing and Support 
Shared Services Centre 
Technical Support Centre 
 
Production 
Construction 
Electricity 
Extraction  
ICT and Internet Infrastructure 
Manufacturing 
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Part II: Selection Patterns in 
Cross-border Acquisitions 
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Chapter 4 – Cross-border acquisitions 
and patterns of selection: Productivity 
vs. profitability 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In the last two decades a substantial preference for mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) over greenfield FDI has been frequently observed in 
global modes of entry by multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Barba 
Navaretti and Venables, 2004; UNCTAD, 2010). This is particularly the 
case of FDI among industrialized countries, where market access is often 
attained through the acquisition of a pre-existing domestic firm rather 
than by building a new establishment. 
Yet, academic research has only very recently started to distinguish, 
theoretically and empirically, between different modes of FDI (i.e. M&A 
vs. greenfield) although their characteristics, causes and implications 
differ significantly (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; 2008). Hence, 
understanding what shapes selection in cross-border acquisition choices 
of MNEs represents a relevant area of enquiry for its academic novelty as 
well as its importance in terms of share of acquisitions in global FDI 
volumes. In this respect, this paper explores the importance of two main 
alternative factors underpinning MNEs decisions to acquire a specific 
target firm: namely, a productivity argument related to accessing foreign 
valuable assets possessed by target firms, and a profit consideration 
associated with the expansion of corporate business in new foreign 
destinations. 
Consider, for instance, from Chapter 2, the case of PZL-Świdnik, a 
polish manufacturer of helicopters acquired by the Italian conglomerate 
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Finmeccanica through its Anglo-Italian subsidiary AgustaWestland in 
2010. According to the Chairman and CEO of Finmeccanica this 
acquisition generates strong opportunities for the parental industrial 
group because of both the expertise of PZL-Świdnik in producing 
aerostructures as well as the access that this specific takeover gives to 
new and profitable markets29. 
This example not only demonstrates that the productivity and 
profitability of target firms are crucial factors that MNEs take into 
account when engaging in cross-border takeovers, but it also suggests 
that distinguishing between these two elements is not always 
straightforward as they can be simultaneously at work. 
The empirical study of the selection decisions of MNEs is surprisingly 
underdeveloped in the literature, mainly due to the lack of time varying 
information on firm ownership. Indirect empirical findings in the 
literature on FDI-induced spillovers suggest that MNEs tend to ‘cherry-
pick’ best performing domestic firms (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009; 
Ramondo, 2009; Criscuolo and Martin, 2009). Only in most recent years 
scholars have started to engage in the empirical investigation of the 
selection decisions of MNEs, providing initial evidence supporting target 
firms’ productivity as a motivating factor of international takeovers 
(Guadalupe et al., 2012; Blonigen et al., 2014).   
Building on this theme, this paper assesses the extent to which the 
probability faced by domestic firms of being acquired in any given year 
relates to their productivity and profitability. Conceptually, these 
motivating factors can be ascribed to two traditional hypotheses in the 
theory of MNEs, namely asset-seeking and market-seeking behaviour of 
global companies. The joint assessment of these hypotheses employing 
firm-level data represents a first novelty of this paper, in that past 
studies on cross-border acquisitions mainly focus on productivity 
                                                 
29 Finmeccanica Press Release “AgustaWestland acquires helicopters and 
aerostructures manufacturer PZLSwidnik”, Rome 18 August 2009. 
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differentials. Nonetheless, as evidenced by the example presented above, 
while productive assets and capabilities embedded in existing domestic 
firms can be relevant aspects that MNEs take into account in the 
selection of an acquisition target, MNEs can also engage in cross-border 
takeovers to obtain a significant spot in a specific market. The latter 
strategy is in line with the objective of gaining direct access to the 
existing and promising business linkages of the acquired firm. Hence, 
domestic firms experiencing positive changes in their profits over time 
may be plausibly selected for acquisition.  
In order to separately analyse the effect of target firm productivity and 
that of profitability, we exploit within-firm differences in the probability of 
being acquired, similarly to Blonigen et al. (2014), and we additionally 
compare acquired firms with those that are never acquired in the study 
period in order to alleviate any concern related to sample selection.  
 Hence, domestic firms experiencing positive changes in their 
businesses and profits may be more plausibly selected for acquisition.  
This paper is also innovative as we conduct the study on a large 
sample of European manufacturing firms, as opposed to previous studies 
that only focus on companies in single countries or on industry- and 
country-level data. Our panel is drawn from Bureau Van Dijk databases 
Orbis and Zephyr and it includes 306,247 potential target firms observed 
at multiple points in time over the period 1997-2013. In addition, by 
employing time varying ownership information on domestic companies 
we are able to observe at what point MNEs acquire domestic firms.  
Our main empirical finding is that domestic companies that 
experience positive changes in profitability have higher probability than 
others of being acquired over the sample period. A within-firm increase of 
one standard deviation in profitability as compared to the industry mean 
is associated to a 0.8% higher probability of being acquired by a foreign 
MNE in the next period. By contrast, within-firm variation in productivity 
does not significantly relate to international acquisition decisions, 
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suggesting that MNE selection only occurs on the observable market 
performance (i.e. profitability) of domestic firms. These findings are 
confirmed also by employing different measures of firm productivity and 
profitability. Furthermore, baseline results still hold across a large 
number of checks and extensions, indicating that within-firm differences 
in profitability are intimately associated to changes in ownership. 
Understanding the selection patterns of cross-border takeovers is 
highly relevant for public policies in both territorial and industrial 
perspectives. In presence of FDI-induced spillovers, in fact, designing 
regional and industrial programmes aimed at FDI attraction can be 
beneficial for the recipient economy. In addition, acquired firms could 
benefit from the enlarged market that being part of a global production 
chain entails, with potential positive effects also on domestic employment 
and on the local network of suppliers.  
The paper is structured as follows: the next section is devoted to a 
critical discussion of the literature on international acquisitions and 
setting up of hypotheses. Section 3 presents data and the construction of 
the dataset. Section 4 explains the empirical setting of the paper and its 
differences as compared to previous studies. Results are presented in 
Section 5 along with a discussion of the findings associated to several 
extensions and robustness checks. Section 6 offers some concluding 
remarks as well as considerations for policy.   
 
4.2 Related literature 
The notion of cross-border investment is intimately associated with 
the conceptualisation of the boundaries of the MNE, thus, encompassing 
the idea of a trade-off between integration and outsourcing of activities 
overseas. This appears to be a nontrivial choice for the management of a 
MNE, faced with the issue of internalisation of a specific operation via 
FDI and its governance costs. From a theoretical standpoint, the 
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international trade literature has conceived the internalisation decision 
as a transaction-cost problem (Grossman and Helpman, 2002) or as a 
response to the issue of incomplete contracts between partner firms 
(Antrás, 2003; Antrás and Helpman, 2004 and 2008).   
Once a MNE decides to undertake FDI, it can do so mainly by 
establishing a new plant (greenfield FDI) or by acquiring an existing 
domestic firm. This organisational choice depends upon a number of 
elements such as recipient country attributes, industry characteristics 
and MNEs features (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007; 2008). While the 
determinants of greenfield FDI have received wide empirical attention by 
researchers, mainly through analyses of location behaviour, there is still 
a substantial lack of systematic evidence on the drivers of selection 
decisions of MNEs when they undertake cross-border acquisitions. 
Reasonably, cross-border acquisitions, far from being casual business 
choices, follow specific paths that spring from the interplay between the 
complexity of internalisation strategies of MNEs and the characteristics 
of heterogeneous domestic firms. In this respect, a nascent strand of 
literature has commenced to explore this area of enquiry shedding light 
on a number of factors driving MNE selection decisions. In the remaining 
of this section, these recent contributions will be reviewed and discussed.   
 
4.2.1 Acquisitions to access foreign productive assets 
The evidence that MNEs expand overseas by acquiring domestic firms 
in foreign countries is often interpreted as a corporate strategy aimed at 
enhancing MNEs existing capabilities (Caves, 1996). This form of asset-
seeking investment is regarded as an expedient of MNEs to advance their 
competitiveness at the global level through the enlargement and 
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deepening of their portfolio of tangible and non-tangible assets30 
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008).  
An underlying assumption in the logic of asset-seeking investment is 
that some firms possess assets that are desirable to other firms, 
including pure capital goods, specific technical competencies or 
managerial and marketing skills (Iammarino and McCann, 2013). Hence, 
acquisition activity can be aimed at accessing these assets, which lead in 
turn to the realisation of efficiency gains through the exploitation of 
similarities between the acquirer and the target firm. In Jovanovic and 
Braguinsky (2004), for instance, better managers tend to buy better 
projects and the complementarity between the qualities of their assets 
lead to the generation of surplus. Nocke and Yeaple (2008) develop an 
equilibrium model to explain greenfield FDI and cross-border takeovers, 
arguing that MNEs engage in acquisitions in order to complement own 
assets with target firms’ assets. In other words, acquisitions lead MNEs 
to purchasing complementary activities overseas that the acquirer 
initially lacks. In their model, hence, a mechanism of positive assortative 
matching entails that better entrepreneurs purchase better production 
facilities, thus generating higher profits. A further motive for engaging in 
international acquisitions recalls the resource-based view of the firm and 
it contemplates the existence of non-mobile capabilities owned by local 
firms (Nocke and Yeaple, 2007). MNEs are thereafter pushed to acquire 
domestic firms abroad in order to exploit strategic complementary 
capabilities that are not transferable across borders. In line with the 
complementarity of assets view, Head and Ries (2008) adopt a gravity 
and multi-country analytical framework to study bilateral and 
multilateral FDI, suggesting that cross-border acquisitions function as 
                                                 
30
 Such a view also provides the cornerstone for evolutionary conceptualizations of MNEs, where 
FDI serves as an instrument to define and refine new corporate technological trajectories (e.g. 
Cantwell, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1993). 
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an exploitative mechanism of corporate control of overseas productive 
assets.  
Recently, a number of contributions investigate more specifically the 
incidence of target firms’ assets in motivating cross-border acquisitions. 
In analysing Norwegian plant-level data, Balsvik and Haller (2010) argue 
that foreign owners tend to acquire domestic firms in order to obtain 
efficiency gains from synergies associated to the existence of 
complementary resources between MNEs and local companies. The 
relevance of assets matching as a triggering factor for cross-border 
acquisitions is also corroborated by Guadalupe et al. (2012), who 
examine the acquisition decisions of MNEs for a sample of Spanish firms. 
In investigating the relationship between foreign ownership and 
innovative capacity of newly acquired companies, they argue that 
incentives for acquisitions and innovation are strongly interdependent 
and, as a consequence, a positive selection in acquisition choices occurs 
whenever there is a complementarity between target firms’ productivity 
and the amount of innovation. In other words, target firms’ productive 
assets complement MNEs investment in innovation upon acquisition and 
this conducts to the takeover of most productive domestic firms within 
industries. Analogously, Blonigen et al. (2014) inspect the dynamics of 
cross-border acquisitions on a panel of French firms focussing on the 
synergic role played by the capacity of companies to generate export 
networks and time-changing productivity levels of these domestic actors. 
Their empirical analysis suggests that valuable assets sought by MNEs 
pertain to the antecedent capability of French firms to form export 
linkages, which is positively dependent on high initial productivity. 
Nonetheless, acquisitions are actually found to occur mostly when firms 
are afflicted by a negative productivity shock, which generates a 
depressing effect on the price of the same assets. On the other hand, 
assets complementarity does not emerge as a compelling factor to explain 
international acquisitions in Díez and Spearot (2014). In fact, in testing 
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whether assortative matching acts as a meaningful driver of cross-border 
takeovers, these authors do not observe the occurrence of this feature in 
the data.  
 
4.2.2 Acquisitions to access foreign markets 
Cross-border acquisitions can also be motivated by profitability 
considerations made by MNEs as a way to increase their market power, 
reduce the competitive pressure within industries and attain a larger 
market share. For instance, the limited availability of firm-specific 
ownership advantages, such as a superior technology, pushes firms to 
merge in an oligopolistic market (Horn and Persson, 2001). In this 
framework, low trade costs encourage cross-border acquisitions since 
firms can access new foreign markets, while high trade costs intensify 
domestic mergers due to reduced home competition. In a similar vein, 
Bjorvatn (2004) argue that economic integration increases market 
competition, thereby reducing the profit and reservation price of target 
firms. This, in turn, would raise the gains associated to international 
acquisition activity. Evidence in favour of the positive effect of decreasing 
trade costs on cross-border acquisitions is provided by Coeurdacier et al. 
(2009), as well as by Breinlich (2008), both emphasising the role of 
mergers and acquisitions in the process of industrial restructuring 
following economic integration. The incentives to engage in cross-border 
mergers in an oligopolistic context are also magnified by the existence of 
information asymmetries, which encourage uninformed foreign MNEs to 
acquire domestic firms with detailed knowledge about demand in the 
local market (Qiu and Zhou, 2006). Market power considerations as 
drivers of international acquisitions emerge in Neary (2007), where trade 
liberalisation is conducive to cross-border merger waves. In fact, with 
increased economic integration more efficient firms tend to acquire 
foreign less efficient rivals, thus facilitating specialisation according to 
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countries’ comparative advantage. In this respect, Brakman et al. (2013) 
and Feliciano and Lipsey (2015) provide evidence that cross-border 
acquisition activity is more concentrated in sectors that are characterised 
by a revealed comparative advantage in the country of the acquirer. 
Although market power considerations and profitability are posited to 
be noteworthy aspects spurring cross-border acquisition activity, 
empirical tests employing firm-level data are scarce. Early attempts in 
this direction come from the industrial organisation literature on 
domestic mergers, where the probability of target companies of being 
acquired depends upon their level of profitability among other factors 
(e.g. Harris et al., 1982; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989). The present 
study also aims at testing the relevance of domestic firm profitability in 
shaping the patterns of selection associated to cross-border takeovers.  
 
4.2.3 Hypotheses development 
Considering all the above, this paper posits that MNE acquisition 
choices can be driven by two fundamental and interconnected factors: 
target firm productivity and profitability. In this respect, the empirical 
part of the present paper aims at testing the following hypotheses. 
Productivity hypothesis: MNEs acquire domestic firms that exhibit 
larger positive variation in productivity over time, as a strategy to access 
valuable and complementary assets. 
Profitability hypothesis: MNE acquire domestic firms that exhibit a 
larger positive variation in profitability over time, as a strategy to access 
new market opportunities and expand their business activities. 
Not surprisingly, firm productivity and profitability can be 
interconnected as more productive firms are more likely to experience 
thriving business conditions. Also, firms that experience more profitable 
business can increse their productivity as a result of economies of scale. 
In the empirical section of the paper, we aim at testing the above 
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hypotheses bearing in mind that these two firm characteristics are 
strongly related from a conceptual point of view.    
 
4.3 Data 
4.3.1 Dataset construction 
Our sample of European companies is drawn from Bureau van Dijk 
cross-country and longitudinal databases Orbis and Zephyr. Orbis 
provides firm-level information on accounting and financial items of 
companies worldwide from which we construct our measures of 
profitability and productivity. Data on M&A operations are contained in 
Zephyr, which allows tracking time varying ownership information of 
firms. The two datasets can be easily matched via common company 
identifiers. Previous research employing these sources of data is well 
established and it includes recent works on international taxation (Voget, 
2011), productivity (Maffini and Mokkas, 2011; Gal, 2013) and bank 
lending (Giannetti and Ongena, 2012) among others. In our empirical 
analysis, we consider acquisitions occurred from 1997 to 2013 in 14 
European countries, that is, EU-15 countries31 with the exception of 
Luxembourg, for which no relevant manufacturing firm is observed. For 
our purpose, a cross-border acquisition is defined as a transaction 
involving a foreign company acquiring a stake of a previously 
domestically-owned firm. Thus, the acquirer is a foreign-owned company 
and the target is a domestic firm. We therefore exclude from this 
definition certain types of operations, such as (i) wholly domestic 
transactions where both the acquirer and target are domestic companies; 
(ii) domestic firms acquiring foreign affiliates located in the acquirer 
country; (iii) transactions involving two foreign entities, such as a foreign 
                                                 
31
 These are the so-called ‘Old’ EU member countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK, 
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affiliate acquiring another foreign affiliate in a third country (iv) 
operations resulting in increased stakes of ownership: the latter may 
include, for instance, an MNE that already owns a certain percentage of a 
domestic firm as a result of a previous cross-border takeover, and 
successively engaging in a new acquiring operation to increase its control 
over the domestic firm.  
Also, we exclude mergers from our empirical analysis, since these 
transactions involves a merging of companies on a one-to-one share 
swap for shares in the new company32. Hence, while in an acquisition a 
firm buys and subsumes another firm, a merger represents a transaction 
where two or more firms decide to create a new company. Similarly, we 
also exclude other forms of transactions such as joint ventures, 
Institutional Buy-Outs (IBOs), Management Buy-Outs (MBOs) and share 
buyback operations. Unfortunately, not all cross-border acquisitions in 
Zephyr could be matched with company information in Orbis, due to 
different issues such as missing observations for the acquired companies 
in Orbis before the transactions and some missing identifiers. Other 
acquisitions from Zephyr, instead, could not be used in the empirical 
analysis because the target firms are not registered in Orbis. 
After carefully considering all the above, the dataset includes 458 cross-
border acquisitions. Table 1 reports the number of cross-border 
acquisitions and the number of firms by country based on the discussion 
above. The sample consists of 306,247 firms observed at multiple points 
in time over the period 1997-2013, for a total of 1,177,895 observations. 
This results in an unbalanced panel of firms located across 14 countries. 
As noticed by other studies using the Orbis database (e.g. Maffini and 
Mokkas, 2011), the share of firms in the sample is skewed towards 
certain countries such as Italy, Spain and France and this depends to a 
large extent upon the availability of key variables across countries. As far 
                                                 
32
 Definition from Zephyr user guide online.  
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as cross-border acquisitions are concerned, the largest economies in 
Europe, that is, Germany, France, Italy and the UK, account for almost 
69% of the total number of transactions. Including Spain in this group 
raises this percentage to about 79%.  
A restricted sample is generated encompassing only those firms that 
are acquired by an MNE over the years 1997-2013. In other words, 
domestic companies that are never acquired in the sample period are 
excluded from this second dataset. The sample size is then reduced to 
268 firms acquired over the sample period and 759 observations. This 
reduction in the number of acquired domestic firms is due to the 
methodology adopted for the construction of variables, as explained in 
the next section. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
4.3.2 Variables construction 
In order to test our hypotheses relative to the two different drivers of 
cross-border acquisitions, two proxy variables for productivity and 
profitability of domestic firms are required. We follow the financial 
literature in defining the profitability of firms as the ratio between 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and fixed assets (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001; Campa and Kedia, 2002; Cornett et al., 2008). EBIT is 
calculated in Orbis as the difference between gross profit of a firm, the 
total cost of goods sold and other operating expenses. Since EBIT is 
calculated before taxes and interest expenses, it provides a good measure 
of the ability of companies to make profits. As mentioned, EBIT is divided 
by fixed assets as a measure of firm total capital. Finally, the variable is 
normalised by its industry mean and logged, as follows:  
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𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑙𝑛
(
𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑖𝑡−1
1
𝑁
∑ (
𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)𝑠𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑠=1
                                              (1) 
 
where i denotes the firm, t stands for time and s indicates the NACE 4-
digits manufacturing sector33. Industry means are only calculated by 
year and sector in this measure, even if they could be also computed by 
country. For instance, a domestic firm in a specific country can be 
acquired because it is particularly profitable in its home country. 
However, considering the high level of economic integration of EU 
countries and the tight trade linkages across Europe, our preferred 
measure of profitability is normalised on a wider industry mean than the 
country level. Nonetheless, results are checked against alternative 
measures of profitability, also taking into account such a national 
dimension, are contemplated. First, the effects of depreciation and 
amortization of assets are excluded from firm earnings by substituting 
EBIT with a measure of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA). The latter can be relevant for capital-intensive 
firms and sectors where the depreciation of capital can strongly depress 
earnings as measured by EBIT. Second, two additional measures of 
profitability are generated by replicating EBIT- and EBITDA-based 
variables normalised on industry means calculated by individual country 
for the reasons discussed above.  
As far as labour productivity is concerned, following to Guadalupe et 
al. (2012), this is intended as the ratio between value added and 
employment, normalised by industry mean, as follows: 
 
                                                 
33
 The sample includes 292 different NACE 4-digits manufacturing sectors. 
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𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑙𝑛
(
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑖𝑡−1
1
𝑁
∑ (
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑
𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
𝑠𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑠=1
                                       (2) 
 
where i denotes the firm, t stands for time and s indicates the NACE 4-
digits manufacturing sector. A different proxy for labour productivity is 
also computed by replacing value added with turnover. Furthermore, as 
in the case of profitability, the two measures of labour productivity are 
re-computed on industry means by country.  
Although TFP may be a better proxy for firm productivity than labour 
productivity, the calculation of TFP in Orbis is likely to lower the number 
of observations and potentially decrease the number of cross-border 
acquisitions that could be used in the empirical analysis, due to the high 
requirements for TFP calculation in terms of data. Furthermore, the 
decrease in the number of firms may be biased towards companies that 
provide a wider range of data, and that are plausibly larger and more 
productive than others34. Regardless of these potential limitations, 
however, we test the robustness of our results also with respect to two 
TFP measures. Table 2 provides the correlation matrix between the 
various measures of profitability and labour productivity described in 
this section (panel A). Interestingly, profitability and labour productivity 
do not exhibit high correlation coefficients. In particular, the correlation 
between our preferred measures (PR1 and LP1) is only 0.13. Panel B of 
Table 2 provides the correlation coefficient between profitability and 
labour productivity in the dataset restricted to domestic companies that 
are acquired at some point during the sample period. 
                                                 
34
 Gal (2013) shows a very high correlation between TFP and labour productivity 
(calculated as value added-employment ratio) using Orbis data. 
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Finally, we consider employment and fixed assets as control variables 
for firm size and capital availability35. Summary statistics are described 
in Table 3. Interestingly, the mean values of both profitability and labour 
productivity are higher in the restricted sample than in the full sample. 
Considering that the former only includes domestic firms that are 
acquired by an MNE at a certain time over the sample period, such a 
difference in mean values may be suggestive of the fact that firms that 
are going to become foreign affiliates tend to be more profitable and 
productive than the others. Similarly, these firms also tend to be larger 
as well as having larger capital endowments. 
 
[Table 2 and 3 here] 
 
4.4 Empirical strategy 
In this section we introduce the empirical setting adopted to evaluate 
the relevance of the two main hypothesised factors motivating cross-
border acquisitions, that is, the search for productive assets and market 
considerations. By employing different measures for labour productivity 
and firm profitability, we model the selection decision of MNEs as the 
linear probability that domestic firms can be acquired at any time during 
the sample period. Covariates are included with a one-year lag in order to 
avoid that target characteristics are influenced by foreign ownership. In 
this respect, Fich et al. (2011) argue that an M&A negotiation period 
typically lasts between 31 and 163 days from the initiation date. 
Furthermore, also previous empirical contributions adopt a single year 
lag to model acquisition decisions (e.g. Guadalupe et al., 2012; Blonigen 
et al., 2014). 
                                                 
35
 Similar to profitability and labour productivity, these control variables are normalised by yearly 
industry means and take a logarithmic form: 𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 = 𝑙𝑛
(𝑥)𝑖𝑡−1
1
𝑁
∑ (𝑥)𝑠𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑠=1
. 
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Thus, the probability y that a domestic firm i operating in industry s 
is acquired in a given year t is estimated as: 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜗𝑋𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜆𝑠𝑡 + 𝜔𝑐𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                          (3) 
 
where PR stands for firm profitability, LP indicates labour productivity, X 
is a vector of time-varying firm-level controls, δ is a set of time dummies, 
λ includes industry trends, ω represents a set of country-year dummy 
variables, φ incorporates firm fixed effects and u is an idiosyncratic error 
term. Although the only control variables included in X are firm lagged 
employment and fixed assets, we are confident that incorporating fixed 
effects at the firm-level will account for any independent, target-specific 
and time invariant acquisition determinant that is omitted in the model. 
These, for instance, can include managerial quality and practices, 
company structure, reputation effects and all sorts of unobserved time-
constant factors operating within the firm that can attract takeovers or 
can be correlated with the capacity to generate earnings or employing 
assets efficiently.  
We also control for specific influences that can affect cross-border 
acquisition decisions across years by including time dummies. In fact, it 
is well documented that aggregate M&A occur in waves (Andrade et al., 
2001) and such a cyclical nature of corporate business can affect the 
probability of firms to be acquired in a given year. Moreover, waves of 
mergers tend to be clustered within industries as a result of the exposure 
of firms to technological, regulatory and economic shocks that alter the 
structure of specific industries (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996). Hence, 
industry trends are included in our empirical model to account for any 
time variant industry-specific disturbance that can affect domestic firms’ 
characteristics as well as the strategic decision of MNEs to incur in a 
cross-border takeover and select a specific target. A third important 
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dimension of the non-uniform distribution of acquisitions controlled for 
is the geographical dimension. In fact, the clustering of acquisitions in 
specific countries is striking in our data, as evidenced in Table 1. 
Although firm fixed effects include the location of targets and we do not 
have data on firms that move in space across time, we generate a set of 
country-year dummies that allow controlling for the concentration of 
cross-border takeovers in specific destinations over time. The relevance 
of national boundaries and geography for the occurrence of international 
acquisitions tends to be associated with the performance of national 
stock markets, which are more likely to affect a country as a whole 
rather than a specific industry (Erel et al., 2012). 
With respect to existing empirical strategies modelling the selection 
decisions of MNEs, we combine the above-mentioned aspects in a novel 
way. For instance, while accounting for industry trends and time fixed 
effects, Guadalupe et al. (2012) explore within-industry differences in 
probability of international acquisitions, not controlling for fixed effects 
operating at the level of individual firms in their linear probability 
specification. Blonigen et al. (2014) extend their baseline logit analysis to 
include firm and time fixed effects using a sample that only includes 
acquired foreign affiliates. As evidenced in the equation to be estimated 
presented above, instead, our empirical strategy combines firm and time 
fixed effects with industry trends in a linear specification, employing both 
a full dataset including acquired firms as well as those that are never 
acquired, and a restricted dataset only containing companies that are 
acquired at some point over the sample period. In addition, considering 
that the present study focuses on a set of countries rather than a single 
country, we also incorporate a term capturing waves of acquisitions that 
cluster within national economies. In so doing, we investigate the 
relevance of within-firm variation in profitability and labour productivity 
in affecting the selection decisions of MNEs that engage in cross-border 
takeovers. 
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4.5 Results  
This section is structured in six parts, each coinciding to a different 
empirical approach employed to test our hypotheses regarding the 
selection decisions of MNEs in cross-border takeovers. First, the baseline 
analysis concentrates on the relevance of lagged profitability and labour 
productivity in driving the choices of MNEs towards certain target firms 
rather than others. Second, we scrutinize alternative specifications of the 
baseline setting by introducing and testing different measures of firm 
profitability and labour productivity. Third, we explore the potential non-
linearity of the selection decision of MNEs as far as the interaction 
between profitability and labour productivity is concerned. Fourth, we 
compare target profitability and labour productivity across industries 
characterised by different technological intensity. Fifth, we adopt a more 
stringent definition of cross-border takeovers by re-estimating the linear 
probability model on acquisitions of majority stakes as well as completed 
takeovers. Finally, we assess the relevance of target characteristics by 
restricting the sample to include only domestic firms that are acquired at 
some point over the sample period.  
 
4.5.1 Probability of foreign acquisition: baseline estimates  
The baseline results for the estimation of the linear probability 
equation are provided in Table 4. In columns (1) and (2), lagged measures 
of firm profitability and labour productivity are entered in isolation.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
This preliminary evidence suggests that, conditional on being 
domestically-owned before acquisition, a target firm’s higher ability to 
exploit market opportunities and make profits matter for the selection 
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decisions of MNEs. On the other hand labour productivity does not 
appear to be a relevant driver of acquisition decisions, suggesting that 
takeovers in Europe are not associated with the search for valuable 
productive assets. The lack of significance on labour productivity could 
be due to the fact that other controls for firm size and fixed capital are 
not included. Hence, in columns (3) and (4), covariates for employment 
and fixed assets are added, with our variables of interest still kept 
separate. Results do not vary in terms of statistical significance as 
compared to the previous specifications, supporting the hypothesis that 
cross-border takeovers are more inspired by market considerations. By 
contrast, there is no supporting evidence for selection decisions based on 
within-firm changes in productivity. A concern on the validity of these 
results may arise by entering both profitability and labour productivity in 
the same specification, as their effects and significance could deviate 
from specifications where they are separately estimated. Therefore, we 
test this by running estimations reported in columns (5) and (6), which 
incorporate firm profitability and labour productivity in the same model. 
Analogously to previous estimates, results remain stable suggesting that 
MNEs tend to select more profitable domestic firms. As evidenced by 
results in columns (1) to (4), the statistical insignificance of the 
coefficient on firm labour productivity as a determinant of cross-border 
takeovers in columns (5) and (6) cannot be associated with the 
simultaneous inclusion of the profitability measure. Moreover, while it 
could be argued that firm profitability captures an effect similar to that of 
labour productivity, we have shown in the data section that their 
correlation coefficient is particularly modest in magnitude. We consider 
the coefficient on profitability in column (6) as our preferred baseline 
estimate since this is our most extended specification. This denotes that 
firms experiencing a one percentage point increase in profitability have a 
probability of 0.038% of being acquired or, equivalently, a one standard 
deviation increase in lagged profitability is on average associated with a 
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0.8% higher probability of being acquired by a foreign MNE in any given 
year. This latter figure should be interpreted bearing in mind that only 
0.15% of firms are acquired in our full sample, as shown by the numbers 
reported in Table 1. Hence, the magnitude of the effect appears to be 
nontrivial. 
These baseline results tend to corroborate the notion that MNEs 
select domestic companies that exhibit notable within-firm changes in 
profitability, after potential waves of cross-border takeovers as well as 
trends of corporate activity in specific industries and countries are 
controlled for. This implies that domestic firms experiencing above-
average increases in their profitability are targeted by MNEs in the 
following year.  This provides some preliminary support to the hypothesis 
that cross-border acquisitions are associated with a market entry 
rationale, according to which MNEs aim at securing a solid position in 
foreign locations through the acquisition of a profitable domestic 
company in order to access new or larger market opportunities.  
As it is mentioned above, a one year lag in the measures of 
profitability and labour productivity appears reasonable according to the 
evidence on the typical negotiation time required for acquisitions (Fich et 
al., 2011). To a closer inspection this circumstance is also corroborated 
by our data: indeed, by exploiting time information about acquisitions, 
we find that 90% of transactions in our sample are rumoured or 
announced in the same calendar year in which they are eventually 
completed. This figure increases to 98% when also including acquisitions 
that are rumoured or announced in a specific calendar year and they are 
successfully completed in the following year. Therefore, in terms of 
timing, cross-border takeover decisions appear to be based in most cases 
on a relatively quick assessment of target firms that have recently 
experienced a profitability boost. Conceptually, this common occurrence 
could be considered as reasonable when cross-border acquisitions are 
associated to a market access rationale: indeed, MNEs in search of new 
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or wider market opportunities plausibly tend to assess targets on their 
more recent observable market performance and linkages. Also, the high 
speed of the selection decision could be also underpinned by 
considerations in terms of price: that is, firms with growing businesses 
can become more costly in time.   
 
4.5.2 Evidence from alternative measures of profitability and 
productivity 
In the previous section we have explored how firm profitability and 
labour productivity affect international acquisitions by employing the 
operational definitions reported in equations (1) and (2). A concern could 
be that our baseline results will change with different definitions of these 
measures. For instance, in considering EBIT we are incorporating 
amortisation and depreciation costs in our profitability measure. 
Similarly, in normalising our measures by yearly industry means we are 
not accounting for the relative important role that specific firms can play 
in their industry within their national boundaries. To accommodate these 
and other aspects, this section offers an analysis of cross-border 
takeovers by employing alternative measures of profitability and labour 
productivity constructed as explained in section 3.2.  
Table 5 reports the linear probability estimation results on the full 
sample of domestic firms by adopting these new measures. In Panel A, 
we alternate different proxies of labour productivity, while firm 
profitability enters the model as specified in equation (1). Similarly, Panel 
B includes labour productivity as constructed in equation (2) combined 
with alternative proxy variables for firm profitability. All specifications 
include covariates for firm size in terms of employment and fixed assets 
as well as a full set of year dummies, industry trends, country-year 
dummies and time invariant firm effects. In this respect, estimated 
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coefficients in Table 5 are directly comparable with our baseline 
estimates. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
Results in Panel A support the idea that selection decisions of MNEs 
are associated with the search for domestic firms with a strong ability to 
make successful business. This result remains stable across 
specifications when different measures of labour productivity are 
employed. The latter, similarly to the baseline results, does not exhibit 
statistically significant coefficients in columns (1) to (3) regardless of the 
way in which the measure is constructed. As matter of fact, substituting 
firm value added with turnover as well as fragmenting yearly industry 
means by country constantly provides the same non-significant 
estimates on labour productivity. In a similar vein, Panel B reports 
estimation results that corroborate further the hypothesis that cross-
border acquisitions are influenced by the increasing success of domestic 
firm boost in profitability, while MNEs do not seem to be sensitive to the 
opportunity to access the productive assets of potential target 
companies, ceteris paribus. The statistical relevance of firm profitability is 
also robust to different operational definitions as suggested by columns 
(4) to (6), where the significance level is maintained between 1% and 5%.  
Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect is similar to that in our 
baseline estimates, with the exception of EBITDA-based measures of 
profitability, which exhibit a stronger effect. This may reasonably suggest 
that depreciation and amortisation truly depress firm earnings when they 
are not excluded from the definition of profitability. 
A further concern with respect to these results can be related to the 
inclusion of labour productivity as a proxy for domestic firms’ valuable 
productive assets instead of TFP. In fact, while labour productivity tends 
to capture the incidence and relevance of the workforce in transforming 
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inputs into output, it misses by definition the role played by other factors 
of production. At the same time, it is possible that firm profitability 
captures within-firm variation in TFP, and this would explain the 
constantly significant coefficients associated with different measures of 
firm profitability. In a nutshell, excluding TFP could simultaneously 
explain the statistical relevance of firm profitability and the insignificance 
of labour productivity. Our empirical model described by equation (3) in 
Section 4 can be easily modified to accommodate the inclusion of a 
measure of TFP. Therefore, two simple measures of production function-
based TFP are generated by exploiting Orbis data and following Gal 
(2013). By exploiting information on firm value added, employment and 
tangible fixed assets, firm TFP is estimated as the residual of both simple 
OLS and fixed effects estimations at the firm level. Hence, we normalise 
these two measures of TFP by yearly industry means at the 4-digits 
industry level and we lag them. We eventually obtain two variables of TFP 
with a similar structure to our measures of profitability and labour 
productivity. The correlation coefficient between the two measures of TFP 
is 0.35, suggesting that the portion of time invariant productivity is large. 
This is also evident by comparing the correlation between the two 
measures of TFP and labour productivity, as described in equation (2). 
The coefficient stands at 0.85 in the case of OLS residual TFP, while it 
decreases to 0.31 when labour productivity is compared to the fixed 
effects TFP. With respect to the potential issue that profitability may 
capture some TFP-type effect, this should not constitute a concern in our 
data given that the correlation between OLS residual TFP and 
profitability, the latter defined in equation (1), is only 0.32 and it falls to 
0.08 when considering fixed effects TFP.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
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In Table 6, the linear probability model detailed in equation (3) is 
estimated by substituting labour productivity with TFP to check the 
robustness of our previous results to the inclusion of such a variable. A 
first observation should be made with respect to the number of firms that 
enter the regression, which falls from 306,247 to 213,776, further 
justifying the adoption of labour productivity in the first place to study a 
larger sample and to avoid selection issues. Similarly to Table 4, columns 
(1) and (2) first report the results for productivity in isolation. Neither 
version of TFP yields statistical significant coefficients, in line with the 
estimates of labour productivity. Columns (3) and (4) instead reflect 
previous results, with a notable role played by domestic firms’ market 
linkages in shaping the selection decisions of MNEs that engage in cross-
border takeovers. Therefore, the pattern illustrated in the baseline is 
further supported, and concerns associated with our preferred measures 
of profitability and productivity should be, at least, mitigated by the tests 
performed in this section. 
 
4.5.3 Non-linearity in within-firm probability of foreign 
acquisition  
While previous sections presented baseline results and their 
robustness to model specification with alternative measures of 
profitability and labour productivity, this part will investigate whether 
the probability of foreign acquisition that each domestic firm faces in any 
given year can be considered as a non-linear function of its valuable 
productive assets and its capacity to run profitable businesses. The 
notion that higher productive efficiency corresponds to thriving market 
performance is well established (Foster et al., 2008). Therefore, this may 
reasonably suggest that the probability of foreign acquisition associated 
with the market access rationale underlined by our previous results 
could be particularly marked in the presence of more productive 
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domestic firms. In other words, more productive domestic companies can 
be those that reasonably experience a more substantial positive within-
firm expansion in profits as compared to previous years. In this respect, 
firm productivity is conceptually seen as a determinant of cross-border 
acquisitions that discriminates between potential targets rather than 
indicating when a domestic company is acquired. This is in line with the 
empirical evidence produced in Guadalupe et al. (2012), who maintain 
that MNEs cherry-pick more productive firms within industries36. In our 
setting, this could explain the non-significant coefficient emerging from 
within-firm variation in productivity and, at the same time, the relevant 
role played by thriving firm profitability. Therefore, from an empirical 
point of view, we augment the probability model in equation (3) by 
entering an interaction term between firm profitability and labour 
productivity in order to delve into the potential interplay between these 
two firm characteristics in shaping the selection decisions of MNEs. 
Results of this estimation are reported in column (1) of Table 7, which 
shows that the effects of firm profitability and labour productivity do not 
vary as compared to previous results. Interestingly, the interaction term 
yields a positive and significant coefficient, as hypothesised. Within-firm 
differences in the probability of being acquired also depend upon the 
level of firm productivity, conditional on being domestically-owned before 
the takeover. 
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
To further examine this aspect, we break our sample down at median 
values of firm profitability and labour productivity. In so doing, we are 
able to estimate the probability of being acquired as a function of within-
                                                 
36
 By contrast, the study of within-firm differences in the probability of being acquired by a MNE in 
Blonigen et al. (2014) suggests that the occurrence of negative shocks in firm productivity 
encourages takeovers as it lowers the price. 
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firm variation in profitability using specific sub-samples of high- (low-) 
productive domestic companies. Similarly, we test the differential 
relevance of firm productivity in shaping foreign acquisition decisions on 
sub-samples of high- (low-) profitability enterprises.  
Estimates are presented in columns (2) to (5) of Table 7. The 
concentration of the statistically significant effect of profitability in the 
sub-sample of domestic firms exhibiting a level of labour productivity 
above the median in column (2) supports the idea that more productive 
domestic companies tend to experience positive within-firm variations in 
their profitability that make them systematically more appealing for 
takeovers than the rest of potential targets. In this sub-sample of 
domestic firms, a one standard deviation increase in lagged profitability 
corresponds to a 1.4% higher probability of being acquired by a foreign 
MNE in any given year37, which is a larger effect than the one retrieved in 
our baseline estimates. As expected, the same does not occur in column 
(4) when we analyse within-firm changes in labour productivity in the 
segment of high profitability companies. As mentioned, these results 
corroborate the hypothesis that a notable portion of the profitability 
effect tends to be concentrated among more efficient firms, as these may 
plausibly be those that easily experience a reinforcement of their 
businesses over time. 
 
4.5.4 Foreign acquisitions and technology      
The profitability effect emerged in previous results may also be 
associated with the technological intensity of specific industries. We 
employ the Eurostat aggregations of manufacturing sectors by 
technological intensity based on NACE Rev.2 in order to identify 
industries characterised by different levels of technology. In so doing, we 
are able to group firms into high-medium technology and medium-low 
                                                 
37
 The standard deviation of lagged profitability in this sub-sample is equal to 2.0463. 
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technology sectors. In particular, the former category encompasses 
68,477 firms grouped in 92 4-digit industries while the latter contains 
237,770 companies in 200 4-digit industries. The number of cross-
border takeovers is similar across the two segments of firms, with 227 
acquisitions occurring in high-medium technology sectors and 231 in 
medium-low technology industries. The profitability effect on the 
probability of being acquired by a MNE can plausibly be associated with 
sectors that are characterised by a higher technological intensity as these 
industries could require higher costs of entry and investment in R&D 
(Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999). Therefore, limited competition in these 
sectors could be conducive of stronger increases in firm profitability over 
time. The lower number of firms in high-medium technology sectors in 
our data seems to point in this direction. Interestingly, firm average size 
in terms of employment of firms in high-medium technology industries is 
179 employees in our sample, whilst the same dimension decreases to 61 
employees when considering medium-low technology sectors. Thus, 
domestic firms operating in segments of the economy where the 
technological content is higher are considerably larger in size. This can 
produce additional barriers to entry due to strong economies of scale in 
these industries, especially in presence of transport costs and non-
homogeneous goods.  
In Table 8, we estimate the probability of being acquired by 
differentiating between high-medium technology and medium-low-
technology sectors. Columns (1) and (2) report results for the baseline 
model while columns (3) and (4) include the interaction term between 
firm profitability and labour productivity. The effect of profitability tend 
to be concentrated in high-medium technology sectors, as anticipated, 
while cross-border acquisitions in medium-low technology industries are 
not responsive to this aspect. The coefficient in column (1) suggests that 
a one standard deviation increase in firm profitability corresponds to a 
2.5% higher chance of switching to foreign ownership in the following 
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year, conditional of being previously domestically-owned38. The effect of 
profitability holds when the interaction enters the specification. The 
latter is surprisingly non-significant when examining takeovers in high-
medium technology sectors, while it becomes weakly relevant in the sub-
sample of medium-low technology industries. This may indicate that the 
(weak) effect of profitability in these sectors is present only for the most 
productive firms experiencing a positive variation in earnings.  
 
[Table 8 here] 
 
4.5.5 Completed and majority foreign acquisitions 
This section is aimed at testing the robustness of our previous results 
with respect to changes in the dependent variable. The measure of time 
varying foreign ownership employed so far, in fact, contains different 
types of cross-border takeover. The first difference relates to acquisitions 
of majority and minority stakes of the target firm. In fact, different 
organisational strategies by MNEs can lead to the decision to engage into 
cross-border takeovers according to different degrees of control of foreign 
assets. The second difference is associated with the completion of a deal 
as opposed to acquisitions that are only announced or rumoured.  
 
[Table 9 here] 
 
Table 9 provides evidence considering these different aspects. In 
columns (1) and (2), we consider a measure of majority acquisitions, 
defined as transactions resulting in a total share of foreign ownership 
that is equal or larger than 50%. As a result, the total number of 
acquisitions decreases to 420 from the initial 458. This limited decrease 
in the number of cross-border takeovers is not due to the fact that MNEs 
                                                 
38
 The standard deviation in this subsample is 1.9983. 
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immediately acquire a large ownership share of targets. Actually, 
acquisitions of more limited shares are frequent in our sample. However, 
most of these are followed by further transactions in the same calendar 
year by the same MNE aimed at increasing its stake of ownership. In 
these cases, we consider only the last operation of acquisition, often 
resulting in a majority takeover. By contrast, when more operations 
between the same acquirer and target span over different calendar years, 
we consider the first operation only. Columns (3) and (4), instead, report 
estimation results for completed operations. As mentioned, some 
acquisitions are only announced or rumoured, whereas completed 
acquisitions amount to 416 transactions. Finally, in columns (5) and (6), 
we simultaneously combine information on majority and completed 
operations, thus obtaining 387 cross-border acquisitions. Results 
continue to support the notion that takeovers are associated with market 
access considerations via domestic firms experiencing thriving business 
conditions. Furthermore, similarly to previous results, columns (2), (4) 
and (6) report that this effect is also mediated by firm productivity: that 
is, when a domestic company is more efficient, within-firm expansion in 
profitability tends to be associated with a higher chance of being 
acquired in a given year. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients is 
also in line with previous results.  
 
4.5.6 Evidence from acquisition targets only 
In the previous sections, we employed a full sample containing both 
firms that are acquired at some point over the period 1997-2013 and 
firms that remain domestically-owned over the whole time span. By 
contrast, in this part the sample is restricted to domestic firms that are 
acquired by foreign MNEs in a certain year, similarly to the empirical 
strategy of Blonigen et al. (2014). Therefore, we test whether within-firm 
variation in profitability and productivity also explain differences in the 
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probability of foreign acquisition in the group of targeted domestic 
companies. This empirical approach can also be informative of the timing 
of foreign takeovers, considering that all firms in the sample are acquired 
by the end of the sample period.  
 
[Table 10 here] 
 
Table 10 presents the estimation results based on data on 268 firms 
acquired over the period. We lose some of the acquisitions as compared 
to the full sample due the generation of new variables for firm 
profitability, productivity and other characteristics as well as yearly 
industry means. Results still support the idea that MNEs that engage in 
cross-border takeovers select domestic firms experiencing a boost in their 
business performance in the form of higher profitability, while firm 
productivity does not play a relevant role. The significance level of the 
coefficients on firm profitability, however, ranges between 5% and 10%. 
Furthermore, we do not detect any significant interaction effect between 
firm profitability and productivity. These differences are probably due to 
a more limited within-firm variation in profitability and productivity in 
the sample restricted to acquisition targets only, as compared to the full 
sample. Overall, however, results in Table 10 still support the baseline 
estimates as well as the hypothesis in favour of market access 
considerations as the fundamental element that informs the selection 
decisions of MNEs engaging in acquisitions across borders.   
 
4.6 Conclusions 
The relevance of M&A over other forms of FDI has notably grown in 
the last decades. This is particularly the case of FDI in advanced 
economies, where the acquisition of pre-existing domestic firms is the 
preferential strategy of entry of MNEs. In spite of this, academic research 
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trying to understand the selection decisions of MNEs that engage in 
cross-border takeovers has lagged behind, in part as a result of lack of 
information on changes in the ownership structure of companies. 
Therefore, shedding light on the systematic patterns of selection that 
characterise the choices of international acquirers has become 
particularly urgent in both academic and policy terms. In fact, with few 
recent exceptions, existing econometric studies only focus on industry-
wide or country-wide determinants of acquisitions and the micro-level 
drivers of this important form of FDI remain underscored. This lack of 
quantitative empirical evidence on a central feature of current 
globalisation (i.e. cross-border acquisitions) represents an important 
motivation developing the present chapter. 
In this paper we have hypothesised that while the productivity 
mechanism suggested by the literature can be a relevant driver of 
acquisitions, market access considerations could be analogously 
important in shaping the behaviour of MNEs. In fact, corporate strategies 
can be also aimed at securing a position of strength in a foreign market 
via the acquisition of a domestic firm experiencing thriving business 
performance. By employing data on European firms in EU ‘old’ member 
countries, we found strong evidence in favour of this second hypothesis, 
while productivity motives for acquisition do not find any support in our 
sample. This finding appears especially meaningful considering that EU-
15 countries are notoriously associated with inflows of FDI aimed at 
accessing the large European market (Head and Mayer, 2004). Our 
results are robust to different measurements of productivity and firm 
profitability. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the effect of positive 
within-firm variation in business conditions tends to be concentrated 
among more productive firms, providing some support for the notion that 
MNEs acquire more efficient firms that are capable to increase the 
profitability of their business operations. As expected, the relevance of 
the time varying capacity of firm to make profits is concentrated in 
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industries characterised by higher technological intensity. This is 
possibly due to the higher barriers to entry and the presence of scale 
economies in these sectors. Our findings are also robust to different 
definitions of foreign ownership, including the acquisition of majority 
stakes and the inclusion of completed transactions only. Finally, our 
main results also hold when reducing the sample to include only those 
firms that switch from domestic to foreign ownership during the sample 
period. It is important to notice, however, that within-industry 
differences in MNE performance can be associated with different 
propensity and ability to accumulate knowledge, invest in R&D as well as 
managerial capability (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Castellani and 
Giovannetti, 2010). Therefore, selection in the acquisition strategies of 
MNEs could be related to some extent to MNE diversity in these 
underlying characteristics. While the present study is limited in this 
respect, this can be considered a valuable line for future research on the 
selection patterns of cross-border takeovers. Moreover, data limitation 
does not allow measuring strategic assets of target firms in a neat 
manner, but several measures for productivity are employed. A further 
limitation is associated with the existence of explanations of international 
acquisitions not directly tested in this chapter. For instance, MNEs from 
emerging countries increasingly adopt knowledge augmenting strategies 
by acquiring companies in developed countries (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Our data does not allow identifying a sufficient number of transactions 
undertaken by this type of MNE and therefore this analysis cannot be 
adequately developed from an econometric standpoint.   
In a policy perspective, this paper’s findings can be considered to 
delineate measures to support industrial restructuring in the EU as a 
strategy of firms to maintain or increase their competitiveness. However, 
policy makers should also be concerned with the risks associated to large 
waves of M&A in terms of a reduction of market competition through the 
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acquisition activity of MNE, thus taking into account a reinforcement of 
antitrust policies. 
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Table 4.1: Firms and acquisitions by country, 1997-2013 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Country Observations Firms % Acquisitions % 
A. Full sample 
Austria 3,345 1,300 0.42 6 1.31 
Belgium 15,245 3,254 1.06 35 7.64 
Denmark 253 42 0.01 0 0.00 
France 129,674 38,050 12.42 63 13.76 
Finland 23,273 6,672 2.18 17 3.71 
Germany 68,970 23,013 7.51 79 17.25 
Greece 18 8 0.00 0 0.00 
Italy 325,555 91,964 30.03 93 20.31 
Ireland 1,407 490 0.16 2 0.44 
Netherlands 1,063 320 0.10 2 0.44 
Portugal 79,640 24,556 8.02 6 1.31 
Spain 419,717 90,231 29.46 49 10.70 
Sweden 70,720 15,958 5.21 28 6.11 
United Kingdom 39,015 10,389 3.39 78 17.03 
Total 1,177,895 306,247 100.00 458 100.00 
B. Restricted sample 
Austria 11 3 1.12 3 1.12 
Belgium 48 22 8.21 22 8.21 
Denmark 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
France 69 25 9.33 25 9.33 
Finland 25 10 3.73 10 3.73 
Germany 109 44 16.42 44 16.42 
Greece 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Italy 171 59 22.01 59 22.01 
Ireland 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Netherlands 6 2 0.75 2 0.75 
Portugal 1 1 0.37 1 0.37 
Spain 107 34 12.69 34 12.69 
Sweden 68 19 7.09 19 7.09 
United Kingdom 144 49 18.28 49 18.28 
Total 759 268 100.00 268 100.00 
Notes: A) Columns 1, 2, and 3 are based on Orbis data, while columns 4 and 5 are based on 
Zephyr.  
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Table 4.2: Correlation between measures of profitability and labour productivity 
  PR1 PR2 PR3 PR4 LP1 LP2 LP3 LP4 EM AS 
Full sample 
          ln (ebit/assets) t-1 (PR1) 1 
         ln (ebitda/assets) t-1 (PR2) 0.89 1 
        ln (ebit/assets) by country t-1 (PR3) 0.72 0.66 1 
       ln (ebitda/assets) by country t-1 (PR4) 0.66 0.72 0.90 1 
      ln (value added/empl.) t-1 (LP1) 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 1 
     ln (turnover/empl.) t-1 (LP2) 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.73 1 
    ln (value added/empl.) by country t-1 (LP3) 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.83 0.58 1 
   ln (turnover/empl.) by country t-1 (LP4) 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.62 0.82 0.70 1 
  ln employmentt-1 (EM) -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.11 0.15 0.13 0.04 0.01 1 
 ln assetst-1 (AS) -0.31 -0.34 -0.37 -0.39 0.38 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.75 1 
Restricted sample                     
ln (value added/empl.) t-1 (LP1) 0.29 
         Notes: PR stands for profitability and LP stands for labour productivity. All variables are normalised by industry 
mean as explained in the relative section. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics 
  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
 
Full sample Restricted sample 
ln (ebit/assets) t-1 1177895 -1.899 2.078 759 -0.2647 1.1888 
ln (ebitda/assets) t-1 1124238 -1.372 1.638 
   ln (ebit/assets) by country t-1 1002614 -1.327 1.989 
   ln (ebitda/assets) by country t-1 1037000 -0.953 1.614 
   ln (value added/empl.) t-1 1177895 -0.161 0.663 759 -0.0273 0.4052 
ln (turnover/empl.) t-1 1149393 -0.430 0.898 
   ln (value added/empl.) by country t-1 1177084 -0.100 0.592 
   ln (turnover/empl.) by country t-1 1149392 -0.256 0.767 
   ln employment t-1 1177895 -1.109 1.482 759 -0.5768 1.3810 
ln assets t-1 1177895 -1.900 2.231 759 -0.9005 1.845 
Notes: PR stands for profitability and LP stands for labour productivity. All variables are 
normalised by industry mean as explained in section 3.2. 
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Table 4.4: Probability of foreign acquisition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: Foreign 
ownership 
                    
ln Profitability t-1 0.0035*** 
 
0.0040*** 
 
0.0037** 0.0038** 
 
(0.0013) 
 
(0.0015) 
 
(0.0013) (0.0015) 
ln Labour productivity t-1 
 
0.0063 
 
0.0075 0.0048 0.0045 
  
(0.0073) 
 
(0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0084) 
ln Employment t-1 
  
-0.0011 0.0030 
 
0.0008 
   
(0.0056) (0.0067) 
 
(0.0067) 
ln Assets t-1 
  
0.0033 -0.0007 
 
0.0026 
   
(0.0032) (0.0028) 
 
(0.0032) 
       Observations 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 
Clusters 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
adj. R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. B) All 
variables are normalised by industry means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits level. 
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Table 4.5: Alternative measures for profitability and labour productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: Foreign ownership 
      A. Alternative measures of labour productivity 
       Profitability=ln(ebit/assets) t-1 0.0036** 0.0037** 0.0034** 
   
 
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
   Labour productivity = 
      ln (turnover/empl.) t-1 0.0037 
     
 
(0.0066) 
     ln (value added/empl.)  
 
0.0057 
    by country t-1 
 
(0.0085) 
    ln (turnover/empl.)  
  
0.0083 
   by country t-1 
  
(0.0089) 
                 
B. Alternative measures of profitability 
       Labour productivity =  
      ln (value added/employment) t-1 
   
0.0035 0.0142 0.0136 
    
(0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0085) 
Profitability = 
      ln (ebitda/assets) t-1 
   
0.0062*** 
  
    
(0.0022) 
  ln (ebit/assets) by country t-1 
    
0.0040** 
 
     
(0.0017) 
 ln (ebitda/assets) by country t-1 
     
0.0051** 
            (0.0020) 
C. Both panels 
       ln Employment t-1 0.0009 0.0012 0.0030 -0.0006 0.0078 0.0076 
 
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0077) (0.0074) 
ln Assets t-1 0.0028 0.0025 0.0022 0.0041 0.0027 0.0031 
 
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
       Observations 1,149,393 1,177,084 1,149,392 1,124,238 1,002,614 1,037,000 
Clusters 300,389 306,193 300,389 300,174 290,959 293,043 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.50 0.49 
adj. R-squared 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.29 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. B) All variables 
are normalised by industry means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits level. Where specified, industry means 
are also calculated by country. 
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Table 4.6: Foreign acquisitions and total factor productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep Var: Foreign 
ownership 
              
ln Profitability t-1 
  
0.0061*** 0.0059** 
   
(0.0023) (0.0023) 
ln TFP ols t-1 0.0172 
 
0.0112 
 
 
(0.0141) 
 
(0.0140) 
 ln TFP fe t-1 
 
0.0237 
 
0.0165 
  
(0.0152) 
 
(0.0150) 
ln Assets t-1 0.0040 0.0030 0.0088 0.0079 
 
(0.0056) (0.0054) (0.0060) (0.0058) 
ln Employment t-1 0.0045 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0026 
 
(0.0131) (0.0110) (0.0130) (0.0109) 
     Observations 662,910 662,910 662,910 662,910 
Clusters 213,776 213,776 213,776 213,776 
R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 
adj. R-squared 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y 
Country-year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. B) All variables are normalised by industry 
means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits level. 
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Table 4.7: Interaction effect between firm profitability and labour productivity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Full 
sample 
High 
productivity  
Low 
productivity 
High 
profitability 
Low 
profitability 
Dep Var: Foreign 
ownership 
 
(>50%)  (<50%) (>50%) (<50%) 
            
ln Profitability t-1 0.0046*** 0.0070** 0.0024 
  
 
(0.0015) (0.0033) (0.0027) 
  ln Labour 
productivity t-1 0.0105 
  
0.0262 -8.00e-05 
 
(0.0075) 
  
(0.0184) (0.0132) 
Interaction t-1 0.0038** 
    
 
(0.0017) 
    ln Employment t-1 0.0003 4.75e-05 -0.0178 0.0113 -0.0069 
 
(0.0057) (0.0119) (0.0148) (0.0115) (0.0127) 
ln Assets t-1 0.0027 0.0081 -0.0008 -0.0013 0.0012 
 
(0.0027) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0054) (0.0077) 
      Observations 1,177,895 502,265 503,006 502,252 503,033 
Clusters 306,247 245,122 245,386 245,123 245,391 
R-squared 0.46 0.67 0.71 0.65 0.72 
adj. R-squared 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.31 0.45 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-year 
dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. B) All variables are normalised by industry means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits 
level. 
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Table 4.8: Probability of foreign acquisition by technological class 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep Var: Foreign 
ownership 
High-Medium 
tech. 
Medium-Low 
tech. 
High-Medium 
tech. 
Medium-Low 
tech. 
          
ln Profitability t-1 0.0124** 0.0013 0.0141** 0.0019 
 
(0.0053) (0.0013) (0.0061) (0.0015) 
ln Labour productivity t-
1 0.0043 0.0051 0.0144 0.0101 
 
(0.0224) (0.00741) (0.0244) (0.0073) 
Interaction t-1 
  
0.0064 0.0032* 
   
(0.00610) (0.00174) 
ln Employment t-1 0.0057 0.0009 0.0053 0.0003 
 
(0.0185) (0.0057) (0.0185) (0.0057) 
ln Assets t-1 0.0107 0.0003 0.0111 0.0004 
 
(0.0093) (0.0031) (0.0094) (0.0031) 
     Observations 272,394 905,501 272,394 905,501 
Clusters 68,477 237,770 68,477 237,770 
R-squared 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.48 
adj. R-squared 0.23 0.30 0.23 0.30 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y 
Country-year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. B) All variables are normalised by industry means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits 
level. 
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Table 4.9: Completed and majority acquisitions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep Var: Foreign 
ownership Majority  Completed  Completed majority  
              
ln Profitability t-1 0.0035** 0.0044*** 0.0033** 0.0041** 0.0032** 0.0041*** 
 
(0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0016) 
ln Labour 
productivity t-1 0.0023 0.0092 0.0043 0.0104 0.0027 0.0092 
 
(0.0082) (0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0080) (0.0083) 
Interaction t-1 
 
0.0043** 
 
0.0038** 
 
0.0041** 
  
(0.0019) 
 
(0.0018) 
 
(0.0018) 
ln Employment t-1 0.0005 0.0001 0.0023 0.0018 0.0016 0.0010 
 
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0064) (0.0064) 
ln Assets t-1 0.0019 0.0020 0.0017 0.0019 0.0013 0.0014 
 
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
       Observations 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 1,177,895 
Clusters 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 306,247 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
adj. R-squared 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 
Year FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country-year 
dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
B) All variables are normalised by industry means computed yearly at NACE 4-digits level. 
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Table 4.10: Restricted sample 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep Var: Foreign ownership 
           
ln Profitability t-1 4.604** 3.994* 4.015* 
 
(2.253) (2.312) (2.297) 
ln Labour productivity t-1 -3.180 -0.944 -0.838 
 
(7.433) (7.833) (8.413) 
Interaction t-1 
  
0.182 
   
(3.539) 
ln Employment t-1 2.658 2.637 
  (4.440) (4.429) 
ln Assets t-1  -3.798 -3.792 
  (3.675) (3.673) 
    Observations 759 759 759 
Clusters 268 268 268 
R-squared 0.63 0.63 0.63 
adj. R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.57 
Year FEs Y Y Y 
Country-year dummies Y Y Y 
Industry trends Y Y Y 
Firm FEs Y Y Y 
Notes: A) Firm-level clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. B) All 
variables are normalised by industry means computed 
yearly at NACE 4-digits level. 
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Chapter 5 – Inward FDI and Local 
Innovative Performance. An empirical 
investigation on Italian provinces 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In the current wave of globalisation of the world economy it is widely 
acknowledged that foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a growing and 
primary role (WTO, 1996; Dicken, 2007). UNCTAD (2012) shows that the 
volume of FDI has dramatically risen in the last twenty years, with an 
increase in world FDI inward stock of about 2 millions of dollars to more 
than 20 millions.  
Not surprisingly, policy makers in most countries place great 
emphasis on the potential benefits that may stem from the attraction of 
FDI. The view that attracting foreign subsidiaries of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) will yield great advantages to recipient economies is 
grounded in the belief that some positive knowledge externalities arise 
from foreign activities and spread to domestic firms. Beside of several 
potential benefits, the increase of domestic productivity and the transfer 
of more advanced technology are frequently considered as the main 
rationale for integrating measures of attraction of FDI in local economic 
development policies. In this respect, the idea that knowledge plays a 
fundamental role in the process of growth is deeply rooted in economic 
theory, which assigns a crucial role to innovation and its diffusion in the 
economic performance of nations (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear whether FDI concretely benefits 
recipient economies. Despite the large amount of studies in this field and 
its relevance for public policies, evidence on FDI-induced knowledge 
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externalities remains inconclusive and empirical exercises frequently 
offer mixed suggestions (Smeets, 2008).  
 
By employing Italian manufacturing data to answer the question 
whether inward FDI benefit the innovative performance of recipient 
economies, this paper will attempt to add some new evidence to the 
literature on the impact of FDI. There are a number of elements that 
make this empirical exercise different from the bulk of previous research. 
Firstly, the impact of knowledge externalities associated to FDI is 
investigated on direct measure of innovation, namely, patent data. To the 
best of our knowledge, few papers adopt such an indicator (Cheung and 
Lin, 2004) while the literature is dominated by studies based on broader 
measures of economic performance such as total factor productivity (TFP) 
of domestic firms, labour productivity or growth rate. Secondly, FDI are 
also measured with a direct indicator. Indeed, while most studies use 
several proxies for the presence of foreign firms into the host economy, 
this paper employs the real inflow of foreign capital in Italy. This provides 
a more detailed measure of the actual magnitude of the activities carried 
out by foreign enterprises. Thirdly, FDI-induced knowledge externalities 
are underexplored in the case of Italy, with few notable exceptions 
represented by recent contributions (Castellani and Zanfei, 2003; 2007; 
Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2006). The Italian case is instead very 
interesting for the well-known geographical dualism of the Italian 
economy. Finally, the occurrence of knowledge spillovers is investigated 
along provincial lines (NUTS-3), that is, at a geographical scale that is 
rarely adopted in the literature mainly due to lack of data. This allows 
estimating a more precise effect by reducing the potential ecological 
fallacy39 and also taking into appropriate consideration the existence of 
                                                 
39
 In its simplest definition the ecological fallacy may be interpreted as error of deduction that involves 
deriving conclusions about a certain observation solely on the basis of an analysis of broader group data. In 
the case of this analysis the inference on the impact of FDI on local innovative performance may be 
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spatial disparities in both inward FDI and innovation performance. 
Results reveal that local production systems do benefit from knowledge 
externalities generated by FDI in Italy. Our finding also passes a fair 
number of checks suggesting that local innovative performance relies on 
both internal and external sources of knowledge. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existent 
literature devoted to the economic rationale of the impact of FDI on 
innovation. Section 3 describes data while Section 4 introduces the main 
methodological challenges associated to the estimation of the causal 
effect of FDI on innovation and presents in detail the identification 
strategy adopted. Section 5 discusses the main findings while in Section 
6 the robustness of results is checked. Finally, concluding remarks and 
policy considerations are developed in Section 7. 
 
5.2 Conceptual background and literature 
review 
Traditionally, the literature on FDI spillovers implicitly assumes that 
MNEs have more advanced technology than most domestic firms. Hence, 
the entry of foreign affiliates into an economy is believed to benefit local 
firms by providing them with a number of advantages not available 
domestically, ranging from new technologies to market opportunities. 
The “superiority” of foreign firms has been firstly theorised within the 
industrial organisation literature by Hymer (1976/1960)40. Domestic 
firms have general advantages linked to better information about the 
                                                                                                                                                 
inaccurate if performed at a broader geographical level of analysis for two key reasons due to the extreme 
heterogeneity in terms of structure, composition and absorptive capacities of different local areas 
(Gagliardi, 2015). 
40
 Hymer’s seminal theory is contained in his 1960 doctoral dissertation which was published posthumously 
in 1976.  
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national market, the language and the legal and political system. Thus, 
firms wishing to operate in foreign markets need to overcome domestic 
competition by increasing their efficiency through the acquisition of firm-
specific advantages. These include the capacity to access factors of 
production at lower cost, product differentiation and the availability of 
more advanced knowledge. This initial conceptualisation is further 
supported by Dunning (1980), who theorises the existence of ownership-
specific advantages possessed by some firms that decide to internalise 
them and to locate in foreign markets as a way to maximize their 
productive efficiency in a world of imperfect competition and uncertainty. 
This literature suggests that FDI occurs when firms possess own assets 
and find more profitable to internalise the use of such advantages rather 
than selling or sub-contracting them to other firms. At the same time, 
these firms decide to locate in foreign countries where specific location 
factors allow for a better exploitation of their ownership advantages.  
More recently, but in a similar vein, scholars suggest that MNEs are 
more productive and innovative than domestically-oriented firms 
(Criscuolo et al., 2010). Indeed, it is widely acknowledged that MNEs 
tend to invest large amounts in R&D, generating a notable share of global 
knowledge (Castellani and Zanfei, 2006; Dicken, 2007; McCann and Acs, 
2009).  
Given the alleged superiority of technology and assets of MNEs, it is 
commonly believed that when a foreign subsidiary locates in a new 
market some knowledge spills over to domestic firms. The idea that FDI 
may benefit host economies through spillover effects is empirically 
explored since the 1970s. Early works find a positive relationship 
between the foreign presence in a host economy and the performance of 
domestic firms (Caves, 1974, Globerman, 1979, Blomström and Persson, 
1983).  
Since the 1990s empirical works have increasingly refined along with 
improvements in the quality of data. In general, recent works try to open 
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what Görg and Strobl (2005) call “the black box” of spillover effects from 
FDI. In other words, researchers have started to explore both 
theoretically and empirically a number of specific mechanisms through 
which the presence of foreign activities may benefit domestic firms 
(Blömstrom and Kokko, 1998; Liu et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2001; Saggi, 
2002; Harris, 2009). Research indicates that the nature of these 
channels of knowledge transmission is essentially dual for interactions 
between domestic and foreign firms occur at both intra- and inter-
industry level. Intra-industry (or horizontal) interactions between foreign 
and domestic firms may lead to knowledge leakages through a variety of 
mechanisms. Some scholars suggest that demonstration effects play a 
great role in knowledge transmission whenever domestic firms are 
exposed to the superior technology of MNEs subsidiaries (Castellani and 
Zanfei, 2003; Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and Fontoura, 2007, 
Smeets, 2008; Monastiriotis and Alegria, 2011). Part of the literature 
argues that intra-industry spillovers may be denser in more competitive 
markets. The competitive pressure caused by the entry of foreign firms 
may act as an incentive for domestic firms to use available resources and 
existing technology more efficiently (Blomström, 1989; Wang and 
Blomström, 1992) as well as speeding up the process of adoption of new 
technologies (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). Finally, intra-industry 
spillovers have been analysed looking at labour mobility (Fosfuri, Motta 
and Rønde, 2001) as well as pre-existing regional innovativeness (Huang 
et al., 2012). 
 
Inter-industry (or vertical) interactions between foreign and domestic 
firms appear to be more witting than intra-industry dynamics. As a 
matter of fact, when firms operate in different industrial segments that 
are vertically connected with each other, they can intentionally establish 
backward and forward linkages. From an empirical point of view a 
number of evidences have been provided in support of the existence of 
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valuable inter-industry spillovers working through backward and forward 
linkages (Blalock, 2001, Ernst and Kim, 2002, Crespo and Fontoura, 
2007, Javorcik, 2004, Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2008, 2009, Bitzer et 
al., 2008, Blalock and Gertler, 2008, Markusen and Venables, 1999, 
Castellani and Zanfei, 2006, Crespo and Fontoura, 2007).  
 
Beside this large body of literature, it is worth mentioning that some 
recent contributions highlight that the origin of foreign investment is a 
relevant aspect for a full understanding of FDI-induced spillovers. In fact, 
while it is customary to conceive MNEs as endowed with superior 
knowledge as compared to domestic firms, this is something that is 
intimately connected with the evidence associated to MNEs from 
industrial countries. Nevertheless, in recent years, the growing 
importance of emerging countries in the global arena (e.g. BRICS), is 
accompanied by a spur in FDI originating from developing countries (Luo 
and Tung, 2007). Specifically, MNEs from this group might not be 
endowed with superior technological attributes and, instead, their 
internationalisation strategies in foreign locations (i.e. industrial 
countries) are likely to be oriented towards knowledge augmentation and 
the acquisition of strategic resources (Chen and Chen, 1998; Mathews, 
2002; Luo and Tung, 2007). In this respect, there is some evidence that 
when domestic firms are acquired by MNEs from developing countries, 
the former suffer large decreases in employment, sales and labour 
productivity as compared to takeovers undertaken by MNEs from 
industrial countries (Chen, 2011). 
 
5.3 Data 
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Data used for the analysis is collected from different and 
complementary sources aggregated at provincial level41. Due to the 
nature of the data and, particularly, to the characteristics of our 
dependent variable (i.e. patent data) and main regressor of interest (i.e. 
FDI inflows), the analysis will be restricted to the manufacturing sector. 
All variables are taken in logarithms and averaged across the period 
2001-200642.  
 
Innovative performance - The dependent variable is defined as the 
provincial share of patents on provincial GDP and it is provided by the 
OECD REGPAT database containing detailed patent data at NUTS-3 
level. Despite some well-known limitations associated with the non-
patentability of some inventions, the difficulties in accounting for the 
differentiated degree of novelty of patented products (not all patented 
products are equally ‘new’ and/or valuable) and their potential sectoral 
bias, patent data remains a reliable measure of innovative output since it 
provides comparable information on inventions across different regions 
and a broad range of technological sectors (OECD, 2001; Sedgley and 
Elmslie, 2004). Moreover, it is worth noting that we consider patents 
filled by applicants rather than inventors since MNEs tends to apply for a 
                                                 
41
 Note that we consider 103 provinces over the total number of 107 because of the lack of data on the 4 
more recently-created Sardinian provinces of Olbia-Tempio, Medio Campidano, Ogliastra and Carbonia 
Iglesias. Note also that provinces are administrative areas in Italy rather than functional units. Alternative 
geographies include “Sistemi Locali del Lavoro” that are functional labour markets areas defined based 
commuting flows. However data for these units are more limited and available for much shorter time series. 
In addition to that it is worth noting that the majority of existing studies in Italy adopts either NUTS2 or 
NUTS3 areas as spatial unit of analysis. This facilitates the comparability of results.  
42
 Patent data at the NUTS3 level are in principle available for a longer time series; however data on control 
variables at the provincial level prior to 2001 are unavailable. Even though still relatively limited, the 
coverage of a six year period is a significant improvement on the existent quantitative literature on the 
determinants of innovation in the Italian provinces. All existing studies cover a similar or shorter time span. 
For example Cainelli et al. (2005) looking at the role of social and institutional factors on the innovative 
performance of Industrial districts in Emilia Romagna cover the 2002-2007 period; in a similar vein 
Laursen and Masciarelli (2007), whose analysis is focused on larger geographical units (NUTS-2 Regions), 
still cover a shorter time interval (2001-2003). More specifically related to the impact of FDI on 
productivity in the Italian case, Castellani and Zanfei (2003) use firm level data for the period 1993-1997 
while Castellani and Zanfei (2007) uses a time span 1992-1997. 
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patent from their headquarters, even when a patent is invented in a 
different region (Verspagen and Schoenmakers, 2000). This measure, in 
line with the existing literature, is likely to limit any concern related with 
the noise associated to patent applications filled by inventors who are 
resident in the recipient province and employed in foreign subsidiaries. 
In other words, our measure of innovation does not include the patenting 
activity of MNEs, which would bias our estimation of knowledge 
externalities.  
 
FDI Inflows - Data on inward FDI comes from the Balance of 
Payments of the Bank of Italy. The database provides detailed data on 
financial flows by province and sector. This represents a key advantage 
over the existing literature using indirect proxies for the presence of 
MNEs (e.g. share of foreign employment, share of foreign enterprises) 
instead of direct measures of flow. Figure 5.1 shows the FDI trend for the 
period 2001-2006. The upper left graph plots the national share of FDI 
inflows showing an increasing amount of foreign capital into the Italian 
economy over the whole period. However, when trends by macroregion 
are taken into account it is evident that the national aggregate is driven 
by Northern regions while the contribution of the South remains 
negligible. This preliminary evidence suggests the existence of a relevant 
and significant self-selection of FDI into more productive areas making 
more urgent the need of addressing reverse causality.  
 
[Figure 5.1 here] 
 
Innovative Inputs - Controls for the amount of private investments in 
R&D and the share of graduates in science and technology on total 
population are provided by ISTAT and are available at regional level 
(NUTS-2). 
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Additional Regressors - Further controls include the share of 
employment in manufacturing in each province as proxy for 
specialization, the share of long term unemployment as proxy for the 
characteristics of the local labour market and population density as 
proxy for agglomeration economies. All these additional regressors are 
provided by ISTAT at NUTS-3 level. Furthermore, a full set of macro-
regional dummies defined at NUTS-1 level is included to control for 
unobserved regional characteristics. 
The detailed description of variables used in the analysis is reported 
in Table 5.1. 
 
[Table 5.1 here] 
 
5.4 Methodology 
The estimation of the relationship between FDI and innovation 
implies a number of methodological issues. First of all, it has to be 
considered that the impact of FDI on local innovation is unlikely to be 
recoverable on a yearly basis. The existence of a certain time lag between 
the localization of a new business activity and the emergence of a related 
innovative outcome is perfectly reasonable, both if the impact of FDI 
passes through the innovative activities performed by the new firm and if 
this impact is instead mediated by an externality mechanism. This 
concern is exacerbated by the nature of our innovation variable. Despite 
adopting patent applications43 as key measure for innovative activities, 
the granting procedure may require a certain amount of time before 
being formalized. 
Moreover, the possibility to exploit the panel dimension is prevented 
by an additional consideration. Unfortunately, some of our relevant 
controls, in particular the amount of investments in R&D and the share 
                                                 
43
 Defined as the OECD as the closest data to the inventive process 
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of graduates, are only available at regional level (NUTS-2). This implies 
that a certain degree of measurement error is likely to affect our 
estimation and to lower the credibility of our results. Finally, due to the 
limited time dimension of the panel, ranging from 2001 to 2006, the 
within variation in our sample may be insufficient to identify the effect of 
our regressor of interest (Baltagi, 2005). 
Finally, it is also worth emphasizing that externalities are particularly 
difficult to identify since externalities, by their very nature, “leave no 
obvious paper trail by which they can be tracked or measured” 
(Duranton, 2006, p.26). Nonetheless spatially aggregated measures of 
FDI should provide a better proxy of the total effect over and above its 
direct component (see Moretti, 2004) that in the case of this paper may 
be associated to the innovative contribution of the individual foreign 
subsidiary. 
 
Taking into account all these aspects, the analysis of the impact of 
FDI on local innovation is developed by adopting a between-groups 
approach based on ordinary least squares (OLS). This implies using time 
averages of data for the time interval 2001-2006 (group means)44.  
The estimated equation is defined as a place based Knowledge 
Production Function (KPF) at provincial level (Crescenzi et al., 2013), 
where inward FDI is included as an additional regressor and externalities 
associated to FDI are modelled according to a spatial correlation 
approach. 
The equation of interest will therefore take the following form: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝐼 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (1) 
                                                 
44
 As acknowledged by the existing literature the between-groups estimator is more suitable to address 
issues related to measurement error as compared to standard panel techniques such as random or fixed 
effects estimators. 
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where 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the share of patents by applicant over 
provincial GDP in province i at time t, 𝐾𝑖𝑡is the share of private 
investments in R&D, 𝐿𝑖𝑡 is the share of graduates in science and 
technology, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖𝑡 is our regressor of interest, namely FDI inflow as share 
of provincial GDP, 𝑋 is a vector of provincial controls including the share 
of employment in manufacturing as proxy for specialization, long term 
unemployment share, population density and a full set of macro-regional 
dummies.  
 
Another traditional methodological issue that has been highlighted in 
the existing literature is the potential reverse causality between FDI and 
innovation. Our key hypothesis is that FDI affect local innovative 
performance contributing to enrich the local knowledge-base and 
generating positive spillovers through virtuous cycles of cooperation and 
competition. However, the sign of the relation may indeed be reverse: FDI 
may be more attracted by areas showing successful innovative 
performance since, as profit-maximizing agents, firms may have an 
economic incentive to locate in successful areas and to exploit the 
advantages associated with local favourable conditions. This is a 
particularly relevant concern in the case of MNEs aiming to tap into local 
capabilities and to benefit from local competitive advantages, which 
would imply the risk of overestimating the impact of FDI. On the other 
side, the effectiveness of new financial investments as carriers of novel 
information and best practices may be negatively affected by a local 
environment that is not able to absorb and transform these inputs into 
innovation. This further entails that in the case of deprived areas or 
locations characterized by relevant deficits in terms of local absorptive 
capacities we may underestimate the impact of FDI. As emphasized by 
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previous research in a multilevel analysis the sign of the potential bias is 
not straightforward (Haskel et al., 2007). 
Most recent papers attempt to disentangle the true effect of FDI either 
exploiting GMM techniques (Benfratello and Sembenelli, 2006; Driffield, 
2006; Crespo et al., 2009) or through an IV approach (Haskel et al., 
2007; Crescenzi et al., 2013).  
 
To recover predictions about the genuine causality between FDI and 
local innovative performance we adopt an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach based on the “shift-share” methodology associated with Bartik 
(1991) and recently popularized by a number of contributions in different 
fields (Card, 2007; Moretti, 2010; Overman and Faggio, 2012). To the 
best of our knowledge, this methodology has not been adopted so far in 
the literature on the impact of FDI, mainly due to the nature of proxies 
employed to measure FDI used in the great majority of past studies. This 
instrument uses initial shares of employment by division45 in each 
province and the average amount of FDI inflows at national level between 
2001 and 2006 by division to instrument the amount of FDI that each 
province receives during the same time interval. The rationale behind 
this instrumental variable builds on the idea that in the absence of area 
specific shocks, each province would benefit from a share of national FDI 
inflows proportional to its initial share of employment by division taken 
as a measure of specialization and calculated in 1991. This further 
implies assuming that the location decision of MNEs looks at the 
characteristics of the local production system and tends to be skewed 
toward areas characterized by a greater potential in terms of backward 
and forward linkages, complementarities in production, availability of 
trained labour force and local know how (Saliola and Zanfei, 2005). The 
                                                 
45
 This is defined in terms of 2-digits NACE classification and data refers to the 1991 Census. Note that the 
2-digit dimension has been preferred to more detailed classification in order to account for both broader 
sectoral spillovers. 
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instrument is then expected to be significantly and positively correlated 
with our regressor of interest due to the traditional stability in the 
sectoral specialization of Italian provinces. 
 
More specifically it will takes the following form: 
 
𝐼𝑉_𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖 = ∑ 𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,1991
𝑗
𝑗 × (1 + 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠2001−2006
𝑗 )        (2) 
 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐼2001−2006
𝑗  represents the share of FDI inflows in the 2-digits 
sector j at national level within the period 2001-2006 and 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,1991
𝑗
 is the share of employment in sector j and province 
i in 1991. This implies that the flows of FDI at national level by sector are 
attributed to each province based on the initial degree of sectoral 
specialization.  
 
5.5 Results and discussion 
The main results for our specification of interest are reported in Table 
5.2. 
 
[Table 5.2 here] 
 
Column 1 presents our baseline specification where the innovative 
performance of Italian provinces is regressed on the amount of inputs 
devoted to the innovation process, namely investment in R&D and share 
of graduates in science and technology. As expected, both innovation 
inputs are positively and significantly related to the generation of new 
knowledge.  
Column 3 includes explicitly the regressor of interest, namely the 
amount of FDI as share of provincial GDP, supporting the existence of a 
positive and significant correlation at 1% level with the innovative 
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performance of Italian provinces. Further controls are progressively 
added in the following columns in order to test for the robustness of our 
correlation against the inclusion of potentially relevant variables. 
Regressors for population density as proxy of agglomeration, value added 
in manufacturing as measure of specialization and long term 
unemployment to control for local labour market characteristics are 
explicitly included in columns 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Column 5 also 
adds a full set of macro-regional dummies to rule out the risk of 
unobserved regional characteristics operating at broader geographical 
scale. This is a particularly relevant issue in the case of Italy given the 
traditional north-south divide within the country. 
All the regressors show the expected sign with population density 
significantly and positively correlated to local innovative performance and 
long term unemployment significantly and negatively associated to 
innovation. Interestingly, our control for specialization in manufacturing, 
despite entering our regression as significant and positively related to 
innovation (Tab.2, Col. 4), becomes gradually less significant once 
further controls are included, corroborating our feeling with respect to 
the role played by the traditional north-south Italian dichotomy. Finally, 
it is worth noting that the inclusion of additional controls lower the 
significance of investments in R&D, further supporting the key role of 
external capital (complementing the limited financial capacity of the 
Italian production system based mainly on small and medium 
enterprises) and the availability of an “enabling environment for 
innovativeness” (Glaeser et al., 2010) in fostering local innovative 
performance. 
The regressor of interest, the share of inward FDI, despite the slightly 
decreasing magnitude in the coefficient, remains significant at 1% level 
and positively correlated to innovation in all specifications. 
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In spite of the evidence in favour of the existence of a robust 
correlation between FDI and local innovative performance in the case of 
Italian provinces, it has to be acknowledged that our specification, 
focusing only on the inflow of FDI, may underestimate the potential 
negative effect of foreign disinvestment. The relevance of the latter as key 
control for the investigation of the impact of FDI inflows in specific 
geographical contexts has been rarely investigated within the existing 
literature mainly due to lack of data. Nonetheless, foreign disinvestment 
may weaken the local production system and reduce the intensity of 
localized knowledge externalities. This is a particularly relevant concern 
in the case of Italy where public incentives for the attraction of FDI, 
especially in southern regions, have been extensively adopted without 
taking properly into account their long run sustainability. In order to 
control for this potential negative impact, column 6 includes an 
additional regressor for foreign disinvestment. As expected, it enters the 
estimation with a negative and significant sign, also contributing to 
increase the magnitude of our regressor of interest. This suggests that 
disinvestment may have a second order effect in determining the 
innovative performance of local areas. This evidence is reasonable in light 
of our dependent variable measuring innovation rather than productivity 
or growth. The valuable knowledge externalities arising from FDI are 
likely to be more relevant in the case of new investment bringing into the 
local economy novel distinctive technological capabilities. On the other 
side, disinvestment is plausibly affecting more consistently the strengths 
of the local production system and weakening the intensity of localized 
agglomeration economies. This, in turn, reduces the capability to exploit 
the benefits associated to novel information. 
In order to try to address the potential bias related to additional 
omitted variables and reverse causality we adopt the instrumental 
variable approach previously discussed. Results reported in Column 7 
(Table 5.2) confirm the positive and highly significant correlation (1% 
 194 
 
level) of inward FDI with our dependent variable. Despite being not 
evident in terms of changes in the significance level of our regressor of 
interest, the Hausman test confirms the existence of a substantial bias in 
our OLS estimates that justifies the change in the magnitude of our 
coefficient. A change of 1% in the share of FDI on provincial GDP 
generates a 29% increase in the share of patents application per million 
of inhabitants. In the interpretation of this value it should be borne in 
mind both the scale of our dependent and independent variables46 and 
the nature of our measure of innovation, namely patent applications, 
that are likely to be more representative of the innovative performance of 
large enterprises rather than small and medium firm. Although few 
papers investigate the impact of FDI in the Italian case, the evidence in 
favour of a positive effect of FDI correlates with some recent evidences 
(Castellani and Zanfei, 2003, 2007). Despite that, any comparison on the 
magnitude of the effect remains controversial due to a substantial 
difference in the actual variables employed. Most of the existing studies 
adopting proxy measures for both FDI and local innovative performance 
tend to overlook any further discussion about the actual size of the 
economic effect.  
 
The first-stage estimate reported in Table 5.3 confirms the reliability 
of our instrument, which is significantly correlated with the 
instrumented variable. In addition to that and in compliance with the 
econometric literature on weak instruments (Staiger and Stock, 1997; 
Stock and Yogo, 2005), the F-statistic for the first-stage is reported in 
Table 5.4 showing a value that is generally above both the value of 10 
                                                 
46
 Note that in respect to the existing literature our FDI variable reflects the real amount of capital inflows. 
An average increase of 1% in the share of FDI over GDP is quantifiable in more than 1 million of Euros 
while an increase of 29% in the share of patents over GDP is about 7.46 patents. 
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reported by Staiger and Stock (1997) and the thresholds values defined 
by Stock and Yogo (2005). 
 
[Tables 5.3 and 5.4 here] 
 
5.6 Robustness Checks 
We start checking the robustness of our results by looking at the 
goodness of the instrumental variable approach. Table 5.5 reports our 
2SLS estimation progressively eliminating all the controls. The sign and 
significance level of our regressor of interest remains unchanged 
confirming that its effect on the innovative performance of Italian 
provinces is not driven by model specification. This test may also be 
taken as indirect evidence supporting the validity of the exclusion 
restrictions. 
 
[Insert Table 5.5 here] 
 
Finally, in order to provide further support to the instrumental 
variable approach, the reduced form equation is estimated by means of 
OLS regression of our dependent variable on the instrument and 
exogenous controls (Table 6). As shown by Angrist and Krueger (2001), 
although being poorly informative with respect to the real magnitude of 
the coefficient, the reduced form can be used as additional test to 
determine the sign of the coefficient of interest. The estimation of the 
reduced form equation confirms that FDI is a positive and relevant 
determinant of innovation in Italian provinces. 
 
[Insert Table 5.6 here] 
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The estimation performed in this paper demonstrates to be robust to 
the inclusion of additional significant regressors and to the correction of 
the potential bias associated with the endogeneity of the regressor of 
interest. The instrumental variable approach discussed has showed to be 
strongly correlated to the instrumented variable and not affected by 
issues related to the specification of the model. Nevertheless, there is still 
the possibility that our instrument is correlated with other variables not 
explicitly taken into account in our regression. According to the existing 
literature on the impact of FDI, it is reasonable to assume that our 
instrument for FDI is correlated with a negative competition effect 
provoking the exit of local firms from the market. Despite being 
acknowledged by many existing studies, this issue is rarely explicitly 
addressed in the literature mainly due to lack of data. Nonetheless, a 
negative competition effect due to the entry of MNEs with superior 
technological, managerial and organizational skills (Cantwell and 
Iammarino, 2003) crowding out local firms may impact the structure of 
the local production system weakening local innovative potentials. To 
control for this specific aspect, our instrument has been regressed over 
the provincial share of domestic companies in liquidation. Results 
reported in Table 5.7 rule out any doubts regarding a potential 
systematic correlation with our instrument. 
 
[Table 5.7 here] 
 
Finally, we perform a further check for the robustness of our results 
by considering a dependent variable that is more commonly employed in 
the existing literature, namely, labour productivity47. Results shown in 
Table 5.8 confirm that the key intuition does not change when a more 
                                                 
47
 This is measured as the value added in manufacturing per unit of labour. Data are available at the 
provincial level for 2001-2006 and comes from ISTAT. While labour productivity is widely used in the 
literature, TFP has to be conceptually preferred. However, data on TFP is not available at NUTS-3 level. 
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traditional analytical framework looking at the spillover effects of FDI on 
a measure of productivity is taken into consideration. FDI still exhibits a 
significant and positive sign both in the OLS and IV specification. 
Therefore, this result suggests that the evidence in favour of FDI-induced 
externalities persists also within an empirical setting that is more 
coherent with previous studies. 
 
[Table 5.8 here] 
 
The estimation of the impact of FDI on local innovative performance 
seems to be robust to a number of checks, encompassing the inclusion of 
additional controls and the implementation of the 2SLS estimation to 
address the endogeneity of the regressor of interest. FDI proved to be a 
significant determinant of local innovative performance by enriching the 
knowledge base of Italian provinces and generating valuable positive 
knowledge externalities. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
In the last few decades the attraction of FDI has been placed at the 
core of the policy agenda in both developed and developing countries. 
This centrality in the political debate is supported by the belief that the 
attraction of external resources could benefit recipient economies thanks 
to knowledge externalities arising from the localization of affiliates of 
MNEs endowed with superior technological, managerial and 
organizational skills.  
However, existing academic literature suggests that local economic 
conditions are a crucial pre-requisite for valuable knowledge externalities 
to be successfully captured by local production systems and transformed 
in innovation. 
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So far there is weak consensus on whether knowledge externalities 
associated to FDI benefit systematically the economic and innovative 
performance of host locations. Such an inconclusiveness of the existing 
empirical literature is due to a number of flaws. 
A first point concerns measurement issues associated to the adoption 
of proxies for both FDI and innovative performance. Traditionally, FDI is 
indirectly measured by indicators of foreign presence such as the share 
of employment in foreign firms or the number of foreign firms. These 
variables do not account for the actual size of foreign capital mixing up 
relevant financial investment with minor flows. A second concern regards 
the endogeneity related to the estimation of the causal impact of FDI. 
While early literature generally focuses on the correlation between FDI 
and outcome variables, more recently scholars have paid deeper 
attention to these sources of biasedness. However, there are still few 
attempts to track consistently this issue and more work is needed in this 
direction. 
This paper aims at contributing to the existing debate with new 
evidence and attempts to address both the above mentioned problems. 
Firstly, we adopt a direct measure of FDI consisting of the real amount of 
capital flow in Italian provinces. Secondly, we try to tackle endogeneity 
concerns through IV methodologies. In our empirical exercise, we find 
that FDI contributes significantly to the patenting activities of Italian 
provinces over the period 2001-2006. This finding correlates with similar 
evidence provided by some previous empirical studies.  
Beside of this, it is worth noting that our investigation focuses on the 
gross impact of FDI without disentangling the channels through which 
knowledge externalities affect local economies. It remains in our future 
research agenda the development of a more detailed investigation of the 
mechanisms through which knowledge spills over space. This further 
direction for research will be possible along with improvements in the 
quality of data. An additional limitation of this final chapter also 
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concerns the cross-sectional nature of our data for estimation purposes: 
not including province-level fixed effects, in fact, might introduce an 
estimation bias even in the IV equation, given that unobserved drivers of 
innovation could be correlated with FDI. Although this represents a 
potential issue, we are confident that the impact of this unobserved 
source of heterogeneity is very limited when the exogenous instrument is 
adopted. Therefore, this represents another area for improvement in our 
future research agenda. 
In terms of policy considerations, results suggest that FDI can play 
an important role in fostering local innovative outcomes. Therefore, local 
economies should consider external sources of knowledge as a 
complement to internal generation (Bathelt et al., 2004). This is even 
more relevant considering that a core local input of innovation such as 
private R&D seems to be less important than expected in our empirical 
exercise probably due to the structure of the Italian production system 
based on a great share of small and medium enterprises with a 
reasonably limited financial capacity. Our results are also important in 
light of the well-known historically poor amount of FDI that Italy receives 
annually as compared to other large European countries, such as UK, 
Germany and France. Italy has never adopted any structured policy 
oriented to the attraction of FDI. The empirical evidence provided 
suggests that creating an actual policy of FDI attraction that stimulates 
foreign investors might be a valuable policy option. Clearly, while our 
results suggest that FDI can be beneficial per se, we are obviously 
cautious in arguing that Italian provinces should attract FDI 
irrespectively of local strength and weaknesses in terms of specialization 
of labour force and specialization and competencies of local firms. 
Indeed, the specific profile of local economies have been shown to play a 
strong role in shaping the effectiveness of knowledge externalities arising 
from FDI as demonstrated by the relevance of additional localized drivers 
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of knowledge generation such as human capital and agglomeration 
economies. 
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Figure 5.1: Share of Inward FDI per Macro-Region 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations on Bank of Italy data. 
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Table 5.1: Variables List 
Variable Definition Source Geography Time 
Patents 
Applications to EPO 
(by applicants) 
OECD Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Private R&D 
Share of expenditure 
for private R&D on 
GDP 
ISTAT Regional 
2001-
2006 
Graduates 
Share of graduates in 
science and technology 
on population 
ISTAT Regional 
2001-
2006 
FDI 
Millions in national 
currency 
Bank of Italy Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Population 
Density 
Population on 
provincial surface 
ISTAT Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Employment in 
Manufacturing 
Share of employment 
in manufacturing on 
total employment 
OECD  Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Long Term 
Unemployment 
Share of long term 
unemployed on 
population 
ISTAT Regional 
2001-
2006 
Foreign 
Disinvestment 
Millions in national 
currency 
Bank of Italy Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Firms in 
Liquidation 
Share of firms in 
liquidation on total 
number of firms 
Unioncamere Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Labour 
Productivity 
Value added in 
manufacturing per 
unit of labour 
ISTAT Provincial 
2001-
2006 
Notes: a) Patents, FDI and Foreign Disinvestment variables are weighted by 
provincial GDP, measured in millions of national currency (source: OECD); b) all 
variables are averaged over the period 2001-2006 and enter regressions in log form. 
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Table 5.2: Inward FDI and Local Innovative Performance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dep.Var. Patents OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 
                
Private R&D 0.476*** 0.335** 0.340** 0.188 0.0544 0.0211 -0.0148 
 
(0.154) (0.167) (0.159) (0.161) (0.136) (0.148) (0.172) 
Graduates 0.633** 0.707** 0.674** 0.669** 0.427*** 0.468*** 0.719** 
 
(0.309) (0.300) (0.294) (0.301) (0.154) (0.166) (0.297) 
FDI 
 
0.137*** 0.134*** 0.0993*** 0.0675*** 0.0782*** 0.296*** 
  
(0.0373) (0.0354) (0.0319) (0.0251) (0.0241) (0.0541) 
Population Density 
  
0.311* 0.327* 0.420*** 0.449*** 0.383** 
   
(0.182) (0.177) (0.156) (0.155) (0.173) 
Employment in 
Manufacturing 
   
1.170*** 0.511* 0.505* 0.0385 
    
(0.268) (0.263) (0.259) (0.308) 
Long Term Unemployment 
    
-0.578*** -0.486*** -0.397*** 
     
(0.0805) (0.142) (0.153) 
Foreign Disinvestment 
     
-0.0467** -0.0728** 
      
(0.0185) (0.0321) 
Constant -7.592*** -6.956*** -8.561*** -7.560*** -8.125*** -8.646*** -8.341*** 
 
(0.806) (0.800) (1.377) (1.420) (1.183) (1.189) (1.452) 
        Macro-Regional dummies NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.380 0.489 0.510 0.579 0.684 0.707 0.479 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5.3: First Stage Regression 
  (1) 
Dep.Var.: FDI Inflows OLS 
    
Private R&D 0.0847 
 
(0.4254) 
Graduates -1.1870 
 
(0.8479) 
Population Density 0.0277 
 
(0.4472) 
Employment in 
Manufacturing 1.9674** 
 
(0.9414) 
Long Term Unemployment -0.4595 
 
(0.4398) 
Foreign Disinvestment 0.0798 
 (0.1024) 
IV FDI 4.9374*** 
 (1.2091) 
Constant -1.1380 
 
(3.5854) 
  Macro-Regional Dummies YES 
Observations 103 
R-squared 0.314 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: First Stage Statistics 
Variable F(1, 93) P-Value 
IV FDI  16.67 0.000 
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Table 5.5: Model Specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dep.Var.: Patents 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
              
FDI 0.296*** 0.300*** 0.233*** 0.260*** 0.275*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.0541) (0.0583) (0.0423) (0.0379) (0.0459) (0.0424) 
Private R&D -0.0148 -0.00440 0.00445 0.103 0.195 0.162 
 
(0.172) (0.149) (0.152) (0.175) (0.177) (0.192) 
Graduates 0.719** 0.686*** 0.571** 0.754** 0.754** 0.799** 
 
(0.297) (0.259) (0.231) (0.324) (0.318) (0.340) 
Population Density 0.383** 0.382** 0.362** 0.291 0.283 
 
 
(0.173) (0.172) (0.171) (0.180) (0.186) 
 Employment in Manufacturing 0.0385 0.0209 0.186 0.669*** 
  
 
(0.308) (0.315) (0.276) (0.256) 
  Long Term Unemployment -0.397*** -0.389*** -0.432*** 
   
 
(0.153) (0.111) (0.112) 
   Foreign Disinvestment -0.0728** -0.0731** 
    
 
(0.0321) (0.0324) 
    Constant -8.341*** -8.269*** -7.591*** -7.162*** -7.762*** -6.172*** 
 
(1.452) (1.480) (1.372) (1.513) (1.467) (0.871) 
       Macro-Regional dummies YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.479 0.468 0.546 0.443 0.395 0.324 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5.6: Reduced Form Equation 
  (1) 
Dep.Var.: Patents OLS 
    
IV FDI 1.461*** 
 
(0.384) 
Private R&D 0.0103 
 
(0.143) 
Graduates 0.368** 
 
(0.145) 
Population Density 0.391** 
 
(0.160) 
Employment in Manufacturing 0.621** 
 
(0.254) 
Long Term Unemployment -0.533*** 
 
(0.142) 
Foreign Disinvestment -0.0492** 
 
(0.0188) 
Constant -8.677*** 
 
(1.169) 
  Macro-Regional dummies YES 
Observations 103 
R-squared 0.715 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.7: Market Exit 
  (1) 
Dep.Var.: IV FDI OLS 
    
Firms in Liquidation 0.157 
 
(0.0987) 
Constant 0.654* 
 
(0.355) 
  Observations 103 
R-squared 0.115 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5.8: Inward FDI and Labour Productivity 
  (1) (2) 
Dep.Var: Labour 
Productivity OLS 2SLS 
      
Private R&D 0.0046 0.0031 
 
(0.0198) (0.0201) 
Graduates 0.0355 0.0458 
 
(0.0348) (0.0396) 
FDI 0.0145*** 0.0235** 
 
(0.0053) (0.0103) 
Constant 10.78*** 10.79*** 
 
(0.177) (0.174) 
   Controls YES YES 
Macro-Regional dummies YES YES 
Observations 103 103 
R-squared 0.407 0.385 
 Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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